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Abstract 
In the present era most developing countries and Pakistan in particular are attempting to 
come up with better economic and financial policies as well as more stable governments to 
enhance the prospects of their economies. Pakistan is trying to encourage foreign investment 
through more liberal economic policies, political stability and the maintenance of law and 
order. 
The principal aim of this study is to evaluate the influence of the principal macro-economic 
variables in attracting FDI to Pakistan. One of the principal contributions of this study is to 
include political instability as a potential risk factor in determining the level of FDI in 
Pakistan. As part of this contribution is the construction of political risk indices drawing on 
economic and political chronological events in the country for the period of 1970-2004. 
The empirical analysis indicates that an improvement in the health of economy by raising per 
capita income, lower interest rates (discount rates), and more stable exchange rate, along 
with a stable political environment can affect the short-term flows of FDI and the long-run 
level of FDI. The policy implications are that in Pakistan policy makers in future must take 
into account a wide range of economic and non-economic factors in determining their 
policies towards FDI. 
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Glossary (Islamic Terms) 
al-kharaj bi A financing contract which relates the entitlement to the return on an 
al-daman asset to bearing the risks resulting from its possession. 
bai' al-istisna' A contract of acquisition of goods by specification or order, where the 
price is paid in advance, but the goods are manufactured and delivered 
at later date 
bai' al-salam' A contract of sale of goods where the price is paid in advance and the 
goods are delivered in future. 
bai' bithaman'ajil This contract refers to the sale of goods on deferred basis. It is similar 
to murabahah contract. 
dayn Literally means debt (loan). 
gharar The root word of ghrr denotes description. Bay' al-gharar is an 
exchange in which there is an element of deception either through 
ignorance of goods, the price, or through faulty decription of goods. 
ijarah a contract under which a financial institution purchases and leases out 
equipment required by client for a rental fee. The duration of the lease 
and rental fees are agreed in advance. The ownership rights remain 
with the financial institution. 
mudharabah An agreement made between two parties: one party provides capital 
and the other provides management skills. The ratio of sharing profit is 
agreed in advance. The losses are borne by the capital provider 
(appendix 3.1: 46). 
murabahah The financial institution buys equipment on behalf of client and sells it 
to the client on an agreed profit margin and repayment in installments 
agreed in advance(appendix 3.1: 46). 
musharakah A partnership contract in which both parties provide capital and 
management skills with an agreed profit / loss sharing ratios in 
advance. It is a form of joint venture investment (appendix 3.1: 46). 
riba Literally means and increase or addition. Technically it denotes in a 
loan transaction, any increase or advantage obtained by the lender as a 
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condition of the loan. In a commodity exchange it denotes any 
disparity in the quantity or time of delivery. 
shari'ah Literally, the sari'ah means "the path to water"- the source of all life, 
the clear to be followed and the path which the believer has to tread in 
order to obtain guidance in this world and the deliverance in the next. 
Technically, it means a set of norms, values and laws that govern 
Muslim's lives. 
shirkat-e-mufawadha Equal partnership contracts where capital, profit and loss are shared 
equally (a type of musharakah). 
shirkat-alinan Unequal partnership contracts where any party can participate with 
any proportion (a type of musharakah). 
shirkat-e-sanai This is a form of general partnership business. This partnership is 
formed on the basis of labour, skill and management. This is also 
called Shirkat-as-abdan(partnership in crafts or art), Shirkat-al- 
Amal(on the basis of work) and Shirkat-at-Taqabbul(partnership in 
contracting) (a type of musharakah). 
shirkat-e-wujooh Goodwill-based partnership or credit partnership where business is 
conducted on the basis of goodwill and goods and commodities are 
hired on credit (a type of musharakah). 
shirkat-al-Melk It divided into two parts : 
(a) Shirkat-al-Melk Bil Ekhtiar or voluntary partnership; and 
(b) Shirkat-al-Melk Bil Zabir or involuntary partnership 
(a type of musharakah). 
zahat Alms-giving. Literally it means purification of wealth. Technically, it 
is a taxation system according to sharia'h rules followed by Muslims. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
At the outset of the twenty-first century, most developing countries and Pakistan in 
particular, are struggling to improve the performance of their economies through self- 
reliance and less dependence on foreign aid. One aspect of this policy is to encourage 
foreign investment inflows through more liberal economic policies, political stability 
and strict law and order, to build the confidence of the foreign investors in the potential 
host economies. It is obvious that not only economic and political factors determine 
foreign direct investment [FDI] flows into a country, but there are other considerations 
that foreign investors take into account when making investment decisions concerning a 
specific country. Similarly, policy-makers in the host countries take into account a 
range of economic and non-economic factors while deciding their policies towards FDI. 
Therefore, keeping in view the international non-economic factors, this dissertation will 
look into the effect of the Islamisation of the economy on FDI inflows to Pakistan. 
Abolition of interest charges and payments from the economy has been the subject of an 
ongoing debate for decades in Pakistan. Some political observers and economists 
believe that if the government goes ahead with the proposed abolition of interest, it 
would have disastrous effects on the economy. However, this may lead to more FDI 
inflows to Pakistan, as these are not interest-based transactions, but investments which 
yield profits and which conform to the requirements of Islamic law. In the past, 
however, the process of Islamisation has added to political and economic uncertainty in 
Pakistan, which might have adversely affected the level of FDI inflows. 
The empirical motivation of this thesis is to investigate through the use of quantitative 
time-series methods, the actual and potential effects of Islamisation and other economic 
and political factors on the level of FDI in Pakistan. 
The developments in the world political and investment environment with the increased 
risks of political instability have made it important to investigate their relationship with 
FDI. It is a well-known fact that FDI is supply-determined and is determined by the 
decisions of multinational enterprises. This suggests that the relationship between 
political instability risk and FDI should be envisaged from the perspective of the 
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multinational enterprises. The relationship between political instability risk and FDI can 
also be seen from the perspective of the host countries. 
The answer to the question, as to why FDI mostly happens between developed countries 
not between developed and developing countries in apparent contrast to the neoclassical 
growth model says that capital should flow from capital-rich countries to capital-poor 
countries to earn higher returns, can be found in the high political uncertainty in 
developing countries. Thus, if developing countries want to attract or retain more FDI, 
efforts should be made to increase the political stability in the country. 
Along with the importance of the effects of international investment laws on the 
relationship between political instability risk and FDI, the role of the state in a 
globalizing world should be examined in the sense that the study of the risks from 
political instability could be an important feature of the relationship between politics 
and international economics. This understanding can help the host countries to look into 
the possibilities and limitations of their better political governance. 
To analyse to what extent, and in what way, the rise of political instability could have 
affected FDI stock in the host country, it is worth noting how to shape the qualitative 
information on political instability risk to investigate its empirical relationship to FDI. 
Due to the controversial empirical status of political risk, it has been recognized as an 
additional determinant along with other macro-economic determinants of FDI flows, 
which could dampen FDI flows in the host-country. 
In the light of Pakistan's economic history, the main purpose of this study is to examine 
the macro-economic determinants as well as the impact of political instability risk on 
the flow of FDI. More specifically, an empirical model will be presented, which will 
give an idea of the extent to which the macro economic variables, along with political 
risk index, affect the flow and the stock of FDI in Pakistan. More emphasis will be 
given to the political risk in Pakistan by constructing a political risk index for the period 
1970-2004. There are numerous approaches used for the assessment of political risk 
including event-tree analysis, actuarial techniques or statistical decision theory. For the 
most part, a mixture of subjective and objective approaches dominates corporate 
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attempts to quantify and analyse the host country's political climate. The objective 
approach attaches importance to methodological and procedural solutions to the 
quantification of political risk. The objective approach could therefore be also referred 
to as the method approach. The second approach, known as the subjective approach, 
makes use of qualitative judgment and experience to predict the quantitative evolution 
of the political environment. 
The economic liberalisation in Islamic law is only achieved through an ethical 
implementation of the moral values of Islam. The private and public sector interests are 
controlled through a moral value discipline of the market. The moral system provides a 
criterion for the equal distribution of justice, resources and economic benefits to every 
individual with the goal of social well-being. The Islamisation of the economic system 
is a complete switch over from the conventional system prevailing at present to the 
Islamic Laws. The political will is a necessary condition for the successful 
implementation of the rules and regulations governing the whole legal, monetary and 
fiscal system of the country (Chapra 2002). 
Although much research has been done to show the importance of the Islamic Economic 
System for better resource allocation, income distribution, and stability and growth, still 
there is a lot to study, particularly for a country with an unstable political structure and a 
discouraging law and order situation, which is in the process of switching over from a 
conventional economic and financial system to a full Islamic financial system. Of 
course one can find many valuable examples of empirical work in the Islamic Economic 
literature, however, the effort will be made to develop a model for the specific issues of 
risk under the Islamic modes of investment i. e. equity-based investments (Yasin 1999). 
Despite their better economic and stable political environment, the leading Muslim 
countries have not been able to establish a monolithic political, economic and social 
system. This study will serve as model for other Muslim countries to develop their 
system according to Sharia laws and implement these laws fully to achieve the best 
l results from their investments. 
' See Appendix-1.1,1.2, & 1.. 3 (pages 216-222) 
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This thesis makes three principal contributions to the existing literature. It is the first 
attempt to provide a statistical analysis of FDI in Pakistan, distinguishing between flows 
and levels. This is potentially important because the levels are more important for the 
long-term development of the economy, while the flows are volatile and potentially 
reversible. A second contribution is the computation of political risk indices for 
Pakistan, which can be incorporated into an econometric model of the determinants of 
the level of FDI in Pakistan. The third principal contribution is to develop a 
macroeconomic model of FDI, incorporating political risk as an independent factor, 
inter alia with the other standard determinants of FDI, which is tested using time-series, 
cointegration techniques. This is also the first time-series analysis of FDI in Pakistan, 
since previous studies have used either cross-section or panel data analysis. 
The thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter 2 presents a thorough statistical analysis of FDI flows and levels in Pakistan. 
This will provide the foundation for the time series analysis of FDI flows and will also 
provide an integrated review of economic and political events in Pakistan over the 
sample period and their effects on FDI inflows. 
Chapter 3 outlines the traditional, theoretical motivations for foreign direct investment 
[FDI], drawing on the literature of international trade and portfolio investment. It also 
attempts to extend this analysis to include an analysis of Islamic economic and financial 
concepts of investment2. This analysis suggests that FDI is compatible with Islamic 
financial rules and regulations, since it does not involve the payment of interest. 
In Chapter 4, while focusing upon country risk in general and political risk in particular, 
a review of different risks as an ingredient of political risk is analysed. In this chapter, 
along with a review of the risk rating of Pakistan for the sample period 1970-2004, the 
methodology of political risk indexation is explained and used to develop quantified 
risk indices for Pakistan that are used in later chapters3. 
2 See also Appndix-3.1 (page 55) 
3 See Appendix-4.2 (page 126) & Appendix-4.3 (page 136) 
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Chapter 5 provides a selective review of recent empirical studies of FDI in developing 
countries, along with some sample results, which have used the usual determinants of 
FDI like GDP, the openness of the economy, the interest rate, the exchange rate and the 
inflation rate, as well as political risk factors. These are the determinants which 
contribute to the development of the final model for Pakistan in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 sets out an augmented neoclassical model of the macroeconomic 
determinants of FDI in Pakistan, including political risk, and discusses the 
methodological procedures to be used for the empirical testing of the model. 
Chapter 7 employs ARDL cointegration estimation techniques to generate long-run and 
short-run dynamic versions of the specified model. This empirical examination shows 
that political risk is an important factor influencing inflows of FDI to Pakistan. This 
analysis is developed further by subjecting the political risk indices to sensitivity 
analysis, to see how responsive FDI is to changes in this level of risk. The forecasts of 
the FDI stock have also been derived and analysed through three different scenarios of 
political risk: the Best Case (BC), Most Probable Case (MP) and Worst Case (WC). 
Chapter 8 concludes this study by summarizing the overall findings and the policy 
implications for an improved FDI environment that follow from the future prospects for 
economic and political stability. The concluding remarks are given along with the 
suggestions about the further scope for the use of this research. The final model for 
developing countries in general and Muslim countries in particular, is set out. 
In this thesis, only primary, quantitative, time-series data has been used for most of the 
variables along with a secondary data approach for the calculation of the index of 
political risk from primary, qualitative information. 
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Chapter 2 
FDI in Pakistan: A Statistical Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
"Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as the category of international investment 
that reflects the objective of a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) of 
establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) resident 
in another economy. A direct investment enterprise is defined as an incorporated or 
unincorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor owns 10% or more of the ordinary 
shares or voting power of an incorporated enterprise or the equivalent of an 
unincorporated enterprise" (IMF/ OECD/ UNCTAD 2003: 231). 
Foreign investment, especially direct investment by multinational firms (FDI), is 
believed to be a major contributor to economic growth for developing countries 
(Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford 1996). 
FDI is considered desirable because it can add productive resources to a country, often 
bringing with it new technology and training for workers - as well as much-needed 
capital. FDI inflows represent the largest net resource flow into the developing countries 
(UNCTAD 2003: 4). After many years of apprehension, developing countries have in 
recent years shown strong interest in attracting such investment, but multinational firms 
(MNCs) may be wary of placing their capital in such countries due to the economic and 
political instability (Vernon 1971). 
As Froot (1993) noted, FDI (the purchase by a domestic resident of a controlling stake 
in a foreign company) actually requires neither capital flows nor investment in capacity. 
Conceptually, FDI is an extension of corporate control over international boundaries. 
Once the MNC undertakes a foreign direct investment, some bargaining power 
inevitably shifts to the host country because the investment is by definition not perfectly 
mobile and depends upon local property rights (Maskus, 1997). An additional feature of 
FDI flows is that the share of FDI in total inflows is higher in riskier countries, as 
measured either by countries' credit ratings for sovereign debt or other indicators of 
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country risk (see chart 2.1). There is also some evidence that the FDI share is higher in 
countries where the quality of corporate governance institutions is lower. 
One explanation is that FDI is more likely, compared with other forms of capital flows, 
to take place in countries with missing or inefficient markets. In such settings, foreign 
investors will prefer to operate directly instead of relying on local financial markets, 
suppliers or legal arrangements (Razin 2002). Kindleberger (1969) suggested that, in 
order to think about FDI, we must ask not why capital might flow into a country, but 
rather why some particular asset would be worth more under foreign than under 
domestic control. 
Given the competition for FDI among developing countries, countries wishing to attract 
inward FDI must therefore find ways to reassure private investors that their investments 
are secure and will prosper. 
2.2 FDI Global Trends: Stocks and Flows 
Foreign direct investment can be measured as a stock (or level) at a point in time or as a 
flow over time. These are equivalent to the domestic notion of the capital stock of the 
country and the flow of investment. 
Foreign direct investment flows are made up of three basic components: first, equity 
capital comprising equity in branches, in subsidiaries and other capital contributions 
such as provisions of machinery. The second is reinvested earnings, consisting of the 
direct investors' share of earnings not distributed as dividends by subsidiaries or 
associates and earnings of branches not remitted to the direct investor. The third 
category of FDI flows can be defined as other direct investment capital covering the 
borrowing and lending of funds, including debt securities and trade credits, between 
direct investors and direct investment enterprises and between two direct investment 
enterprises that share the same direct investor (Falzon 2000). 
On the other hand, the FDI stock represents the direct investment position on a 
historical-cost basis, that is, the amount of investment already in the host country as 
opposed to the flow of capital into the host country in a given year. According to the 
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IMF (1993), the difference between the stock at the beginning of the year and its value 
at the year-end must be equal to the flow recorded in the Balance of Payments, which 
reflects the transactions on these assets or liabilities that actually took place; plus the 
change in the value of the stock induced by swings in the exchange rate; plus the change 
caused by alterations in the price of the related assets or liabilities; plus other changes in 
the volume of financial assets and liabilities as summarized below. If AS, is the value 
of stock at the end of period t, then the change in the value is: 
O(PrS't) = SfOP! + PlOS'f 2.1 
where A is the first difference operator. The valuation effect can be divided between the 
exchange rate and the foreign price level so: 
A(PrSt) = S, [AEP * +EOP*J + PrASr 2.2 
where, 0(P, S, ) is the change in the nominal stock, St[DEP * +EAP*] is the revaluation 
of existing stock due to exchange rate and price level changes, and P, OS, is the now of 
new investment in period t. Chart 2.1 shows how this disaggregating change in the 
nominal FDI stock is apportioned between new flows and revaluations effects, with new 
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FDI flows predominant. Chart 2-1 also shows that there has been a generally positive 
trend in FDI inflows into Pakistan over the sample period. In the following sections, 
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these will be explained in relation to the FDI flows and stock around the globe in 
general and with those into Pakistan in particular. 
The FDI stock in Pakistan remained very volatile due to specific political factors and a 
volatile exchange rate. The re-valuation effects of a volatile exchange rate, however, did 
not seem to have any major effect on the stock of FDI, but the political instability and 
the major change in policies do seem to have important effects. The stock of FDI went 
down by 88% during 1981-85 due to the nationalization policy of the government in 
1973 showing effects in the early 1980's. It again started building up after 1985 due to 
the new regime's privatisation policies after 1977 and grew up to 400% until 1996-2000 
since, despite the changes in government; the major policies remained the same. The 
sharp rise in FDI stock in 1996-2000 was due to the foreign investment in controversial 
independent power-generation plants, which gave an indication of political corruption. 
The stock of FDI fell sharply by 73% during 2001-06 due to a number of different 
reasons including: the freezing of foreign currency accounts in 1988, the change in 
government through a military coup, the 9/11 terrorist activities in the USA, regional 
political factors and exchange rate volatility and the sharp rise in inflation (see Table 
6.7). The region's growing economies like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives also 
developed more liberal policies to attract FDI, which became an added factor, along 
with the other factors above, to divert international investment to more secure regions in 
terms of politics, exchange rates and stable, growing economies. 
2.2.1 FDI Stock 
The FDI stock represents the direct investment position on a historical-cost basis, that 
is, the amount of investment already in the host country as opposed to the flow of 
capital into the host country in a given year. The indicator is a composite figure and its 
movements are influenced by factors in addition to foreign investment into a country. 
These factors are broadly the US dollar exchange rates used to calculate FDI stock (at 
year-end exchange rates) and GDP (at average for the year exchange rates), and the 
relative size of GDP between countries. It should be noted that the inconsistency in the 
application of exchange rates used for translating stocks of FDI and GDP into US 
dollars from national currencies can influence the ratio of FDI to GDP and significantly 
alter the rankings. 
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The world inward FDI stocks have skyrocketed over the past two decades from $480 
billions in 1970 to $8,902 billions in 2004 (see Table-2.5). Though the world FDI is 
very unevenly distributed, all regions have shown an increasing inward FDI stock (see 
Chart-2.2). This trend was probably sparked off by the increasingly rapid tendency 
towards globalization in the world economy and the privatization and denationalization 
of government-owned assets. Given the fact that the USA, France, Germany, Japan and 
the UK have been responsible for nearly 60% of FDI flows worldwide, the stock of FDI 
is always affected by the cyclical economic movements in the developed countries 
(Arbenser 2003). 
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Despite a considerable growth from 3% to 12% in FDI stocks in the period 1970-2004 
(see chart-2.3), Pakistan still struggled to achieve a significant share of FDI stock as 
compared to the other South Asian countries (see Table-2.7). As the stock is dependent 
on the inflows to a country along with the revaluation affect, the foreign investors did 
not prefer to reinvest their earnings in the projects. This could be due to companies 
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availing themselves of the facility for 100% profit repatriation along with the 
uncertainty of political institutions. 
Despite a substantial growth rate of FDI stock in the world [3%-12%], developed 
countries [5%-15%], developing countries [2%-5%], Asian countries [0.49%- 3%] and 
the South Asian region [0.44%-5%] during 1970-2004, Pakistan faced fluctuations in its 
growth rate which was 1% for 1970-74,5% for 1975-79,0.08% for 1980-84,18% 
during 1985-1989,23% during 1990-94,17% during 1995-99 and down to 1.2% during 
2000-04. 
These fluctuations could be due to different economic and political reasons in the region 
in general and in Pakistan itself in particular (see chart 9). A substantial growth in FDI 
stock could only be recorded for the period 1985-2000 due to the government of 
Pakistan's investment policies in the liberalization of the economy and also substantial 
FDI inflows with 26% of the total FDI inflows coming during 1994-2000, particularly 
in independent power generation (see Table 2.4, sector-utilities). The positive growth 
rate did not last long and dropped to minusl2% in 2001 due to the change of political 
events in the globe in general and the South Asian region in particular. Pakistan was the 
most affected part of region in FDI flows due to the terrorist threats to Western interests 
after the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks on the US. The USA and Western 
developed countries like the UK, France, Germany and Italy are the major contributors 
of foreign direct investment into Pakistan providing more than 50% of FDI inflows on 
Table 2.3(page 33). 
Pakistan has been able to attract its main FDI investors from the US and the western 
world due to its cooperation with the US war on terrorism and was able to reach 1.21% 
for 2000-04 because FDI inflows grew during 2003-04 by 60 % on Table 2.2 (page 32) 
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2.2.1.1 FDI Stock Trends in South Asia 
Although the South Asian region has not been able to get a substantial share of the 
world FDI stock, Pakistan has been able to achieve a better share of FDI stock, nearly 
50% of the total FDI stock for 1980-1995, due to better liberal policies on FDI flows 
along with a more stable political situation and better economic growth of 4%-10% for 
1980-1995. In 1992, the Pakistan government also introduced more facilities for foreign 
investors through its investment policy. Foreign investors also became more interested 
in the government's privatization and denationalization policy and a substantial 
investment was made in independent power projects to fulfil the electricity needs of the 
growing Pakistani economy during 1980-1995. 
This trend did not last for long as the sudden regime changes destabilized the political 
institutions and foreign investors' confidence. India and Bangladesh became a safe 
heaven for foreign investors due to low labour costs and also a much more stable 
political environment. So during 1990-2004, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka saw a 
substantial growth in FDI stock due to FDI inflows and more stable economies, political 
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institutions and foreign exchange rates. During 1995-2004 they achieved a share of the 
total FDI stock in excess of 75% (Table 2.8). 
1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 
Years 
1995-99 2000-04 
10 Afghanistan   Bangladesh 0 Bhutan 0 India 0 Nepal   Pakistan 0 Sri Lanka 
2.2.1.2 FDI Stock Trends in Pakistan 
Despite political and economic turmoil, FDI stock in Pakistan showed quite steady 
growth of 1.00 %-4.49% during 1970-79. Despite a politically stable and elected 
government and a lowering of the political risk index to just above 50% during 1970-77, 
Pakistan was not able to attract FDI due the nationalization policy of the newly elected 
government after a long period of political unrest from 1965 to 1970 (Appendix 4.2(A)). 
After the change of regime in 1977, the military dictator reversed the previous 
government's nationalization policy to attract more FDI. The change in the policy of 
nationalization to denationalization and privatization showed very encouraging results 
and the flow of FDI reached an average growth of 18% during 1980-88 in the form of 
greenfield FDI (Table-2.2). This substantial growth in FDI flows to Pakistan and the 
successful implementation of the privatization policy helped in building up FDI stock in 
the country. The regional political events like the Russian invasion of Afghanistan 
during 1986 and the United States' alliance also became helpful for a country like 
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Pakistan to attract the attention of western investors. The trend of positive growth 
continued until 1995 and reached 24% growth, the biggest ever in the South Asian 
region despite three consecutive changes of governments during 1990-1995. 
The rapid changes of government affected foreign investors' confidence in the long run 
and they diverted their attention to India and Bangladesh due to more stable political 
governments, stable economies and lower labour costs. Pakistan once again was hit and 
the FDI flows fell by a substantial percentage reaching a negligible level as compared to 
other countries in the South Asian region. The significant FDI flow in the independent 
power projects, 26% of the total FDI inflows, helped Pakistan to retain a level of 17% 
for 1995-99 but this was still appreciably lower than India and Bangladesh (Table 2.8). 
The major reason for the decrease in the stock of FDI could be the Pakistan 
government's investment policy in 1992, which facilitated the foreign investors' 
repatriation to their country of origin of 100% of their profits. The foreign investors, 
who were already shaken due to the freezing of foreign currency bank accounts (1998), 
took the benefit of this investment policy and did not reinvest their earnings further in 
the running plants and projects. 
The growth in the stock of FDI during 1999-2004 remained very slow due to the 
military take-over after the destabilization of the political government in September 
1999. This action again worried foreign investors who were concerned for the viability 
of their contracts and property rights and the investors once again took flight to more 
stable countries like India, Bangladesh and particularly China. 
The chart (2.5) below gives the detailed joint picture of FDI flows (blue) and FDI stock 
(blue+ red). Note that the stock of FDI in the current year is the flow of FDI in the 
current year added to the stock of the previous year. 
As Pakistan's economy started witnessing a visible turnaround starting in 1985, foreign 
investors have once again shown readiness to put their capital into business concerns in 
Pakistan, a country they practically shied away from during the last decade. In 2004-05, 
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Pakistan had already attracted over $1.5 billion FDI, a significant improvement as 
compared to $949.4 million in 2003-04. 
Chart-2.5 
10000 , 
1000 
2 
0 
i100 
N 
10 
I 
Trends: FDI Flows & Stock in Pakistan 1970-2004 
ýoe 
'` 
ýoý_ K0ý1ý mi, ob'e "Ze N oý , ýooti Koý %oýfO ýoý Kaý , ýýk ýý oý' , 
ýl'ý .ý 
Years 
I  Flows   Stock 
op ryýti #I 
2.2.2 FDI Flows 
Global FDI inflows rose modestly in 2004 following large declines in their value in 
2001 (41%), 2002 (13%) and 2003 (12%). At $648 billion in 2004, they were 2% higher 
than in 2003. This growth reflected an increase of flows to developing countries, which 
rose by 40% ($233 billion) as compared to 2003 and their share reached 36% of the 
total flows of global FDI, the highest since 1997 (UNCTAD 2005: 1). 
This section documents the fact that developing regions are leading the recovery in FDI 
flows. In 2002, roughly $651 billion of FDI inflows occurred, and this amount was 
reduced from the peak in 2000. Growth in FDI has also been strong, exceeding 20% 
annually since the 1980s with a surge of over 30% in the late 1990s (UNCTAD 2003: 3). 
Despite the liberalisation of investment policies (see annex 1) throughout the world, in 
developing countries in general and in Pakistan in particular, declining trends in FDI 
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flows during 2000-2003 from 30% to minusl5% were still seen. The developing 
countries in Asia, South Asia and Pakistan have shown signs of recovery with an overall 
positive growth of 9% (1970-2004) (UNCTAD 2004 & 2005). 
Global inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) declined in 2003 for the third year in 
a row, to $560 billion (table 1). This was prompted again by a fall in FDI flows to 
developed countries: at $367 billion, they were 25% lower than in 2002 (table 2). 
Worldwide, a fall in flows by 82% was seen during (2000-2004). It was only 
developing countries as a group that experienced a recovery, with FDI inflows rising by 
9%, to $172 billion overall. 
Although most FDI still occurs between developed countries, developing countries have 
experienced large inflows as well. Despite an overall strong upwards trend, we have 
seen striking differences, not just across countries but also in the timing of FDI flows 
into a given developing country. 
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2.3 FDI to developing countries 
Developing countries, emerging economies and countries in transition increasingly see 
foreign direct investment (FDI) as a source of economic development, modernization 
and employment generation, and have liberalized their FDI regimes to attract 
investment. 
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The participation of developing countries in the total inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has varied considerably over the last 25 years, increasing from 15% in 
1980 to 46% in 1982 and levelling off at slightly over 20% during the last four years. 
In recent years, however, the increase in FDI flows to developing countries turned out 
to be higher than the increase in FDI flows to developed countries. Average annual FDI 
flows to developing countries soared eight-fold, when comparing 1982-1987 and 1994- 
1997. They had remained relatively stable during the crisis years of 1995-1997, but 
dropped during 1997-1998 and dropped further during 1998-2002 from 25% to 23%. 
However, after 2002, the developing countries recovered and attracted a share of 31 % 
during 2000-2003. As a result, developing countries attracted almost one-third of world- 
wide FDI flows recently (Nunnenkamp 2002). 
FDI flows also retained their upward trend until 2004, after three consecutive declines, 
with UNCTAD estimating a6 percent increase to US$612 billion globally, and a 48 
percent increase to US$255 billion in the case of developing countries. At US$ 648 
billion, global FDI inflows were 2% higher than in 2003. Flows to developing countries 
surged by 40% to reach US$ 233 billion in 2003. Some 36% of all FDI went to 
developing countries in 2003. 
Among developing regions, the largest increase in inward FDI was noted in Asia and 
Oceania (46%), followed closely by Latin America and the Caribbean (44%), while 
flows to Africa remained stable. The top five FDI recipients among developing 
countries were China; Hong Kong (China); Brazil; Mexico; and Singapore (for 
individual regional trends in FDI see UNCTAD-2005). 
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2.4 FDI Inflow Trends to Pakistan 
Pakistan was basically an agricultural economy upon its independence in 1947. Its 
industrial capacity was negligible except for processing locally-produced, agricultural 
raw material. This made it imperative for succeeding governments to improve the 
country's manufacturing capacity and increase economic growth along with agricultural 
output. In order to achieve this objective, however, changing types of industrial policies 
have been implemented at different times with a changing focus on either the private 
sector or the public sector. During the 1960s, government policies were aimed at 
encouraging the private sector while during the 1970s the public sector was given the 
dominant role. In the 1980s and 1990s, the private sector was again assigned a leading 
role. Especially during the decade of the 1990s, Pakistan adopted liberal, more market- 
oriented policies and declared the private sector the engine of economic growth. 
Moreover, Pakistan has also offered an attractive package of incentives to foreign 
investors. 
The government of Pakistan issued an Economic Reforms Order (1972) taking over the 
management of ten major categories of industries, commercial banks, development 
financial institutions and insurance companies. There was another round of 
nationalization of small-sized agro processing units during 1975. The sudden shift 
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towards the nationalization of the private sector industrial units shattered private 
investors' confidence and FDI inflows plunged to negative values (Table 2.1). 
Pakistan actively seeks foreign investment. Three distinct government investment 
liberalization initiatives begun in 1992,1997 and 2004 have progressively opened 
Pakistan to foreign investment, offering broad arrays of incentives to attract new capital 
inflows. Notwithstanding this pro-investment stance, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
activity still remained relatively modest during 1990-2004. Despite the fact that FDI in 
fiscal years 2003 and 2004 jumped 19% and 60% to US$ 949 US$ 1,524 million 
respectively, this level remains far below Pakistan's target. 
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2.4.1 FDI Share by Country 
FDI flows into Pakistan originating in developed countries dominated from 1981 till 
2004 (chart 4). The US and UK have been major sources of FDI in Pakistan, although 
the shares of both the US and the UK have fluctuated widely, falling to below 8.8% in 
1983 for the US and 4.7% in 1986 for the UK and rising as high as 63.7% and 35.2% 
respectively for 1991 and 1996/1999 for the US and the UK. The share for the US has 
been, by far, the largest of all the countries. Since 1998, however, the UK share has 
become equal to the US FDI share. The FDI share from US dominated for 20 years 
followed by the UK 12.9%, the UAE 11.6%, Japan 5.7%, and Germany 5.4%. During 
the post reform era, the US share of FDI rose to 42% as compared with the UK 12.3%, 
Japan 6.4%, Germany 5.4%, and the UAE share of 4.7%. It can be noted that the major 
emerging global investor for the period 1990-1999 was Japan, which averaged $28 
million and has annually invested in Pakistan $32 million (approximately 0.1% of net 
FDI flows]) for the same period (Table 2.3) 
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2.4.2 FDI share by sector 
Having examined the trends of FDI, it is worthwhile to review its overall sectoral 
distribution pattern. This analysis may reflect three things; firstly it may reflect the 
preferential treatment given by the government of Pakistan to certain sectors during the 
process of encouraging FDI; secondly, it may also indicate the foreign investors' own 
interest; and thirdly the demand for the product due to the gap between the demand and 
supply. 
The information presented in table 2.4 as revealed from the State Bank of Pakistan and 
BOI Pakistan (2000), shows the changes in FDI stock as percentage of regional FDI 
stocks over the past 20 years. Communication, mining and commerce dominated the 
sectoral inflows of FDI during 2000-2004 by taking an average 26% share of the total 
FDI flows into Pakistan during that period. 
Despite international investors' interest in the petroleum sector during 1987-1994 with 
an investment of 45% of the total investment, the investors became interested in the 
generation of private power due to the rise in the gap between the demand and the 
supply of power (electricity). The main body responsible for the electricity supply, 
WAPDA, had insufficient resources to fill this gap so the government gave incentives to 
the investors to come forward and fill the gap through private power generation plants. 
WAPDA agreed to purchase the power generated by these projects. So during the 
period 1995-1996 there was huge FDI in this sector, which raised the FDI total figure to 
$1.3 billion. 92% of the FDI flow was invested individually by the Hubco Corporation 
during 1994 (Table 2.4). 
During 1996-2000, the utilities sector, including investment in the power sector, 
dominated the inflows by taking 71% of the total share of FDI flows. The domination of 
the power sector was helped by policies (1996) to attract foreign investment in private 
power generation in order to control the shortage of power supply to industrial units. 
Manufacturing industries, mining and quarrying, and commerce attracted most of the 
FDI during the period 1980-1994. The FDI flow to these sectors was noted as over 83% 
of the total FDI but, over the time period, a downward trend was seen which kept on 
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falling from 75% in 1982 to 26% in 1983 with a rise to 54.7% in 1984. The 
manufacturing industry share rose from 11% during 1987-1993 and had a reasonable 
rise to 35% in 1994. 
The sharp increase of FDI in the commerce sector during 1992-1994 is mainly due to 
the inflow in the financial services sub sectors (Khan 1999). Being an agrarian-based 
economy with the largest part of GDP coming from the agricultural sector, so after the 
rift between the independent power projects and the government of Pakistan on the 
tariff issue, the investor turned towards the agricultural sector and a rise in the FDI 
share has been monitored during 1996-1999. At present this sector is dominating the 
FDI distribution. Despite a 36.1% share of the FDI in 1999 for agriculture, forestry, 
hunting and fishing, the overall share during the decade 1990-1999 remained very low 
at 7.99% of the total as compared to the share of agriculture to the overall GDP of the 
country (Table 2.4). 
The power sector also showed the declining trend during the last two years 2002-2003 
soon after the change in the government in 1999. The drop in the FDI share in the 
power sector indicates less interest by international investors in the power sector. 
Commerce remained the dominating sector during the last decade, 1990-2005, with an 
average 21.66% share of FDI. This was probably due to the privatization of the banking 
sector. Many foreign financial institution groups from the Gulf entered putting their 
share of the FDI into the purchasing of the nationalized banks (Table 2.4). 
Despite its domination during the last two years of the 1990s, the power sector remained 
third in the overall share of FDI. The Government gave more incentives to the 
companies in mining and oil exploration, which attracted foreign investment into this 
sector. Also, the tariff rift between the Government and the independent power plants 
caused the investors to become more interested in mining and oil prospecting and 
extraction. 
Inflows of FDI into the prioritised power sector have dominated for the years 1990-95, 
but during 1996-99 its share has declined from 28% 1998 to 14.3% in 1999-2000. The 
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report (Daily Star 2000) concludes that the fall in the share of power is due to over- 
saturation in this sector. The chemical, pharmaceutical and fertilizer sector has emerged 
as the single largest recipient of FDI flows and it has improved its share in FDI from 
11.2% in the fiscal year 1998-99 to 28.3% during 1999-2000. The tremendous increase 
in FDI flows in this sector is because of the commissioning of ICI's PTA Plant and 
FFC-Jordan's fertilizer unit near Karachi, the Daily Star economic report noted. The 
implementation of the National Mineral Development Policy announced in 1995, which 
was aimed at attracting foreign investment to fill the gap between resources and 
investment, remains slow. However, it has succeeded in attracting a number of 
multinational companies (MNCs) currently engaged in examining prospects for the 
exploration and development of precious and base metals in Pakistan. FDI in the 
Mining and Quarrying sector has increased by 50% during 1997-98, but since then it 
has started declining. Its share of the total FDI inflow, however, peaked at 17% in the 
fiscal year 1998-99, but during July-April 1999-2000, it had declined to 15.2 per cent 
(Daily Star, 2000). 
Three sectors mining and communications attracted most of FDI during 2001-02. 
Mining & quarrying and oil & gas continued to be the preferred area for foreign 
investment in Pakistan during 2001-02, mining sector attracted 25% and 
Communications attracted 16% of total FDI flows to Pakistan. The increasing flow of 
foreign investment in the field of mining & quarrying and oil & gas is driven by the 
policy measures taken by the government. This provided an impetus to exploration of 
oil and gas, which was largely ignored in the past. With the revival of Saindak copper 
project and further exploration of Lakhra coal reserves, the chances of attracting more 
foreign investment are brighter (SBP-2001). 
The improvement in the FDI inflows in the communication sector is to be seen in the 
context of fiscal relief given in the Federal Budget and follow-up steps for the 
promotion of information technology and software development in the country. The 
subsequent unveiling of the IT policy and IT exhibitions were held to attract foreign 
investors. Policy measures initiated during 2001 mainly included duty-free imports of 
computer hardware and accessories, reduction of duties on software exports, tax 
incentives to IT institutions, drastic reductions in Internet tariff for ISPs etc. Textiles, 
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electronics and construction have also shown an improvement in attracting FDI during 
the year (SBP-2001). 
Globally, foreign direct investment (FDI) fell by 17 % during 2002; this was the second 
time that these flows decline, reaching the lowest level for the last five years. The key 
reasons for this slowdown include: (1) relatively poor economic performance in major 
economies, (2) non-satisfactory performance of stock markets, and (3) drastic political 
changes in the world. Interestingly, according to World Investment Report 2003, 
Pakistan was amongst the few countries that succeeded in attracting increased FDI in 
both 2001 and 2002. The significant improvements in macroeconomic fundamentals 
and better credit rating are probably some major reasons for this divergent trend (SBP- 
2002). 
During 2002-03, the financial sector took the lead over other sectors and attracted 31 % 
of the total inflows, which is due to sale proceeds from privatization of UBL in July- 
2002. The mining and quarrying sector attracted 24% of the total FDI flows, the UK 
based FDI was largely in oil & gas exploration, that from the USA was also 
concentrated in the mining and communications. The communication sector remained 
the third most attractive sector as investments from US and UAE during 2002-03. This 
increase in FDI during 2004 was relatively broad-based, with almost all sectors 
witnessing an increase. But the most significant flows were due to privatization and 
deregulation in telecommunications and financial sectors (Table 2.4). While partial 
receipts of the HBL privatization and expansion in Islamic Banking during 2004 pushed 
up FDI under financial sector, FDI in communications was attributable to the 
privatization of PTCL, entry of two new cellular companies, and introduction of new 
technologies like WLL service. Excluding these transactions the growth in FDI during 
FY05 was small. FDI during 2004 is much higher due to the receipts on account of 
PTCL privatization, as well as the entry of new Islamic banks (SBP-2003). 
This is a reflection of: (1) a successful liberal regime to attract foreign investment; (2) 
improved macroeconomic fundamentals; (3) appropriate amendments in laws and 
regulations governing FDI; and (4) the implementation of effective reforms to improve 
governance. This is reflected in the country's improved performance in attracting FDI 
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from 19% in 2003 to 60% in 2004. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the country's 
record in terms of attracting FDI, is still relatively poor, and therefore Pakistan still has 
a lot to do, in order improve the domestic business environment (Table 2.4). 
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2.5 Events Influencing FDI flows (1970-2004) 
With a history of political and economic turmoil, Pakistan had many ups and downs in 
the flows of FDI during the period 1970-2004. To give a brief graphical and statistical 
analysis of the shocks to FDI flows in the context of political and economic 
developments (1970-2004), a brief view of government policies and the effect of 
religion on future policies is presented in the following section, which will enable us to 
understand the effect of the Islamic status of Pakistan in the making of policies to attract 
foreign investment. 
The FDI profile has been fluctuating and has been seriously affected by a number of 
factors like state policy, political instability in the country, (Pakistan stayed at the edge 
of the precipice during the 1990s), and the law and order situation which has needed 
considerable improvement, particularly in Karachi, the hub of commercial activity and 
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the industrial lifeline of the country. The local business environment, labour force, 
quality of life, infrastructure development, monetary policies and relations with IFIs, 
including the WB and IMF, have also affected FDI in one way or another (Qazi 2000). 
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While elaborating a number of reasons, which have contributed to the decline of FDI 
during the past three to four years, three factors are conspicuous. They are political 
instability, the law and order situation, the policy dictates of security imperatives and 
regional conflict. Since 1986-1999, the international community has witnessed four 
consecutive changes of short duration governments of Pakistan. The Pakistan Muslim 
League government in 1997-98 closely scrutinized the decisions of the Pakistan 
People's Party government in 1996, which had succeeded in taking FDI to its peak 
because of investment in independent power projects. The contracts signed by the 
Pakistan People's Party government were alleged to have involved huge kickbacks. The 
contracting parties were asked to lower the tariff because Pakistan was to buy electricity 
at a high rate. The row over the tariff rates between WAPDA and HUBCO took a 
26/240 
serious turn and the issue was still unresolved in 1998. This has adversely affected the 
scope of FDI in the country. 
The other two major episodes are the nuclear explosions in 1998 and the Kargil conflict 
in 1999 both of which had a negative effect on FDI because both the episodes conveyed 
negative perceptions about Pakistan to the Western countries, investors and IFIs. It can 
be appreciated that the USA, the UK, Holland, Germany, the UAE and Japan were in 
1998 the top six countries, which made reasonable FDI in Pakistan. Since then their 
involvement has been on the decrease because of inter-state relations, basically due to 
changed perceptions of foreign policy objectives. 
FDI to Pakistan also showed a downward trend due to the decrease in South Asia as a 
whole where FDI decreased from $4.9 billion in 1997 to $3.2 billion in 1999, a shortfall 
of $1.7 billion or 34 per cent, due to political instability in the region. India and 
Bangladesh like Pakistan also faced the effect of a declining share of FDI after 
registering peak investments of $3.8 billion in 1997 and $380 million in 1998 
respectively. 
Steady movement towards liberalization, deregulation, and privatization has long 
characterized Pakistan's investment policy, since 1992 it has been generally recognized 
as one of the most favourable in the region. The policy direction has been consistent, 
market-led and business-friendly. 
All industries are open to investment without government permission, except four 
specified industries, which are Arms & Ammunition, High Explosives, Radioactive 
Substances, Security Printing, and Currency or Mint. 
The policy was designed for the liberalization of the service, infrastructure, social and 
agriculture sectors for foreign investment. Industrial, infrastructure, and social sectors 
are open to 100 percent foreign ownership. Services and agriculture have an upper limit 
of 60 percent foreign ownership (100 percent foreign equity is allowed in services for 
the first five years) and complete freedom of choice on the location of activities. The 
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policy also gave the incentives of full repatriation of capital, profits and dividends from 
all activities. Royalty, technical, and franchise fee payments are allowed for all sectors 
as are the duty-free import of machinery for high technology, value-added, export 
industries and the corporate and agriculture sectors. Generous fiscal incentives, tariff 
incentives, full duty exemptions and, for registered agricultural companies, duty 
reduction to 10% on PME imports for other priority industries, service, infrastructure, 
and social sector projects are allowed. Tax relief (first-year allowance) for PME costs is 
allowed as follows: 
1.90 % for value-added, export, and hi-tech industries. 
2.75% for other priority industries, infrastructure, and corporate agriculture. 
3.50% for services and the social sector. 
The Board of Investment (BOI) of Pakistan took a proactive service-oriented approach 
to promoting investment opportunities in all sectors of the economy and to providing 
investment facilitation services to local, foreign and overseas Pakistani investors (Pak 
Watan 2000). 
The Board of Investment is the focal point of contact between potential investors and all 
government agencies dealing with investment proposals and the provision of 
infrastructure and other facilities. To strengthen the leverage and effectiveness of the 
BOI, Ministers and Secretaries of Economic Ministries are actively associated with all 
activities of the BOI. The BOI maintains strong partnerships with Provincial Investment 
Committees across the nation to facilitate investments. Policies previously stated that 
only the manufacturing sector was open to foreign investment. Now, the Policy Regime 
is much more liberal with most other economic sectors open for foreign involvement 
and with significant efforts at mobilizing domestic financial resources towards long 
term investment. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The role of FDI in the development of developing nations needs no stress. However, it 
is important for any country like Pakistan to consider which sectors need the FDI the 
most, and how to prepare these sectors for the same. 
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Pakistan has been actively trying to seek foreign direct investment since the 1970s but 
no substantial and helpful policy was implemented by the most stable and powerful 
elected government during 1970-77. Instead, the government during 1970-77 
nationalized most of the private sector financial and industrial units, which became a 
major political factor in blocking FDI inflows during 1970-1975. After the regime 
change in 1977, the new government, though headed by a military dictator, began the 
privatization of nationalized industrial and financial institutions. Three distinct 
government investment liberalization initiatives begun in 1992,1997 and 2000 have 
progressively opened Pakistan to foreign investment, offering broad arrays of incentives 
to attract new capital inflows. The previous 1999-2002 military government initiated a 
successful, broad-based macroeconomic reform and structural adjustment program with 
the assistance of international financial institutions. 
Despite major policy incentives to foreign investors, the inflow of FDI to Pakistan has 
been declining since 1995-96 for a variety of reasons including the saturation of 
investment in the power sector; the East Asian financial crises of 1997; economic 
sanctions and the freezing of foreign currency accounts in May 1998; the independent 
power projects and the HUBCO issue, particularly the way it was handled in the past. 
Low levels of foreign exchange reserves and the threat of default on external payment 
obligations along with the disarrayed and unstable relations with the International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) have all been important issues. Since 1998 the government 
has succeeded in removing the above listed constraints. For example, all the 
independent power projects issues, including the HUBCO one, have been resolved, 
foreign exchange reserves have reached a comfortable position, economic fundamental 
have improved, all economic sanctions have been lifted and Pakistan has acquired high 
credibility for its reform program from the IFIs. The stability of the exchange rate has 
also been restored. The investment climate has further improved because of Pakistan's 
enhanced stature in the global order. It is an accepted fact that taking foreign 
investment from a low and declining path to a higher and sustainable path is a daunting 
task. Flows of foreign investments do not increase overnight. With the removal of many 
irritants and significant improvements in the country's macroeconomic environment, the 
flow of investment has picked up. Foreign investment stood at $475 million in 2001-02, 
which was higher than the $403 million in 1998-99. During the fiscal year (2003-04), 
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almost $1.0 billion of foreign investment is expected. It may also be noted that the 
monthly flow of foreign investment, which averaged $ 33.6 million in 1998-99, had 
jumped to $52 million in 2001-02 - an increase of 44 percent. Recent information 
suggests that overall foreign investment stood at $ 167.4 million during the first quarter 
of the 2004. Notwithstanding the increase in foreign investment in recent years, much 
more effort will be required to attract foreign investment on a sustainable basis. 
The study of the political economy of Pakistan suggests that the failure to acknowledge 
the relationship between the economy, state and polity and FDI flows are at the 
forefront of the necessary development of the country in general and the nation in 
particular and it should be put in the forefront, which means that an economic science 
that does not account for the political aspect of the country is likely to be less than 
satisfactory. Hence it can be concluded finally that any economy must be a political 
economy (Bruno 1978). 
Finally speaking, keeping an eye on Pakistan's economic situation, it is possible that 
certain sectors have the potential of not only becoming new attractions for foreign 
investors, but can also prove to be a cure for ills like unemployment and poverty that 
have been a disturbance for the policy planners for many years. Communication, 
utilities and commerce are being cited as being among these sectors in chart 2.11 (page 
25). It is good to note that foreign investors have already started joining hands with 
local firms involved in these sectors. 
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Table-2.1 
FDI flows World/ Asia/ South Asia/ Pakistan (US $ mill: nominal) 
Pakistan as % World/ Asia/ South Asia FDI flows 1970-2004 
Year FDI in 
world 
FDI in 
Asia 
FD1 in 
South Asia 
FDI in 
Pakistan 
% of 
World 
% of Asia % of 
South Asia 
1970 8,601 322 69 23 0.0027 0.071 0.333 
1971 11,095 436 49 1 0.0001 0.002 0.020 
1972 11,771 708 35 17 0.0014 0.024 0.486 
1973 17,056 1,352 35 -4 -0.0002 -0.003 -0.114 
1974 21,317 1,451 62 4 0.0002 0.003 0.065 
1975 21,821 1,736 110 25 0.0011 0.014 0.227 
1976 18,812 1,423 60 8 0.0004 0.006 0.133 
1977 24,887 1,468 -22 15 0.0006 0.010 -0.682 
1978 31,108 1,620 52 32 0.0010 0.020 0.615 
1979 42,358 2,440 154 58 0.0014 0.024 0.377 
1980 55,336 3,174 185 63 0.0011 0.020 0.341 
1981 59,085 4,497 249 108 0.0018 0.024 0.434 
1982 41,533 4,844 200 64 0.0015 0.013 0.320 
1983 40,456 4,562 72 29 0.0007 0.006 0.403 
1984 49,993 4,655 107 55 0.0011 0.012 0.514 
1985 52,704 5,374 264 131 0.0025 0.024 0.496 
1986 81,903 5,973 261 105 0.0013 0.018 0.402 
1987 130,672 8,745 410 129 0.0010 0.015 0.315 
1988 151,588 11,766 327 186 0.0012 0.016 0.569 
1989 187,705 12,449 487 210 0.0011 0.017 0.431 
1990 191,737 19,242 464 224 0.0012 0.012 0.483 
1991 145,520 22,211 389 257 0.0018 0.012 0.661 
1992 157,649 29,445 750 335 0.0021 0.011 0.447 
1993 205,883 46,937 1,118 346 0.0017 0.007 0.309 
1994 231,368 57,323 1,595 429 0.0019 0.007 0.269 
1995 310,741 64,032 2,953 736 0.0024 0.011 0.249 
1996 346,978 74,649 3,526 939 0.0027 0.013 0.266 
1997 438,949 86,347 4,908 601 0.0014 0.007 0.122 
1998 616,619 82,615 3,659 376 0.0006 0.005 0.103 
1999 865,487 105,621 3,061 470 0.0005 0.004 0.154 
2000 1,387,953 146,067 3,109 322 0.0002 0.002 0.104 
2001 817,574 111,854 4,082 485 0.0006 0.004 0.119 
2002 678,751 94,383 4,510 798 0.0012 0.008 0.177 
2003 559,579 107,120 5,611 950 0.0017 0.009 0.169 
2004 648,146 147,545 7,005 1,524 0.0024 0.010 0.218 
2005 
Source: World Bank CD-ROM(2005) and WIR-2000-05, Surveys of Pakistan (1970-2005), 
BOI Pak-2005 (http: //www. pakboi. gov. pk/Biz Guide/investment indicators. html ) 
ADB-2005 (http: //www. adb. orJDocuments/Books/Key indicators/2005/xls/rt23. xls ) 
WIR-2004 (http: //www. unctad. orL/en/docs/wir2004_en. pdf ) 
(httn: //www. unctad. org/en/docs/wir2005annexes en. pdf ) 
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Table 2.2 
FDI inflows World/ Asia/ South Asia/ Pakistan (US $millions: nominal) 
% change of FDI flows 1970-2004 
Year FDI flows 
in World 
FDI 
flows in 
Asia 
FDI flows 
in South 
Asia 
FDI flows 
in Pakistan 
% Change 
in World 
% Change 
in Asia 
% Change 
in South 
Asia 
% Change 
in Pakistan 
1970 8,601 322 69 23 
1971 11,095 436 49 1 29.00 35.40 -28.99 -95.65 
1972 11,771 708 35 17 6.09 62.39 -28.57 1600.00 
1973 17,056 1,352 35 -4 44.90 90.96 0.00 -123.53 
1974 21,317 1,451 62 4 24.98 7.32 77.14 200.00 
1975 21,821 1,736 110 25 2.36 19.64 77.42 525.00 
1976 18,812 1,423 60 8 -13.79 -18.03 -45.45 -68.00 
1977 24,887 1,468 -22 15 32.29 3.16 -136.67 87.50 
1978 31,108 1,620 52 32 25.00 10.35 -336.36 113.33 
1979 42,358 2,440 154 58 36.16 50.62 196.15 81.25 
1980 55,336 3,174 185 63 30.64 30.08 20.13 8.62 
Avg. % Change 21.76% 29.18% 74.09% 192.85% 
1981 59,085 4,497 249 108 6.77 41.68 34.59 71.43 
1982 41,533 4,844 200 64 -29.71 7.72 -19.68 -40.74 
1983 40,456 4,562 72 29 -2.59 -5.82 -64.00 -54.69 
1984 49,993 4,655 107 55 23.57 2.04 48.61 89.66 
1985 52,704 5,374 264 131 5.42 15.45 146.73 138.18 
1986 81,903 5,973 261 105 55.40 11.15 -1.14 -19.85 
1987 130,672 8,745 410 129 59.54 46.41 57.09 22.86 
1988 151,588 11,766 327 186 16.01 34.55 -20.24 44.19 
1989 187,705 12,449 487 210 23.83 5.80 48.93 12.90 
1990 191,737 19,242 464 224 2.15 54.57 -4.72 6.67 
Avg. % Change 16.04% 21.36% 22.62% 28.01% 
1991 145,520 22,211 389 257 -24.10 15.43 -16.16 14.73 
1992 157,649 29,445 750 335 8.33 32.57 92.80 30.35 
1993 205,883 46,937 1,118 346 30.60 59.41 49.07 3.28 
1994 231,368 57,323 1,595 429 12.38 22.13 42.67 23.99 
1995 310,741 64,032 2,953 736 34.31 11.70 85.14 71.56 
1996 346,978 74,649 3,526 939 11.66 16.58 19.40 27.58 
1997 438,949 86,347 4,908 601 26.51 15.67 39.19 -36.00 
1998 616,619 82,615 3,659 376 40.48 -4.32 -25.45 -37.44 
1999 865,487 105,621 3,061 470 40.36 27.85 -16.34 25.00 
Avg. % Change 18.77% 16.98% 0.94% 27.01% 
2000 1,387,953 146,067 3,109 322 60.37 38.29 1.57 -31.49 
2001 817,574 111,854 4,082 485 -41.09 -23.42 31.30 50.62 
2002 678,751 94,383 4,510 798 -16.98 -15.62 10.49 64.54 
2003 559,579 107,120 5,611 950 -17.56 13.50 24.41 19.05 
2004 648,146 147,545 7,005 1,524 13.67 27.40 19.99 60.42 
Avg. % Change -3.19% 3.19% 16.94% 32.63% 
Source: World Bank CD-ROM(2005) and WIR-2000-05, Surveys of Pakistan (1970- 
2005), 
BOI Pak-2005 (http: //www. pakboi. p-ov. pk/Biz Guide/investment indicators. html ) 
ADB-2005 (http: //www. adb. org/Documents/Books/Key Indicators2005/xls/rt23. xls ) 
WIR-2004 (h(p: //www unctad org/en/docs/wir2004 en pdf ) 
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Table 2.3 
Various Countries % share of FDI flows to Pakistan (1980-2004 
Year USA UK UAE Germany. Fran. IlK, 
China 
Italy Japan Saudi 
Arabia 
Canada Netherlands Others 
1970 - - 
1971 - - - - - - - - - - 
1972 
1973 - 
1974 - 
1975 - 
1976 - 
1977 - 
1978 - 
1979 - 
1980 - 
1981 15.5 19.9 8.4 3.6 0.19 0.15 0.02 0.43 0.23 0.3 1.52 49.8 
1982 11.6 16.9 10 3.3 0.23 0.06 0.01 0.5 2.6 0.23 3.34 51.3 
1983 8.8 16.3 8.2 4.8 0.1 0.51 - 0.45 2.5 0.21 1.35 56.8 
1984 24.5 12.7 16.9 9.1 1.71 0.85 0.14 9.53 5.4 0.43 9.71 9.1 
1985 24.2 8.6 47.9 2.9 0.55 1.9 0.27 4.33 -5 - 0.89 13.5 
Average 16.92 14.88 18.28 4.74 0.556 0.69 0.11 3.048 1.146 0.2925 3.362 36.1 
1986 39.7 4.7 23.7 5 1.39 6.2 0.37 8.7 0.92 0.74 0.55 8 
1987 28.2 15.7 15 11.3 3.08 3.39 0.67 8.38 0.55 0.62 0.25 12.8 
1988 45.1 10.8 6.2 4.8 3.68 3.01 0.57 8 0.24 0.43 0.81 16.3 
1989 43.4 10.5 7.3 5.2 2.77 0.42 1.75 7.45 0.51 0.42 2.45 17.8 
1990 52.8 13.7 3.7 5.1 2.88 1.34 1.18 10.65 0.36 0.77 0.93 6.6 
Average 41.84 11.08 11.18 6.28 2.76 2.87 0.908 8.636 0.516 0.596 0.998 123 
1991 63.7 6.1 3.1 6.4 2.53 - 0.59 5.28 0.03 0.9 0.24 11.1 
1992 44.7 8.4 3.1 11.8 1.98 4.05 0.19 7.18 2.67 0.09 1.83 14.1 
1993 32.2 9 2.1 2.6 3.13 0.34 0.08 8.38 0.54 0.34 -0.03 41.3 
1994 39.9 8.7 10.6 4 3.05 0.49 0.06 3.68 0.2 0.09 1.02 28.2 
1995 29.3 29.1 4.8 2.4 1.28 3.11 0.04 7.52 2.46 0.07 1.09 18.8 
Average 41.96 12.26 4.74 5.44 2394 2 0.192 6.408 1.18 0.298 0.83 22.7 
1996 36.1 35.2 8 2.6 1.5 1.1 0.26 5.37 -2.49 0.25 0.1 11 
1997 42.7 22.5 3.2 4 0.8 0.3 0.1 3 0.2 0.1 4.5 18.6 
1998 45.4 18.9 1.5 4.2 2.1 0.6 0 12.5 4.8 0.1 1.2 8.6 
1999 35.5 36 1.2 2.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 3.8 6.1 0 2.3 12.3 
2000 28.8 28.1 1.6 4.8 0.2 1 0.4 3 17.6 0 0 14.5 
Average 37.7 28.14 3.1 3.56 0.98 0.64 0.172 5.534 5.242 0.09 1.62 13 
2001 67.3 6.3 4.4 2.3 -1.4 0.6 0 1.3 0.3 0.7 0 18.2 
2002 26.5 27.5 15 0.5 0.3 0.7 0 1.8 5.5 0.1 0 22.1 
2003 25.11 6.84 14.18 0.74 -0.59 0.66 0.2 1.59 0.76 0.05 0 50.46 
2004 21.04 11.9 24.1 0.9 -0.2 2.1 0 3 1.2 0.1 0 35.86 
2005 
Average 34.99 13.14 14.42 1.11 -0.47 1.02 0.05 1.92 1.94 0.24 0.00 31.66 
Source: World Bank CD-ROM(2005) and WIR-2000-05, Survey of Pakistan (1970-2005), 
BOI Pak-2005 (http: //, A ww pakboi gov pk 3iz Guide/investment indicators. html 
ADB-2005 (http: //www adb ora/DocumentsBooks/Key Indicators/2005/xls/rt23 xls 
WIR-2004 (http: //www. unctad. org/en/dots/wir2004 enpdf ) 
(http: //www. unctad. org/en/docs/wir2005annexes en. pdfl 
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Table 2.4 
Sectoral FDI flows as % of T otal FDI flo ws to Pakis tan (1980 -2004) 
Year Agri, 
forestry, 
Mining & 
Quarrying 
Manufact 
Textile/Cement 
Construction Utilities Commerce Transport, 
Storage & 
Others 
Hunting, 
fishing 
/Sugar Power, 
Gas & 
others 
(Trade, 
Finance) 
Comm 
1970 - - - - - - - - 
1971 - - - - - - - 
1972 - - - - - - - - 
1973 - - - - - - - - 
1974 - - - - - - - - 
1975 - - - - - - - - 
1976 - - - - - - - - 
1977 - - - - - - - - 
1978 - - - - - - - - 
1979 - - - - - - - - 
1980 - 24.6 74.6 1.3 - 1.8 0.5 2.8 
1981 0.5 18.9 60.2 0.46 - -3.8 1.3 22.4 
1982 0.15 24.5 74.6 0.41 - -1.1 0.3 1.1 
1983 0.28 44.3 26 0.43 - 2.2 2 4.5 
1984 0.27 4.3 54.7 0.15 - 29.4 2.1 9.1 
1985 1.85 17.9 33.5 0.3 - 37.4 1.7 7.6 
Average 0.61 21.98 49.8 0.35 #DIV/0! 12.82 1.48 8.94 
1986 0.4 27.8 26.4 0.01 0.05 37.3 3.6 4.4 
1987 0.03 56.7 9.8 - 0.05 25.6 2.5 5.4 
1988 - 48.8 11.7 -0.15 0.18 30.9 5.2 3.3 
1989 1.18 55.1 8.6 9.04 - 19.5 4.7 1.9 
1990 - 34.4 8.7 10.66 0.02 38.9 5 
2.4 
Average 0.54 44.56 13.04 4.89 0.08 30.44 4.20 3.48 
1991 - 45.5 16.2 5.18 0.07 
33.2 -1.1 0.9 
1992 - 4.1 11.9 36.31 9.59 
34.4 -0.3 3.9 
1993 - 9.8 11.1 17.38 0.01 61.1 
0.2 0.3 
1994 0.28 4.6 35 10.68 31.74 13.5 2 2.1 
1995 - - - - - - ' 
Average 0.28 16.00 18.55 17.39 10.35 35.55 0.20 1.80 
1996 15.2 5.5 9 2.1 35.9 15.6 0.9 15.5 
1997 15.2 16.5 5 3.6 39.8 5.6 1.7 12.3 
1998 13.1 23.9 0.8 2.9 27.8 6.4 7.1 10 
1999 36.1 17 2.2 4.5 14.3 7.9 6.6 8.8 
2000 22.2 26.3 6.1 3.9 12.5 -6.7 25.3 7.9 
Average 20.36 17.84 4.62 3.40 26.06 5.76 8.32 10.90 
2001 2.6 56.7 3.9 2.6 7.5 7.8 7.3 10.6 
2002 12.5 23.6 3.5 2.2 4.1 30.9 14.3 8.6 
2003 3.47 21.43 3.97 3.37 -1.49 29.25 24.29 7.96 
2004 7.6 12.8 3.7 2.8 4.8 21.1 34.9 10.8 
Average 6.54 28.63 3.77 2.74 3.73 22.26 20.20 9.49 
Source: World Bank CD-ROM(2005) and WIR-2000-05, Survey of Pakistan (1970-2005), 
BOI Pak-2005 (http: //wwwna kboi, pkBiz Guide/investment _indicators html) 
ADB-2005 (http: //www adb org/DocumentsBooks/Key Indicators/2005/xls/rt23 xls 
WIR-2004 (http: //www. unctad. org-en/docs/wir2004 en. pdf ) 
(httn: //www. unctad. orglen/docs/wir2005annexes en. pdf) 
Fli Ashfaque H. Khan and Yun-Hwan Kim (July-1999) EDRC REPORT 
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Table-2.5 
FDI Stock 1970 - 2004 (US $ millions) 
World, Developed and Developing economies, Asia. South A 
Year World Developed Developing Asia South Asia Pakistan 
1970 451470 210654 240882 201346 196095 544 
1971 464502 220131 244437 202158 196739 545 
1972 478404 230748 247723 202823 197342 562 
1973 493523 242252 251336 204236 198537 562 
1974 514237 257775 256528 205355 199591 566 
Average 480427 232312 248181.2 203184 197660.8 555.8 
1975 540140 279470 260736 203491 201082 591 
1976 566755 296441 270380 207959 202939 599 
1977 587848 311865 276043 209193 204495 614 
1978 614854 332103 282805 212266 206183 646 
1979 649341 357426 291945 216104 208246 704 
Average 591788 315461 276381.8 209803 204589 630.8 
1980 692714 390740 301974 218320 211039 767 
1981 744905 420848 324057 233085 218859 701 
1982 796070 444512 351558 252383 226634 652 
1983 833084 463945 369138 264815 233775 794 
1984 874639 490679 383960 277991 241361 677 
Average 788282 442144.8 346137.4 249319 226333.6 718.2 
1985 972205 569696 402460 287330 249960 1079 
1986 1113539 690290 423195 297929 259226 1298 
1987 1314793 858466 456270 315888 278402 1351 
1988 1475718 992751 481361 334188 295903 1257 
1989 1691779 1176176 513444 353843 315074 1422 
Average 1313607 857475.8 455346 317836 279713 1281.4 
1990 1950303 1399509 547965 378002 337082 1928 
1991 2113411 1512955 593833 400300 357150 2088 
1992 2158861 1502273 645179 430277 384248 2658 
1993 2329052 1595682 715640 486352 435243 2546 
1994 2617192 1788269 804842 557728 503896 3878 
Average 2233764 1559737.6 661491.8 450532 403523.8 2619.6 
1995 2992068 2035799 916697 636465 581012 5552 
1996 3316433 2204853 1059285 731949 671345 6646 
1997 3615045 2315660 1225726 818074 748462 9156 
1998 4278736 2812484 1371887 896962 817504 8779 
1999 5113857 3260017 1745553 1158298 1075415 7891 
Average 3863228 2525762.6 1263829.6 848350 778747.6 7604.8 
2000 5786029 3976356 1939926 1283082 1195687 7753 
2001 6197711 4265471 2071979 1320721 1226736 6799 
2002 6703607 4810641 2093569 1358005 1259136 7043 
2003 7987077 5816292 2280171 1461518 1352409 7163 
2004 8902153 6469832 2232868 1300652 8224 
Average 7115315 5067718.4 2123702.6 1344796 1258492 7396.4 
Source: World Bank CD-ROM(2005) and WIR-2000-05, Survey of Pakistan (1970-2005), 
BOI Pak-2005 (http: //www pakboi gov pkBiz Guide/investment indicators html) 
ADB-2005 (httl2: //www. adb. orp-/Documents/Books/Key Indicators/2005/xls/rt23 xls 
WIR-2004 (http: //www. unctad. ora/en/docs/wir2004 en. ndf ) 
(http: //www. unctad. orglen/docshvir2005annexes en. pdf ) 
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Table-2.6 
FDI Stock Growth rates 1970 - 2004 
World, Developed and Developing economies, Asia, South Asia, & Pakistan 
Year World Developed Developing Asia Saouth Asia Pakistan 
1970 
1971 2.89 4.50 1.48 0.40 0.33 0.18 
1972 2.99 4.82 1.34 0.33 0.31 3.12 
1973 3.16 4.99 1.46 0.70 0.61 0.00 
1974 4.20 6.41 2.07 0.55 0.53 0.71 
Average 3.31 5.18 1.59 0.49 0.44 1.00 
1975 5.04 8.42 1.64 -0.91 0.75 4.42 
1976 4.93 6.07 3.70 2.20 0.92 1.35 
1977 3.72 5.20 2.09 0.59 0.77 2.50 
1978 4.59 6.49 2.45 1.47 0.83 5.21 
1979 5.61 7.63 3.23 1.81 1.00 8.98 
Average 4.78 6.76 2.62 1.03 0.85 4.49 
1980 6.68 9.32 3.44 1.03 1.34 8.95 
1981 7.53 7.71 7.31 6.76 3.71 -8.60 
1982 6.87 5.62 8.49 8.28 3.55 -6.99 
1983 4.65 4.37 5.00 4.93 3.15 21.78 
1984 4.99 5.76 4.02 4.98 3.25 -14.74 
Average 6.14 6.56 5.65 5.19 3.00 0.08 
1985 11.16 16.10 4.82 3.36 3.56 59.38 
1986 14.54 21.17 5.15 3.69 3.71 20.30 
1987 18.07 24.36 7.82 6.03 7.40 4.08 
1988 12.24 15.64 5.50 5.79 6.29 -6.96 
1989 14.64 18.48 6.67 5.88 6.48 13.13 
Average 14.13 19.15 5.99 4.95 5.49 17.99 
1990 15.28 18.99 6.72 6.83 6.99 35.58 
1991 8.36 8.11 8.37 5.90 5.95 8.30 
1992 2.15 -0.71 8.65 7.49 7.59 27.30 
1993 7.88 6.22 10.92 13.03 13.27 -4.21 
1994 12.37 12.07 12.46 14.68 15.77 52.32 
Average 9.21 8.94 9.43 9.58 9.91 23.86 
1995 14.32 13.84 13.90 14.12 15.30 43.17 
1996 10.84 8.30 15.55 15.00 15.55 19.70 
1997 9.00 5.03 15.71 11.77 11.49 37.77 
1998 18.36 21.45 11.92 9.64 9.22 -4.12 
1999 19.52 15.91 27.24 29.14 31.55 -10.12 
Average 14.41 12.91 16.87 15.93 16.62 17.28 
2000 13.14 21.97 11.14 10.77 11.18 -1.75 
2001 7.12 7.27 6.81 2.93 2.60 -12.30 
2002 8.16 12.78 1.04 2.82 2.64 3.59 
2003 19.15 20.90 8.91 7.62 7.41 1.70 
2004 11.46 11.24 -2.07 -11.01 -100.00 14.81 
Average 11.80 14.83 5.16 2.63 -15.23 1.21 
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Table- 2.7 
FDI Stock in Pakistan as % of Global Regions and Economies, 1970 - 2004 World, Developed and Developing economies, Asian and South Asian reLyic 
Year Pakistan % World % Develo ed % Developing % Asia % South Asia 
1970 544 0.12 0.26 0.23 0.27 0.28 
1971 545 0.12 0.25 0.22 0.27 0.28 
1972 562 0.12 0.24 0.23 0.28 0.28 
1973 562 0.11 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.28 
1974 566 0.11 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.28 
Average 0.12 0.24 0.22 0.27 0.28 
1975 591 0.11 0.21 0.23 0.29 0.29 
1976 599 0.11 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.30 
1977 614 0.10 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.30 
1978 646 0.11 0.19 0.23 0.30 0.31 
1979 704 0.11 0.20 0.24 0.33 0.34 
Average 0.11 0.20 0.23 0.30 0.31 
1980 767 0.11 0.20 0.25 0.35 0.36 
1981 701 0.09 0.17 0.22 0.30 0.32 
1982 652 0.08 0.15 0.19 0.26 0.29 
1983 794 0.10 0.17 0.22 0.30 0.34 
1984 677 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.28 
Average 0.09 0.16 0.21 0.29 0.32 
1985 1079 0.11 0.19 0.27 0.38 0.43 
1986 1298 0.12 0.19 0.31 0.44 0.50 
1987 1351 0.10 0.16 0.30 0.43 0.49 
1988 1257 0.09 0.13 0.26 0.38 0.42 
1989 1422 0.08 0.12 0.28 0.40 0.45 
Average 0.10 0.16 0.28 0.40 0.46 
1990 1928 0.10 0.14 0.35 0.51 0.57 
1991 2088 0.10 0.14 0.35 0.52 0.58 
1992 2658 0.12 0.18 0.41 0.62 0.69 
1993 2546 0.11 0.16 0.36 0.52 0.58 
1994 3878 0.15 0.22 0.48 0.70 0.77 
Average 0.12 0.17 0.39 0.57 0.64 
1995 5552 0.19 0.27 0.61 0.87 0.96 
1996 6646 0.20 0.30 0.63 0.91 0.99 
1997 9156 0.25 0.40 0.75 1.12 1.22 
1998 8779 0.21 0.31 0.64 0.98 1.07 
1999 7891 0.15 0.24 0.45 0.68 0.73 
Average 0.20 0.30 0.61 0.91 1.00 
2000 7753 0.13 0.19 0.40 0.60 0.65 
2001 6799 0.11 0.16 0.33 0.51 0.55 
2002 7043 0.11 0.15 0.34 0.52 0.56 
2003 7163 0.09 0.12 0.31 0.49 0.53 
2004 8224 0.09 0.13 0.37 0.63 #DIV/0! 
_Average 
0.11 0.15 0.35 0.55 #DIV/0! 
Source: World Bank CD-ROM(2005) and WIR-2000-05, Survey of Pakistan (1970-2005), 
BOI Pak-2005 : //ww-A,. akboi. gov. k/Riz Guide/investment indicators. html 
ADB-2005 htt: //www. adb org/Documents/Books/Kcy Indicators/2005/xls/rt23. xls 
WIR-2004 tt: //www. unctad. ore%n/docs/wir2004 en. df htt : //www. unctad. oro en/docs/wir2005annexes en df 
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Table-2.8 
FDI Stoc k by South Asian Host Economy, 1970 - 20 04 
Year Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan 
Sri 
Lanka 
1970 0 0 0 0 0 544 0 
1971 0 0 0 0 0 545 0 
1972 0 0 0 0 0 562 0 
1973 0 285 0 0 0 562 0 
1974 0 285 0 0 0 566 0 
Average 0.00 114.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 555.80 0.00 
1975 0 287 0 0 0 591 0 
1976 0 292 0 0 0 599 
1977 0 299 0 0 0 614 
1978 0 307 0 0 0 646 
1979 0 299 0 0 0 704 
Average 0.00 296.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 630.80 0.00 
1980 11 308 0 452 11 1 767 231 
1981 11 313 0 544 11 1 701 300 
1982 11 320 0 616 4 1 652 397 
1983 11 320 0 621 4 1 794 425 
1984 11 320 0 641 2 1 677 463 
Average 11.00 316.20 0.00 574.80 6.40 1.00 718.20 363.20 
1985 11 313 0 747 3 2 1079 517 
1986 11 316 0 864 9 3 1298 542 
1987 12 319 0 1077 14 5 1351 605 
1988 12 321 0 1168 15 5 1257 618 
1989 12 321 0 1420 19 6 1422 638 
Average 11.60 318.00 0.00 1055.20 12.00 4.20 1281.40 584.00 
1990 12 324 2 1657 25 12 1928 681 
1991 12 326 2 1732 31 14 2088 748 
1992 12 329 2 1984 38 18 2658 871 
1993 12 343 2 2516 45 24 2546 1065 
1994 12 355 2 3490 54 31 3878 1232 
Average 12.00 335.40 2.00 2275.80 38.60 19.80 2619.60 919.40 
1995 12 356 2 5641 61 39 5552 1297 
1996 13 535 4 8166 70 58 6646 1430 
1997 11 988 3 10630 82 81 9156 1863 
1998 11 1445 3 14065 93 93 8779 2013 
1999 17 1715 4 15426 105 97 7891 2214 
Average 12.80 1007.80 3.20 10785.60 82.20 73.60 7604.80 1763.40 
2000 17 2429 3 17517 119 97 7753 2389 
2001 18 2522 4 20326 130 116 6799 2471 
2002 19 2574 4 25408 142 118 7043 2668 
2003 19 2695 4 30827 154 148 7163 2897 
2004 
Avera a 17.16 2245.56 3.64 20972.72 125.44 110.52 7272.56 2437.68 
Source: World Bank CD-ROM(2005) and WIR-2000-05, Survey of Pakistan (1970-2005), 
BOI Pak-2005 (httg: // www pakboi rov pk/Biz 
Guide/investment indicators html ) 
ADB-2005 (http: //www. adb. org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators2005/xls/rt23. xls 
WIR-2004 (http: //www. unctad. oralen/docshvir2004 en. pdf ) 
(http: //www. unctad. ora/en/docs/wir2005annexes en. pdf ) 
111 Ashfague H. Khan and Yun-Hwan Kim (July-1999) EDRC REPORT 
38/240 
Chapter-3 
Alternative Philosophical Motivations 
Influencing FDI Transactions 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the traditional, neo-classical (western) motivation for foreign direct 
investment is compared with that of Islamic economics. To a considerable extent the 
differences revolve around the different theories of interest and the illegality of debt- 
finance in Islam. A wider contrast is apparent, however, in that Islamic economics takes 
a broader view of economic and social relations than does market-oriented, neo- 
classical economics and so some of the wider social aspects are also considered in this 
chapter. 
In general terms, the investment philosophy requires an integration of economic 
analysis and political analysis that seeks to achieve the maximum total return consistent 
with the minimum acceptable risk. Monitoring the current economic environment and 
identifying the factors that affect the future direction of the economy provides the 
framework for intelligent investment. Monetary policy is significant for short-term 
portfolio investment. However, long-term economic factors including demographics, 
technological innovation and changing political structures can influence direct 
investment in a country. The process of identifying and assessing the influencing factors 
is an integral part of investment decision-making. 
The economic and political risk of the host country is one of the important determinants 
in investment decision-making and due to the belief that unpredictability and volatility 
in the political environment of the host market increases the perceived risk and 
uncertainty experienced by the firm. 
FDI in its definition and philosophy is a type of equity partnership, either in full or 
partially, which conforms to the basic principles of the Islamic financial system, asking 
the investors either to go for a joint venture, risk-sharing partnership (Musharka) or a 
profit-sharing partnership (Mudarabah) (Al-Suwailem 1998). 
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3.2 Traditional Neoclassical Approach to Direct Investment (FDI) 
This type of investment can be defined as a long-term investment with the purpose of 
acquiring a management stake in the company or having total control of the assets of the 
company. Though the profit-seeking group of investors undertakes this type of 
investment, it has additional developmental effects on the economy of the host country. 
This type of investment may take place through purchases of shares and the loan capital 
security markets, greenfield FDI, mergers and acquisitions or through the privatisation 
of state industry in the host country. 
In a world of perfect markets, the multinational enterprises (MNEs) would not exist and 
there would be no FDI4. According to the Hymer-Kindleberger (1969) theory, the 
foreign-owned firm would make an investment in the host country only if it possesses 
some compensatory advantage that allows it to compete on equal terms with indigenous 
firms. This is, however, not a sufficient condition for FDI since the firm has the option 
of licensing the advantage (technology) to an indigenous producer or exporting the 
product to the host country. Clearly, certain other conditions have to be satisfied for FDI 
to arise. Three such conditions are: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
The advantage is internally transferable (it can be exploited by a subsidiary of the 
parent firm without any additional cost to the parent firm or to the subsidiaries 
already exploiting it); 
It is more profitable for the foreign-owned firm to exploit the advantage itself than 
to license it to an indigenous producer (because of imperfections in the market for 
knowledge or the heavy firm-to-firm transfer costs of the advantage); 
Exporting the product to the host country is not possible or unprofitable due to 
tariff or transport cost barriers. 
According to Golder and Ishigami (1999), theories of FDI also assert that the basis for 
such investment lies in the transaction costs of transferring technical and other 
knowledge, and market imperfections. This is closely related to the internalisation of 
markets hypothesis, which, according to Buckley and Casson (1991), is the most 
important reason for FDI and transnational corporations (TNCs). The theory of TNCs is 
composed of three main features: 
4 http: //www. epw. org. in/34-22/rml. htm 
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1: Maximization of profit by the firms through imperfect markets in the world. 
2: Creation of inter-markets within the firms by bypassing the imperfect markets. 
3: Internalisation of markets across national boundaries generates MNEs. 
According to Buckley and Casson (1991), the theory emphasises lower transport costs, 
high returns to scale at the plant level, and a significant comparative advantage at least 
one location. Then international acquisition and exploitation of knowledge will 
normally be able to involve international production through a worldwide network5. 
According to Dunning (1993), Ownership, Location and Internationalization (OLI) can 
answer three basic questions for FDI cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Also the 
two basic motivation factors, growth and change in the economic environment in the 
area of technology and capital market changes, are very important for the conduct of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The Dunning (1993) OLI model sets out which, 
where and why firms go for cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
The proprietary ownership (0) motive encourages firms to invest abroad in foreign 
firms. The firms avail themselves of this advantage to overcome the extra costs of 
operating in other areas where they are less familiar with the environment and which 
may be costly. In some cases, according to Dunning (1993), firms may go overseas 
to supplement or enhance their existing "0" assets (seeking FDI) seeking synergies 
between their own strengths and those of foreign firms or institutions. 
According to Dunning (1993), firms select sites "L" that best match the deployment 
of "O" assets. The location theory plays a major role in the cost factors like transport 
cost, market size and government policies such as stability, tariffs, taxes and 
regulations for FDI. He further explains that the asset-seeking FDI is drawn to 
locations with strong technological, educational or information creation activities. 
The internalization ("I") analysis draws on the transaction cost theories of the firm, 
and centres on the feasibility of and returns from contracting the sale of intangible 
5 http: //www. epw. org. in/34-22/rml. htm 
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advantages to other firms. Dunning (1993) further explains that internalization can 
also explain vertical FDI where a particular process or function is located abroad by 
TNCs to serve their production system. 
Finally, it is concluded that it is useful to consider the OLI factor specifically for 
mergers and acquisitions and to distinguish mergers and acquisitions from other types 
of investment. So mergers mainly internalise to take advantage of "0" to gain 
economies of synergy, size, and scope. On the other hand, acquisitions are taken to 
involve larger, more powerful firms taking over smaller or weaker ones to gain speedy 
access to the latter's ownership and location. The OLI factor is explained better in 
vertical, horizontal and conglomerate mergers and acquisitions6. 
The underlying motivations are concerned with profit-making by international 
externalities and reducing the transaction costs incurred by markets. There are no 
explicit social and political factors involved in the decision (Kobrin, 1977). Kobrin 
(1977) also emphasises the culture-changing effect of foreign investment. The aspect of 
the culture transferred tends to be diffused throughout the host society by the 
reemployment of trained personnel, backward and forward linkages and competitive 
emulation. 
3.3 Islamic Economic Concept of Investment (FDI) 
According to the Islamic economic and financial system, an interest-based debt 
financing arrangement is not permissible but it allows investment institutions based on 
equity and economic justice. Chapra argues that the Islamic financial system mainly 
consists of a mechanism of two filter systems: the moral and market prices (Chapra 
2000). The explicit inclusion of the moral dimension is in direct contrast to neo- 
classical FDI. 
According to the Islamic finance literature, it has been defined that any excess earnings 
on money capital is riba, which is prohibited regardless of the rate of interest, purpose 
of the loan, and the terms and conditions of the transaction. Islam makes no distinction 
6 WIR-2000 P# 140 to 152 
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between interest and usury, nor does it make any distinction between consumption and 
production loans, insofar as the prohibition on riba is concerned (Ariff 1988). 
The Islamic ban on interest does not mean that capital is costless in an Islamic system. 
Islam recognizes capital as a factor of production, but it does not allow the factor to 
make a prior or predetermined claim on the productive surplus in the form of interest. 
This obviously poses the question as to what will then replace the interest rate 
mechanism in an Islamic framework. There have been suggestions that profit-sharing 
can be a viable alternative (Kahf 1982a and 1982b). Presley (1994) illustrated the 
potential impact of the Islamic doctrine on Western economic relationships by focusing 
on the prohibition of interest (riba) in Islamic economics. Presley also showed that the 
alternative method of financier remuneration (i. e. `Mudharabah' or profit-loss sharing) 
would, under certain conditions, enhance capital investment on account of its ability to 
act as an efficient revelation device. The ideas developed in the Western contract 
literature show that a Mudharabah contract between the manager of a project and a 
syndicate of investors may permit a more efficient revelation of any informational 
asymmetries between the two. 
The following sections give a brief discussion of types of investments that can be 
practised according Islamic Economic and Financial Laws. 
1: Mudharabah (Trustee Partnership) 
This is a type of business arrangement between two parties where one party supplies 
capital and the other provides labour and managerial services. Profits are shared 
between the two parties at agreed-upon terms, but the entire loss is borne by the supplier 
of capital (financier). During the early stages of Islam, the trade relations between the 
Prophet Mohammad and Khadijah are said to have been of the same nature. The 
Prophet Mohammad travelled long distances with trade caravans, selling goods 
belonging to Khadijah and getting his share of the profits. 
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A necessary condition for setting up a mudharabah is that the capital offered by the 
financier must be expressed in monetary units and the share of profit going to either 
party must not be a fixed amount. Profits must be distributed between the two parties on 
the basis of an agreed-upon ratio (Iqbal 1995). 
Mudharabah may be organized in many forms, meeting the needs of today's business 
environment. For example, two parties may make an arrangement such that the 
financier bears the business risk, receives the entire profits and pays commission to the 
other party as a compensation for labour and managerial services. 
A mudharabah may also assume the form of a business corporation if its shares are sold 
to the general public and the financiers form a Board of Directors that formulates a 
broad-based policy for the operation of the business and makes decisions regarding 
distribution of profits among shareholders. The other party, called management, is 
responsible for the business operations, procurement of raw materials, hiring and firing 
of labour, marketing of goods, etc. Depending upon the type of contract, the 
management would be entitled to compensation such as wages, salaries or commissions. 
This type of mudharabah appears to be closer to a modem incorporated business, which 
is the most dominant form of business organization in America today. 
However, despite this apparent similarity, a corporation-type mudharabah would be 
very different from a western business corporation. It would neither be allowed to 
borrow nor to lend funds on the basis of interest. Western corporations, and in fact all 
Western businesses, are heavily involved in interest-based lending and borrowing 
activities. A significant increase in debt financing has been a major cause of many 
business failures during the past two decades. Since, in this system, creditors of the firm 
are entitled to interest payment on the capital they supply, all business risk is diverted to 
the equity holders. This arrangement violates Islamic principles of fairness and 
distributive justice. Moreover, the stock market, which is assumed to play an important 
function in determining the value of the firms whose stocks are traded in the market, has 
turned into a place for speculation, hostile takeovers and insider-trading thus 
introducing fraud, treachery and lies into the economic system. If the creation of a 
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corporation-type mudharabah necessitates the establishment of a stock market and 
speculation (gambling), it cannot be considered lawful in Islam (Also see appendix 3.1). 
2: Musharakah (Joint Venture) or Venture Capital 
A Musharakah is a business arrangement based on the concept of Profit and Loss 
Sharing (PLS). In this arrangement, two or more parties sign a contract to combine their 
efforts, in the form of physical and financial resources, to operate a business. In a 
Musharakah, profits are shared among the partners according to their level of 
participation but losses, if any, are borne by the suppliers of capital. Thus, Musharakah 
is another important business organization that ensures efficient allocation and 
distributive justice. There are many varieties of Musharakah such as shirkat-e- 
mufawadha, shirkat-alinan, shirkat-e-sanai, shirkat-e-wujooh, or shirkat-e-milk, which 
provide ways and means for financing different kinds of business and commercial 
activities. The capitalist system, which favours capital by relieving it from business risk, 
does not provide conditions favourable for the growth of Musharakah types of 
businesses. 
From an Islamic point of view, venture capital is based on equity financing sharikat ¢ 
inan, and thus falls within the framework of Islamic finance. It therefore combines 
economic viability and Islamic preferences, which makes it a promising option for 
Islamic financial institutions. A venture capital firm manages funds provided by 
investors and directs them to the most promising ventures, mainly in the form of equity. 
Although the detailed practices of existing venture capital institutions may not be totally 
consistent with Islamic rules, these details can be easily modified without 
compromising the positive aspects of their underlying principles (Al Suwailm-1998). 
3: Ijarah (Leasing) 
By separating an asset's ownership rights from its use rights, the renting principle Ijarah 
makes use of an asset-independent form of financing. The owner of the asset bears all 
the risks associated with ownership and the user of the asset pays a fixed price (rent) for 
the benefits of the asset. One can, thus, use an asset without owning it. Therefore, Ijarah 
plays an important financial role. 
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In the early sixties, Al Sadr suggested the relevance of the Ijarah principle in the 
management of a bank's assets; this principle remained insignificant until the emergence 
of Islamic banks. In recent literature (e. g., Chapra 1985, Council of Islamic Ideology 
1981), the principle has been discussed thoroughly, however, it has not been widely 
used by Islamic financial institutions (Ahmad 1987) except by the IDB (see, 
particularly: 12th Annual Report of IDB). 
Two variants of the Ijarah principle have been used in Pakistan: hire purchase and rent- 
sharing. In a hire-purchase form of finance, the client (the purchaser of an asset) knows 
the price of the asset, the bank's profits in the underlying sale transaction and the 
amount of rent to be paid. After paying the principal plus the profit and rents for the 
relevant period, the client assumes the ownership. In a recent opinion, the Islamic Fiqh 
Academy of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (01C) has suggested refraining from 
the use of the hire-purchase principle unless appropriate care is taken with regard to the 
provision of such things as the extension of the lease period, the termination of the lease 
contract, the return of the asset to its owner and the purchase of the asset at the end of 
the lease contract. (see: The Islamic Fiqh Academy, 1989, p. 88). 
In a rent-sharing contract, in addition to the principal, the client pays a known share of 
the market rent of the building until such time as he completes all payments. It is 
understood that the bank's profits in the operation are incorporated into the agreed rent. 
In the conventional literature of economics and finance, a comparison of the renting 
principle (i. e., leasing and interest-bearing finance) is frequently undertaken and the 
superiority of the former is highlighted. In an interesting study, Al Masri (1986) has 
compared renting with the PSP and suggested that the PSP (whether based on output or 
profit-sharing) can also be applied to durable assets more efficiently than the renting 
principle. 
Leasing of land, houses and commercial facilities has been a well-known business 
phenomenon for a long time. A lease is a contract between two parties such that the 
owner, called the "leasor", rents his assets to the other party called the "lessee" for use 
for an agreed-upon period on specified rental terms. The lessee is entitled to the use of 
the assets so long as he abides by the terms and conditions of the lease agreement. 
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4: Murabahah (Cost-plus Sale) 
Since 1982 murabahah has emerged as a distinct principle of Islamic finance and has 
become the backbone of contemporary Islamic modes of investment. Murabahah is a 
sale/purchase agreement based on deferred payments with a mechanism of markup and 
markdown; it is also designed as a device for commercial financing, following Islamic 
principles. However, the financial institutions have been asked to avoid it as much as 
possible since it can be prone to interest-based business arrangements. The markup 
principle of finance results from incorporating deferred payments into murabahah. In 
the markup principle, the financier benefits from the difference between the immediate 
and deferred prices of the goods. The markup principle is justified on the basis of a 
generally accepted axiom that time may be valued provided it is incorporated in a sale 
transaction (Saadallah 1986). 
The mark-up creates a fixed, predetermined and secure indebtedness. This has made the 
mark-up principle attractive for Islamic banks as an alternative to interest-based 
transactions. It should, however; be noted that in contrast to interest-based lending, the 
final return to the financier is not fixed in mark-up based financing. In fact the final 
return to the financier is lower than the mark-up price because of the element of risk 
carried by the financier while the merchandise is in his possession. By the same token, 
the mark-up principle removes from the user of the funds the risks which he would 
otherwise have borne had he owned the goods for the same period of time. Thus, the 
final cost of the finance for the finance user may be less than the mark-up price 
(Khan 1989). 
During the time of the Caliphate of Umar, when Muslim traders started long-distance 
trading, the shrewd money lenders who used to be present at the trading centres in 
foreign countries would incorporate interest charges into the exchange rates. When 
these matters were brought to the notice of Umar, he told the Muslims to avoid anything 
that was doubtful. Some naive Muslim scholars use this example to try to make a 
distinction between interest and usury, justifying interest, which is charged at 
reasonable rates, and prohibiting usury because of its exorbitant rates. 
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3.4 A Comparison of Traditional and Islamic Investment 
Investments, either domestic or foreign, bear two meanings usually used by economists 
in the theory of growth, income distribution or employment. Firstly, an international or 
domestic investment can be used to acquire assets physically or financially i. e. financial 
assets. In the non-technical definition of investments, one can speak of a simple 
acquisition of assets but in the macroeconomic sense the meaning of acquisition of 
assets can be different from that in the non-technical use of the term. Also, investment 
types can be either domestic or international. 
Islamic investment is based on the type of contract made between the parties, the 
investor or borrower and the investor or lender. The legal form of an Islamic business 
enterprise or contract sheds light on how capital is raised, how labour is employed, how 
activities are remunerated, who makes decisions, how such enterprises or contracts are 
dissolved and who bears the risks of failure (Sarker 1999). While the traditional 
investment contracts are based on a debt instrument, which gives an impression of profit 
maximization for either the end borrower or lender, alternative "interest free" financing 
techniques based on the profit-loss sharing (PLS) principle (Musharkah and Mudarabah 
financing) and the markup principle (Murabaha and Ijara financing) have been 
developed by Islamic economists to conform with the rules governed by Islamic Shari'a 
principles. Both of the instruments of PLS can be thought of as equity instruments. The 
markup principle has its historical roots in commercial trade activities. 
Although markup instruments are being used widely by the investment banks, they are 
considered to be disputed instruments due to the fixed return on investment. Many 
Islamic scholars have taken the position that markup techniques should be avoided or 
restricted fearing that the markup might open a back door to interest-based transactions 
(Siddiqi 1983 and Khan 1987). 
Aggarwal and Tarik (2000) have stressed that, despite there being a formal equivalence 
in markup financing and debt, the equivalence is not based on the payment of interest. 
Following the literature on incomplete contracts by Hart and Moore (1998), he further 
argued that the handing over of assets to the debtor in the event of default was a salient 
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feature of debt contracts. Similarly, under markup the control rights are with the 
investment agency (debtor) as in a debt contract. 
The Islamic jurists and economists have approved the murabaha investment, if it is 
made according to the approved methodology of contract. They further argue that it is a 
cost-plus contract since one party wishing to purchase equipment or goods and 
commodities approaches the other party to purchase those items who then sells to him at 
cost plus a declared profit. By this method of contract, a party needing finance to 
purchase business machinery or equipment gets the necessary finance on a deferred 
payment basis. Farmers may also get various inputs and agricultural implements from 
the bank on a deferred payment basis. The investment agency (bank) retains control of 
the assets (Sarker 1999). 
Aggarwal and Tarik (2000) further argued about the viability of markup contracts in 
Islamic investment, saying that the immediate control of the assets in case of default 
will decrease the bankruptcy while, under traditional debt investments, the delays in the 
shifting of the assets to the investing agency (bank) can significantly decrease the 
efficiency of the investment. These problems are avoided under Islamic markup 
contracts. 
In principle, in an Islamic economy the self-interest principle, which is the cornerstone 
of free traditional investment in market economies, is dramatically opposed. This 
clearly suggests that the object of an Islamic firm is not profit maximisation. Rather, the 
firm may be satisfied to realise a `reasonable' or `fair' level of profit if that enables it to 
achieve a more important goal (Metawally 1993). 
The fixed nature of the return on capital is considered by most contemporary Muslim 
economists to be the unique characteristic of interest. As a corollary, therefore, the 
Islamic principle of financing is considered to be based on the variable rate of return 
(i. e., profit sharing). Therefore, Mudarabah has been treated by these scholars as a 
synonym for Islamic finance. This is perhaps the reason for neglecting the financing 
potential of the sale-based principle of finance and for the difference in this regard 
between interest and sale. As a result, Islamic economists tend to describe the Islamic 
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economy as debt free. However, the emergence of Islamic financial institutions has 
highlighted the immense financing potential of the sale-based principle where financing 
results in debt creation (Kahf & Khan 1992). 
Kahf and Khan (1992) again tried to clarify the difference between the fixed nature of 
the return on capital invested in real transactions (sale) and on capital invested in pure 
finance (interest). They explained further that profit-sharing is the only Islamic principle 
of earning a return on capital invested in pure finance (where ownership is separated 
from management). However, as sale on a deferred basis serves the financial needs of 
the buyer and seller, it is no wonder that mark-up and renting principles have become 
the dominant practice of contemporary Islamic financial institutions. 
3.5 The Islamic Concept of Contractual Uncertainty (Gharar) 
Literally meaning fraud (al-khid'a), uncertainty (gharar) in transactions has often been 
used in the sense of risk, uncertainty and hazard, it consists mainly of uncertainty over 
the existence of the subject matter of contract or whether gharar basically consists of 
ignorance of the material attributes of the contract. When entering into a contractual 
relationship, there must be "full disclosure" by both parties because a transaction which 
is tainted with gharar will not be permitted. Any type of transaction where the subject 
matter, the price or both are not determined and fixed in advance will be viewed with 
suspicion under Shari'ah law (Kamali-1998) 
Islamic financial system has prohibited taking a risk with Gharar (an investment 
decision full of uncertainty) (Vogal et al 1998). Warde (2000) explains that Islam 
strictly prohibits excessive risk-taking such as sales made under the high degrees of risk 
associated with uncertainty, speculation, uncertain outcome and unknowable future 
benefits. In such cases, it can be concluded that the risk lies within the meaning of 
Gharar. It can be defined as "the sale of what is not present". For example to sell fish 
that are still unfished or a bird that has not been hunted yet. 
Islam requires certainty in contracts, and thus forbids transactions comprising an 
element of uncertainty relating to the object of the contract, its consideration or the time 
allowed for performance of the parties' respective obligations. In practice, the 
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prohibition of uncertainty, or risk, affects many fields of modern commercial 
transactions. For a start, insurance, as known in Western economies, is not permissible, 
since, at the time of concluding the contract, an insurer knows neither whether he will 
be called upon to make a payment to the insured, nor the extent of his exposure, 
Therefore, contracts of conventional insurance contravene the prohibition of gharar. 
Any system of insurance that do not conform to these standards (i. e. "commercial" 
insurance) are prohibited under the Shari'a. All investment projects in the insurance 
sector (which has been opened up to foreign investors by the recent Insurance law) must 
therefore be built on a "cooperative" structure. 
Islamic law has found its own solution to gharar in insurance structures, creating a pool- 
like structure called Takaful. Takaful (i. e. cooperative insurance) consists of a charitable 
collective pool of funds in which "members" pool their resources to assist each other in 
the event of casualty or loss. Under this scheme, members promise to make periodic 
contributions, which are invested by the cooperative in an islamically conforming 
manner, and agree that if one of their numbers should suffer a covered loss, each will 
make a proportionate gift from his account, to cover the loss. 
Another, rather obvious, aspect of the prohibition of gharar is the prohibition of 
financial transactions involving excessive risk. Futures, derivatives, hedge funds and 
swaps are all contracts which are tainted with gharar. 
Islamic Financial system also prohibits speculation and gambling due to its excessive 
uncertainty of contract. For example, futures, options and swap contracts are not 
generally permissible because the return from such investments relies on the occurrence 
of events which may or may not take place and are therefore uncertain. An Islamic 
contract must be concluded by both parties with full knowledge of all the terms. Any 
type of transaction where the subject matter, the price or both are not determined and 
fixed in advance by the parties will not be permitted under Sharia'a. 
The reason behind prohibiting gambling and the ambiguous contracts involving Gharar 
is due to the extremeness of risk and unfair distribution of risk in contracts (Badawi, 
1998). A Gharar transaction is considered as a zero-sum game with uncertain payoffs 
since in this transaction one party loses while the other gains which helps the economist 
to view Gharar within the theory of exchange under uncertainty (Al-Suwailem 2000). 
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Gharar can be summarised to occur into four main varieties on account respectively of 
uncertainty and risk pertaining to the existence of the subject matter, or over its 
availability, uncertainty over the quantities involved, and lastly of uncertainty over 
timing of completion and delivery. First, should there be uncertainty over the actual 
existence of something at the time of contract; this would vitiate the contract according 
to the majority of jurists. The second variety of uncertainty (gharar) concerns a situation 
where a thing may exist, such as fish in the lake, but uncertainty surrounds over its 
availability at the time of contract. If there is only a slight doubt over availability, such 
as of fish in a small pond or of bird in a confined space, gharar arising from this kind of 
doubt is tolerated but excessive gharar over availability would vitiate the sale. The 
question of availability could also be actual or potential in that the object of sale 
although not available at the time of contract may become available later. The third of 
the four varieties of gharar mentioned above are concerned with uncertainty over 
quantity either of the subject matter or its price, or both. And lastly, uncertainty (gharar) 
over the timing of completion and delivery is largely addressed under the theory of ajal 
or deferment in contracts. Deferment is accordingly valid if it involves only one but not 
both of the counter values in a sale. The Islamic jurists have not specified any minimum 
or maximum limits for deferment in payment or delivery and there is some flexibility in 
the manner in which the time frame can be determined (Kamali-1998) 
3.6 Conclusion 
In the light of historical evidence from the early period of Islam and contemporary 
literature, a comparative review of Islamic financing principles has been presented in 
this chapter. Important points have been summarized at the end of each section. In the 
following, some general concluding remarks are made. 
However, the emergence of Islamic financial institutions has highlighted the immense 
financing potential of the sale-based principle where financing results in debt creation. 
This clarifies the point that there is a difference between the fixed nature of return on 
capital invested in real transactions (sale) and on capital invested in pure finance 
(interest). It is, therefore, clear that profit sharing is the only Islamic principle of earning 
a return on capital invested in pure finance (where ownership is separated from 
management). 
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However, as sale on a deferred basis serves the financial needs of the buyer and seller, it 
is no wonder that markup and renting principles have become the dominant practice of 
contemporary Islamic financial institutions. 
Recently, by emphasizing the characteristics of ownership in Islam and its combination 
with different forms of property management, it has been concluded that Mudarabah is 
a principle of pure finance whereas musharakah, like trading, is investment in real 
transactions. 
Debt (dayn) has two primary sources: a non-market source (i. e., a loan) and a market 
source (i. e., a sale). The question of a return on non-market debt does not arise because 
the cause of the debt is a humanitarian consideration and the question of a return on 
debt created by sale does not arise because the return has already been incorporated into 
the price of the assets traded. Thus, once the debt is created, irrespective of its origin, 
the extension of its repayment period can only be non-economic in nature. A debt 
default does not improve the quality or quantity of the debt. Therefore, claiming a return 
for extending the repayment period is unnatural and illogical. The diversified nature of 
the principles of Islamic financing makes it capable of meeting the numerous financial 
needs of society. 
In the developing countries, the capital structure of business and commerce has a very 
weak equity base, and hence it heavily depends on debt capital as a source of funds. The 
Islamic financial system looks at this issue in a much wider context. In an Islamic 
financial framework, there is no room for acquiring capital at a fixed and predetermined 
interest rate. It allows business arrangements in which the supplier of capital is required 
to assume the entire business risk. 
By prohibiting interest earnings in any and all forms, Islam requires people to remain 
active, ready to supply labour, time and skills, or to offer capital for investment, thus 
assuming the business risk. One who earns interest income by supplying capital without 
assuming the business risk is declared unlawful by the Islamic financial system. 
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Under Islamic law, majority of jurists have analysed that Gharar is evidently a broad 
concept of uncertainty and risk-taking as well as excessive speculation and gambling, 
and ignorance over the material aspects of contracts. A certain degree of risk and 
ambiguity that has been deemed unacceptable in earlier times may not be seen in the 
same light under the contemporary market realities. There is thus a strong element of 
subjectivity and value judgment in gharar which has led to differences of opinion 
among jurists. The main dimensions of gharar are not likely to change with advances in 
technology and science simply because modem methods also bring with them 
uncertainties of a different order, which may be a cause of gharar no less serious than 
what we might have had without them. The complexities generated through the modes 
of transaction in banking and finance, stock markets and futures markets have brought 
with them more complex levels of uncertainty (gharar) that often require careful 
assessment and analysis. The basic modes of investment that Islamic law has provided 
are comprehensive enough to relate to all of these concerns and to the over-riding 
concern of all, which is to ensure fairness and prevent excessive uncertainty in 
contracts. 
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Appendix-3.1 
- Summary of Main Features of Islamic Financing Techniques' 
Features 
Nature of 
Financing 
Role of 
Capital 
provide in 
management 
of funds 
Risk bearing 
by the 
capital 
provider 
Uncertainty 
of Rate of 
return 
Cost of 
Capital 
Implications 
of Firm's 
financing 
choice 
Mudharabah 
(Profit Sharing) 
Investment 
based 
Not obliged to 
pay back total 
amount of 
financing 
Nil 
To the full 
extent of 
capital as well 
as the 
opportunity 
cost of capital 
Musharakah 
(Profit Sharing) 
Investment 
based 
Not obliged to 
pay back total 
amount of 
financing 
Full control 
To the extent of 
proportion of 
capital in the 
total investment 
of the enterprise 
For the entire 
period of 
control 
Complete 
uncertainty 
Complete 
uncertainty 
Uncertain 
Ex-ante 
Uncertain 
Ex-ante 
Between the two profit sharing 
methods, Musharakah has the 
edge over mudharabah as capital 
owner in the former case has the 
right to interfere in the 
management and have some 
control over problems created by 
informational asymmetry and 
moral hazard 
Techniques 
Ijarah 
(Leasing) 
Leasing 
Based 
Only rent is 
paid 
Full control 
Same as in 
Mudharabah 
Until the 
asset 
completes its 
life or it is 
disposed off 
Complete 
uncertainty 
Fixed and 
pre- 
determined 
M urabahah 
(Mark up-based) 
Combination of 
trading and 
Debt 
Obliged to pay 
back the entire 
financing 
Full control 
The full extent 
to the capital 
Only for a short 
period until the 
goods are 
purchased and 
taken over by 
the finance user 
Uncertainty 
only for a short 
period of 
contract 
Fixed and pre- 
determined 
Between the two fixed costs of 
capital techniques, Ijarah has the 
edge over Mudharabah as 
capital user in the former case is 
responsible only for the payment 
of the cost of capital and not 
responsible for capital goods 
itself 
Curtsy, www. bradford. ac. uk/acad/management/ externaV pdf/ workingpapers/ 2005/ Booklet_05=15. pdf 
Bay'al-salam 
(Mark up- 
based) 
Combination 
of debt and 
trading 
Not obliged 
to pay back 
total amount 
of financing 
Nil 
Same as in 
Mudharabah 
Even after 
the expiry of 
the contract 
until the 
goods are 
finally 
exposed off 
Complete 
uncertainty 
Uncertain 
Ex-ante 
Bay'as- 
Salam 
provides the 
advantage to 
the seller of 
receiving 
cash advance 
and the buyer 
the benefits 
of lower cost 
of purchase 
'Adopted from Islamic Research and Training Institute (1991); Comparative of Some Islamic Financing Techniques, Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia. 
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Chapter-4 
Country Risk and Uncertainty 
4.1 Introduction 
Since the 18th century, the study of risk and uncertainty in the development and 
fulfilment of business and investment has been a major focus of traditional research and 
analysis by economists. They have tried to present different points of view on risk and 
to explain risk-taking in investment. Meanwhile, Islamic economists have put forward a 
different point of view based on the religious teachings of Islam. This chapter is an 
attempt to discuss the effect of religion on the investment decisions in the context of 
different theories concerning risk and uncertainty. 
Generically, risk is the chance that something bad will happen and this is also a 
perfectly apt definition in the world of investing. This, however, leaves little room for 
measurement; risk in the context of investing simply refers to the variability of 
investment returns. Risk can also be defined as a measure of the potential inability to 
achieve the overall objectives of a program within a defined cost schedule and technical 
constraints and the possibility or chance of meeting danger, suffering loss, injury, etc. 
(Homby 1986). 
Lupton (1999) elaborates that changes in the meaning and use of risk are associated 
with the emergence of modernity beginning in the seventeenth century and gathering 
force in the eighteenth century. In modernity, risk, in its purely technical meaning, came 
to rely upon conditions in which the probability estimates of an event are able to be 
known or are knowable. Uncertainty, in contrast, can be used as an alternative term 
when these probabilities are inestimable or unknown. Risk and uncertainty tend to be 
treated as conceptually the same thing: for example the term `risk' is often used to 
denote a phenomenon that has the potential to deliver substantial harm, whether or not 
the probability of harm occurring is estimable. So it can be said that risk is a very loose 
term in every day parlance. Such findings suggest that risk has definitely become more 
of a key word in the news media, used in the place of such words as `danger', `threats' 
and `hazard'. Risk can also be defined as a socially constructed interpretation and 
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response to `real' danger that objectively exists, even if knowledge about it can only 
ever be mediated through socio-cultural processes (Doglus 1995). 
According to Webster's (1929) dictionary, risk is the "possibility of loss or injury. " In 
investing, risk is the chance that the returns on a particular investment may vary. That's 
another way of saying that there are uncertainties when investing. 
Most investors think of risk as the "chance of loss" or to quantify it, how much you 
could potentially lose for the potential gain. The basic rule of thumb in investing is the 
higher the risk, the higher the potential return; the lower the risk, generally the lower the 
return. There are also other risks associated with investing. These include risks such as 
investments that do not keep pace with inflation, or investments that experience 
unacceptable levels of volatility (fluctuations in value). According to Cool (1999) the 
meaning of risk was wrongly used in economics from 1921 until 1999 and he provided 
a different definition of risk. Cool argues that risk is neither uncertainty nor variance 
and also not the negative of `expected revenue', but risk is the probability of loss 
(disease, death) but it can be defined as the absolute value of the probable loss. 
No matter what an individual decides to do with their savings and investments, they will 
always face some risk. Even money hidden in a mattress or jam jar is vulnerable to the 
risk of being lost in a house fire or burglary. Money in the bank can lose buying power 
because of inflation over the years, leaving the investor with fewer dollars in real terms 
than when they made their deposit. Investing in stocks, bonds, or mutual funds also 
carries risks to varying degrees. 
Strictly speaking, risk and uncertainty are not synonymous. Risk refers to a set of 
unique consequences for a given decision, which can be assigned probabilities, while 
uncertainty implies that it is not possible to assign probabilities (Pike et al 1986). 
The word `risk' originates from the French dictionary word `risque' and was introduced 
in English in the mid seventeenth century. The word `hazard' was common in the 
insurance business; it refers to the chance of loss or other event on which a claim may 
be made. For example, as no one can say for sure whether a particular building will 
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catch fire, most building owners do not operate on a sufficient scale to reduce the loss. 
Extend this base to cover the operations of a large number of persons and convert the 
contingency into a fixed cost to reduce the loss. 
A measurable uncertainty, or `risk' proper, is so far different from an immeasurable one 
that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all. We shall accordingly restrict the term 
`uncertainty' to cases of the non-quantitative type. It is this `true' uncertainty, and not 
risk, as has been argued, which forms the basis of a valid theory of profit and accounts 
for the divergence between actual and theoretical competition. The main concern here is 
the relationship between a known risk and an uncertainty. 
According to Levy & Sarnat (1990), the term risk or equivalent uncertainty is used 
interchangeably to describe an option whose profit is not known in advance with 
absolute certainty, but for which an array of alternative outcomes and their probabilities 
are known. A risky investment is one in which the distribution of profit is known. 
As stated above, uncertainty is an immeasurable risk. Thus there is a positive correlation 
between uncertainty and risk in that the former relates to the overall environment or 
framework and the latter corresponds to a particular event that may take place in that 
environment. The probability of certain outcomes can be elaborated through the 
example of tossing a coin, rolling a dice or drawing out a card from a pack of fifty-two. 
In tossing a coin the probability of heads or tails is 50 %. The probability will decrease 
if the number of possibilities is increased i. e. rolling a dice with numbers from one to 
six gives the probability of a six coming out in a throw as 16.67 %, similarly it is 
decreased if we have to draw a card in a solitaire game. The probability of one 
particular heart coming out in each pull decreases to 1.92 %. 
Further, uncertainty can be used to describe the weather changes in the United Kingdom 
as compared to many other parts of the world where the weather remains the same for a 
couple of months at least. This uncertain change of weather also has great impact on 
economic decisions and development and the situation remains uncertain and also risky. 
Given the positive correlation between (immeasurable) uncertainty and risk, the former 
can be used in place of the word `risk'. From a business point of view we can speak of 
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`risk of loss' and `uncertainty of gain', the word `risk' is ordinarily used in a loose way 
to refer to any sort of uncertainty viewed from the standpoint of the unfavourable 
contingency whilst the term `uncertainty' is used with reference to the favourable 
outcome. 
According to this differentiation, risk offers no profit whereas uncertainty does. Knight 
(1921) suggests employing "objective" and "subjective" probability to designate the risk 
and uncertainty respectively. So the practical difference between the two categories, risk 
and uncertainty, is that for risk, the outcomes in a group of instances are known (either 
through calculation a priori or from statistics of past experience), while in the case of 
uncertainty it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with 
is almost unique. 
Following Knight, some economists differentiate between risk and uncertainty on the 
basis of measurable and immeasurable outcomes, respectively. In practice, however, the 
distinction between uncertainty and risk is blurred. That is why human attitude towards 
uncertainty and risk is similar. However, Adam Smith observes that human beings tend 
to differentiate between uncertainty and risk with respect to what is actually at stake. He 
states that men will readily risk a small amount in the hope of winning a large amount 
when the adverse probability (known or estimated) against winning is much in excess of 
the ratio of the two amounts. 
Accordingly they will commonly refuse to incur a small chance of losing a larger 
amount for a virtual certainty of winning a smaller, even though the actuarial value of 
the chance is in their favour. We begin distinguishing between risk and uncertainty 
when we don't know what will occur in the future. Risk is `uncertainty that matters' 
because it affects economic decisions. Thus, uncertainty is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for risk. Every risky situation is uncertain but there can be uncertainty without 
risk (Bodie et al 2000). 
As risk and uncertainty lie at the very heart of capital investment decisions and risk has 
implications for almost every economic activity, risk may be classified into a number of 
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types. A clear understanding of the different forms of risk can be helpful in the 
decision-making process of investing abroad (Pike et al 1986). 
The term `country risk' is often used in connection with cross border investments and 
analyzed from the foreign investor's perspective. The country risk for a given country is 
therefore the unique risk faced by foreign investors when investing in that specific 
country as compared to the alternative of investing in other countries. Country risk is 
the unique part of the investment's risk caused by the location within national borders. 
Country risk is often meant to measure the possibility of loss only, often called the 
downside risk. What we understand by the term country risk will to some degree depend 
on the type of investment. It is common to use three categories when describing foreign 
investments: lending, equity investment and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
A country is a political entity, with country-specific rules and regulations applying to 
the investment. In addition to the specific regulations, e. g., laws protecting private 
property rights, a government's willingness and ability to change these rules and 
regulations will constitute a source of risk to the investment. 
Political risk may also be caused by the behaviour of the state or state-owned companies 
in the market place, or by more extreme situations like war and civil unrest8. Jodice 
(1985) defined political risk as changes in operating conditions of foreign enterprises 
that arise out of the political process, either directly through war, insurrection, or 
political violence, or through changes in government policies that affect the ownership 
and behaviour of the firm. Political risk can be conceptualized as events, or a series of 
events, in the national and international environments that can affect the physical assets, 
personnel and operation of foreign firms. 
4.2 Country Risk 
Country risk is a broad concept that comprises an underlying combination of 
economics, finance, geopolitics, sociology and historical issues. As the new global 
economy raises the level of uncertainty and complexity for the international firm's 
$ When studying mainly financial assets such as stocks and bonds, the term country risk, and especially political risk, is in most 
cases used to describe the possibility of shocks in financial markets caused by some unforeseen event. The term event risk may also 
be used. 
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cross-border strategy, country risk analysis has today become an essential component of 
strategy decisions regarding export, investment, partnership, mergers and takeovers. 
Along with the risks present in their domestic operations, institutions engaged in 
international activities are exposed to `country risk' -- the risk that economic, social, 
and political conditions and events in a foreign country will adversely affect an 
institution's financial interests. In addition to the adverse effect that deteriorating 
economic conditions and political and social unrest may have on the rate of default by 
borrowers in a country, country risk includes the possibility of nationalization or 
expropriation of assets, government repudiation of external indebtedness, exchange 
controls and currency depreciation or devaluation. 
Country risk has an over-arching effect on an institution's international activities and 
should explicitly be taken into account in the risk assessment of all exposures (including 
off-balance-sheet) to all public - and private sector - foreign-domiciled counterparties. 
The risk associated with even the strongest counterparties in a country will increase if, 
for example, political or macroeconomic conditions cause the exchange rate to 
depreciate and the cost of servicing external debt to rise. 
Country risk is not necessarily limited to an institution's exposures to foreign-domiciled 
counterparties. Although it may not be feasible to incorporate the potential effect of 
country risk on domestic counterparties into an institution's formal country risk 
management process, country risk factors should nevertheless be taken into account, 
where appropriate, when assessing the creditworthiness of domestic counterparties. For 
example, a domestic borrower's credit risk might increase because of significant export 
receivables from a foreign country or because of the transfer-pricing of imports from a 
foreign affiliate. Country risk considerations would also be pertinent when one of the 
determinants of a transaction's value is a foreign country's foreign exchange or interest 
rate environment, as would be the case in an interest rate swap in which one rate is 
derived from a foreign country's yield curve. 
Country risk is not limited solely to credit transactions. Investments in foreign 
subsidiaries, and other outsourcing arrangements with foreign providers all carry with 
61/240 
them the risk that policies or conditions in a foreign country may have adverse 
consequences for the institutions. Nowadays, such issues are more relevant around the 
world, since so-called globalization has led countries towards economic disclosures, 
essential for keeping them competitive. 
Moreover, commodity and stock exchange markets are now linked through real time 
connections, which make the information flows faster and more efficient. So, all agents, 
investors, banks and companies are trying to improve their asset returns, taking 
advantage of the amazing international liquidity opportunities brought by the process of 
globalization. However, to some countries, such opportunities do not only mean 
increasing the investment return. They also represent additional risks from the increased 
volatility of returns. Within this highly sophisticated context, where the decisions are set 
in an effective global market, the country macroeconomic instabilities achieve amazing 
proportions as could be noticed during the financial and economic crisis. So, the 
evolution of international trade as well as the investment and financial programs 
development - due to the business set up, velocity and breadth - demand periodic 
improvements in risk methodology and analysis, especially the country risks that form 
the subject of this chapter. 
A large portion of the past research on political and economic risks has focused on 
developing or testing various political and economic risk measures (Howell & 
Chaddick-1994). Some studies examined more specific country risks, such as the risk of 
terrorist threats (Harvey 1993). Others attempted to determine which risk factors affect 
foreign direct investment. One study sought to replicate Euromoney's and Institutional 
Investor's proprietary country risk ratings using the author's own model, which 
consisted of various macroeconomic and political risk variables. The researchers found 
that all three models predicted similar outcomes. In short, the results suggest that both 
magazines' ratings could be replicated to a significant degree with only a few widely 
available economic statistics (Coset & Roy1991). 
A more recent study compared 1986 projections of The Economist, Political Risk 
Services and The Business Environment Risk Information (BERI) (now Business 
Environment Risk Intelligence) against business losses (defined through a rating 
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method developed by the authors) incurred between 1987 and 1992 (Howell & 
Chaddick 1994). Assuming that the risk measures (or indices) should correlate with 
losses in the period following the assessment, the authors assessed the adequacy of the 
indices by testing the correlation between the index data and the loss indicator. The 
results of their study indicate that, although a few variables were significantly correlated 
with speculative attacks, there are no clear early warning signals of currency crises 
(Eichengreen et al 1995). 
Country risk is also considered a unique part of investment risk caused by the location 
within national borders. Country risk has often meant the measurement of loss only; 
hence it is also called the downside risk (Nordel 2001). Country risk analysis can also 
be a way to minimise the risk of uncertainty for new entrants into emerging markets. 
The managers can formulate their further strategies according to the country risk profile 
for the next three to five years with the scenario of the present economic and political 
situation of the country and also define country risk analysis as an advice and guidance 
measure for the new managers (Oetzel, et al 2001). 
Country risk analysis is also an acknowledgement of the level of control of the national 
government over economic, political and regulatory issues, which play a major role in 
the stability of the country, to achieve the confidence of the international investors 
(Best 2002). 
Country risk analysis as a unique subject can play a particular role in the changing of 
previous trends through internal and external events. Calverley (1988) considers 
political instability risk as an internal part of country risk and it can also be a 
determinant of economic growth in the long run. He also considers that global events 
can also be a major part of the country risk. Calverley (1988) has further elaborated six 
major rules to be looked into in the analysis of country risk. First to understand country 
risk it is necessary to look into the economic and political history of the present 
situation, which gives a basic idea of the international and domestic circumstances. 
Second, he considered it vital to look into the vulnerabilities of the country, even if the 
economic and political situation is favourable. Third, he recommends using scenario 
analysis and sensitivity techniques to identify these vulnerabilities. Fourth, he advises 
the consideration of the uncertainty factor in the judgement of country risk, as the 
degree of uncertainty is an important constituent of the country risk analysis. Fifth, he 
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asked the analysts to look into all of the factors affecting country risk individually as 
there is the possibility of misjudgement of the risk involved in the vulnerability of the 
country. Calverley adds that a country with a risk rating of `B', a "moderately good 
risk", can very often be a "very good risk" but at the same time can have one major 
vulnerability. He has quoted the example of Iran with a very good risk level in all 
respects except the possibility of major political upheaval, which clearly changes the 
whole scenario. Sixth, in his conclusion, he identified ways to deal with uncertainty in 
order to spread the risk across countries and to balance the portfolio in terms of types of 
risks, for example oil producing countries or the aid-dependent countries. 
The importance and effectiveness of country risk analysis is universally agreed 
throughout the literature as being the result of political, social and economic factors and 
that the three factors are highly correlated. Meldrum (2000) has also categorised country 
risk analysis into six major groups: economic risk, financial risk, exchange risk, 
geographical risk, sovereign risk and most important political risk, which overlap in 
interrelationship within the local economy through the local and international political 
system. 
It has been recognized that the generation of interest in foreign investment by the 
multinational corporations is only due to the present importance and necessity of the 
foreign investment for economic development in the developing countries, which has 
been reported through different studies over different time spans (Hong et al 1999). 
Despite the importance of foreign investment for economic development, the MNCs 
still consider the political and law and order risk of the host country to be a major 
determinant in investment decision-making as the volatility and uncertainty of the host 
country increases the risk and uncertainty of the expected returns on the investment. It 
has also been widely recognized that both country-specific and global factors are 
important in explaining capital flows (Fernandez et al 1996 and Taylor et al 1997). 
4.3 Types of Country Risk 
Investment planning is almost impossible without a thorough understanding of risk. 
Before we discuss risk in detail, we should know the ways to handle risk. We can not 
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avoid risk completely but avoidance of some risk is deemed to be possible through the 
act of investing in "risk-free" investments. 
Modern investment analysis categorizes risk into two general types: those that are 
pervasive in nature, such as market risk or interest rate risk, and those that are specific 
to a particular security issue, such as business or financial risk. Therefore, we must 
consider these two categories of total risk. We can arrive at a better understanding 
through the following process. Dividing total risk into its two components, a general 
(market) component and a specific (issuer) component, we have systematic risk and 
non-systematic risk, which are additive: 
Total risk = General risk + Specific risk 
= Market risk + Issuer risk 
= Systematic risk + Non-systematic risk 
1: Systematic Risk (Market Risk) 
An investor can have a diversified portfolio to eliminate a part of the total risk, the non- 
market part. The second part of the risk is the non-diversifiable or the market risk. The 
first part of the risk is directly associated with overall movements in the market or 
economy and called the systematic (market) risk. Virtually all securities have some 
systematic risk, whether bonds or stocks, because systematic risk directly encompasses 
interest rate, market and inflation risks. The investor cannot escape this part of the risk 
because no matter how well he or she diversifies, the risk of the overall market cannot 
be avoided. 
Some risks facing the company are not unique to that business in that market, but are 
faced by all firms operating in the broader, general marketplace. These so-called 
"systematic" risks, such as changes in interest rate levels, the performance and direction 
of the economy or the availability of certain types of skilled labour, cannot be avoided. 
2: Non-systematic Risk 
The risk not related to overall market variability is called the non-systematic (non- 
market) risk. This risk is unique and is associated with factors such as business and 
financial risk as well as liquidity risk. Although all investments tend to have some non- 
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systematic risk, non-market risk can be eliminated by diversification. This type of risk 
can also be called `unique risk' or `diversifiable risk'. The risks that are entirely unique 
to a company, products, buyers, promotional programs, billing, pricing, IT system and 
so on are non-systematic risks specific to an individual firm. Although there is little that 
can be done to avoid or mitigate exposure to systematic risk, it is possible to use various 
diversification strategies to offset risks that are unique to an individual business. 
3: Economic Risk 
Being a major constituent of the country risk analysis, economic risk is a fundamental 
element that produces major change in the expected risk and return of an investment 
which arises from changes in fundamental economic policy goals such as fiscal, 
monetary, and wealth distribution and creation, or via a significant change in a 
country's comparative advantage (e. g., resource depletion, industry decline, 
demographic shift). Economic risk often overlaps with political risk in some 
measurement systems since both are linked to policy (Meldrum 2000). 
Analysts have been trying to formulate a relationship between country risk and the 
major economic factors effecting economic growth and the long-term perspective of 
investment. Along with the growth factors, the analysts have also examined fiscal 
policies, e. g. government expenditures (investment vs. spending as a percent of GDP), 
tax policy (types and rates of taxation, fairness, effectiveness vs. popular avoidance), 
and the government's debt situation (government deficit/GDP, total government 
debt/GDP, debt financing sources). Analysts also look into the major growth factors, 
free market policies, an open economy and other institutional factors (property rights, 
the degree of regulation and the extent of any black market) that affect long-term 
investments. 
Calvo et al (1996) concluded that stable macroeconomic policies, labour market 
conditions, and exchange rate policies in many developing countries attracted more 
capital from the US during the 1980's. Calvo further added that one would expect that, 
as the governments of developing countries make macroeconomic and institutional 
reforms, international investors will gain confidence and be more willing to direct 
capital flows toward the new markets. 
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Alfaro et al (2004) also found a causal relationship between FDI and economic growth 
and conclude that FDI promotes growth through efficient financial markets. 
4: Political Risk 
Political risk is considered as a primary concern and an important part of country risk. 
Political risk can also be defined as a change in political institutions stemming from a 
change in government control, social fabric, or other non-economic factors. This 
category of risk also covers the potential for internal and external conflicts, 
expropriation risk and traditional political analysis. Risk assessment requires the 
analysis of many factors, including the relationships between various groups in a 
country, the decision-making process in the government and the history of the country. 
The political factor in the country risk analysis grew to be a major force during the 
1970s after some radical changes in the political structure of the regions in countries 
like Iran and Nicaragua. Along with these major political changes another major 
concern for the country risk analysts is whether the military or a dictatorship or a 
democratic government is better from the risk standpoint. 
Political risk can also be measured in a quantitative form. Measurement ranges from 
various classification methods (type of political structure, range and diversity of ethnic 
structure, civil or external strife incidents) to surveys or analyses by political experts. 
Most services tend to use country experts who grade or rank multiple socio-political 
factors and produce a written analysis to accompany their grades or scales. Company 
analysts may also develop political risk estimates for their business through discussions 
with local country agents or visits to other companies operating similar businesses in the 
country. In many risk systems, analysts reduce political risk to some type of index or 
relative measure. Unfortunately, little theoretical guidance exists to help quantify 
political risk, so many "systems" prove difficult to replicate over time as various socio- 
political events increase or decline in importance in the view of the individual analyst. 
The political risk has been defined as the implementation of the host government 
policies that directly affects the foreign investment to the country. Schmidt (1986) links 
the risk to subdivisions such as "transfer risk", "operational risk" and "ownership 
control risk" emphasising the risk of confiscation of assets. 
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For thousands of years, international traders and investors have considered that political 
decisions or events in a host country have an effect on the expected outcome of 
investment or trade with that country. This can be seen as an early form of political risk 
analysis. 
Over approximately the last thirty years, the socio-political environment has been 
changing in different regions of the world. Sometimes, these political effects or even the 
radical political changes, have had a positive effect on the inflows of foreign investment 
into the country experiencing political changes. However, most of these changes have 
had an inverse affect on the inflows of foreign investment to the country due to the 
creation of an environment of uncertainty for the international investors (Llewellyn 
1994). 
Llewellyn (1994) also adds that the impact of politics on business operations has always 
been seen as negative. Expropriation, inconvertibility of profits, war damage, and 
damage from civil strife and breach of contract for political reasons have been the 
consequences of political interference. Kidnapping for ransom by guerrilla or other 
political groups is another means by which the investor may lose money because of a 
political risk. While analysing the relationship between political risk and FDI, which 
can be defined in general as the stability of the government of the host country and the 
foreign investment inflows to the country, Kobrin (1978) found a negative relationship 
between political instability and FDI. He further refined his results by defining political 
instability in terms of many other factors, which can eventually risk causing harm to the 
business operating under foreign direct investment. These factors can include guerrilla 
activities related to political movements, discriminatory taxes and the non-protection of 
patents. 
Kobrin (1981) further elaborated his studies and observations as in the following 
paragraph: 
"The term `political risk' thus appears constrained from both an analytical and operation 
viewpoint. What we are, and should be, concerned with, is the impact of events which 
are political in a sense that they arise from power or authority relationships and which 
affect (or have the potential to affect) the firm's operations. Not the events, but their 
potential manifestation as a constraint upon foreign investors, should be a concern. " 
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5: Financial Risk 
Country financial default risk refers to the probability that a country will be unable to 
generate enough foreign exchange to enable its residents, both public and private, to 
meet interest and principal payments on their foreign debts. It plays a prominent role in 
the literature on sovereign debt and country creditworthiness and has profound 
implications for a country's economic and social well-being. First of all, a de jure or de 
facto default indicates that a country is unable to generate the foreign exchange it 
requires to maintain internal and external economic equilibrium. Restoration of 
equilibrium implies relative price changes, resource reallocation, and income 
redistribution, with resulting painful effects on levels of output, employment and 
standards of living. Besides the costs associated with economic adjustment, debt default 
also inflicts two other penalties on the country. The first refers to the costs associated 
with the loss of access to international capital markets. The second concerns the costs 
due to direct sanctions such as the elimination of trade credits or the seizure of assets 
(Clark et a! 2004). 
4.4 Political Risk 
The importance of analysing these three questions is due to two major reports on the 
interest in FDI by developing countries instead of borrowing from developed countries. 
Firstly, it was mentioned in the World Bank Report (1994-95) on capital flows to 
developing countries in 1990-1993. Secondly, the main characteristics of FDI in sharing 
risk are market discipline, export orientation and the transfer of technology and 
managerial skills. According to recent trends in FDI flows to the developing countries, 
politically and economically stable countries received more FDI. 
The economists arrive at different conclusions on the affect of socio-political factors on 
FDI, where political instability has not been defined as a major determinant of FDI 
flows as it varies from country to country. Aharoni (1996) found it the major 
determinant but Green (1972) argues that political instability has no affect on US FDI to 
the recipient countries, while Levis (1979) found a mixture of results while applying the 
two different proxies of political stability or instability to different countries. 
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Singh and Jun (1995) tested various models and concluded that socio-political 
instability is a complex phenomenon, so it gave different results9. 
Finally they concluded that the political instability is the major determinant of FDI in 
positive or negative affect on flows. However, the relationship between FDI and 
political instability can be exactly pinned down by the detailed study of the sectoral FDI 
data. They also concluded that the relative size of the export sector is the strongest 
explanatory variable of FDI flows to a host country. 
Political risk analysis has become an essential part of the strategic decisions 
individually made by the banks lending to sovereign countries and by multinational 
companies investing across borders. 
Despite vast literature and empirical studies on the expected risk to be faced by MNEs, 
the importance and significance of political risk for FDI has become one of the essential 
variables for empirical studies. Moreover, a definition of political risk is essential if any 
kind of analysis of it is to be undertaken. Thus, it is essential to recall what political risk 
is while analyzing the relationship between political risk and FDI. 
Economists have also tried to find out the expected effects of foreign currency value on 
investment (returns decline in the foreign currency) in the scenario of returns on 
international investment as compared to the returns on domestic investments made by 
the MNEs. As described above, the two types of risk analysis were used for empirical 
analysis. Firstly, the quantitative risk analysis generally focused on a country's ability to 
repay the debt. Secondly, the qualitative analysis attempted to find out a country's 
willingness to repay the debt. During the empirical analysis of the above risks, the 
transfer, and short-term exchange rate risk were kept in major focus. 
Simmonds and Robock (1973) define political risk in international investment situations 
as the discontinuities in the business environment, when they are difficult to anticipate 
and when they happen due to sudden change in the political situation in the host 
I As the regression results differ substantially when different proxies are employed to capture the relationship. The significance of a 
broad-based qualitative political risk index has been found to be greater for the high-FDI group. 
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country. Agmon (1985) defines political risk as the unanticipated changes in 
government policies that affect the relative prices of traded factors of production, goods 
and services caused by the instability in the political situation of a country. 
Accordingly, there exists literature with different definitions of political risk. Indeed the 
definition of political risk depends on the perspective in which it is viewed by the 
analystio 
Post 1980's, the concept of political risk has gained an important impetus following the 
initial attempts in the economics literature to quantify and clarify the concept as a 
mechanism for the objective evaluation of foreign investment flows. 
The evolution of FDI gave birth to a variety of economic studies using various methods 
and approaches to assess the political risk empirically. Among these studies, it is worth 
mentioning the definition by Rummel and Heenan (1978), in which they proposed a 
method of converting political instability into probabilistic terms to provide a scientific 
definition of political risk. 
Various attempts have been made to provide a quantitative political risk analysis to 
international investors to ease their decision-making process. William Coplin and 
Michael O'Leary (1979) also began to develop the Political-Risk Services (PRS) 
Evaluation System, which has been used by a number of multinationals since the 
1980's". Since then, new approaches to political risk have also been developed in the 
economic literature. One distinguishing feature of these new approaches is their attempt 
to value the political risk and integrate it into the decision-making process of an 
enterprise, as well as their use of socio-economic and socio-political variables for the 
assessment of political risk 12. The Business Environment Risk Information Index 
(BERI) developed by F. T. Haner (1966) as a quantitative guide to political risk ratings 
can be noted as the first ever services-based risk analysis system. BERI started with a 
review of more than 144 countries three times a year and based its judgments and 
10 See appendix- 4.1 (page 125) 
http: //www. icrgonline. com/page. aspx? page=icrgmethods#_top 
12 See also, "Bank of America WIS, Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) S. A., Control Risks Information Services 
(CRIS), Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Euro money, Institutional Investor, Standard and Poor's Rating Group, Political Risk 
Services: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Moodys Investor Services" 
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appreciations on the analysis by a panel of outside experts who try to rank countries 
according to fifteen factors affecting the business climate (BERI 1966). 
Each of the indices or ratings provided amalgamates a range of qualitative and 
quantitative information into a single index or rating. In the forth-coming sections, the 
methodologies used by some of the foremost providers of risk ratings are applied 
internationally in general and to Pakistan in particular (Harvey et a! 1996). 
Post 1990's, the political risk concept has been further refined due to scientific 
contributions from other fields of research such as political science, sociology, decision 
theory and psychology and the interdisciplinary work between political science and 
economics. 
Post 1980's and 1990's, the surge in demand for FDI has become the centre of attention 
and the subject of discussions in the literature on international trade and finance. The 
determinants of FDI in general and political risk in particular have been a major 
question in literature on the empirical analysis of relationship in international trade and 
investment. 
Several studies have been carried out on determinants of FDI to discover the ways and 
motives of international investment. Thus the empirical studies trying to determine the 
role of political risk in international investment decisions came up with two types: one 
based on executive management answers to survey questions and the second based on 
events data and FDI. 
The empirical research into the relationship between political research and FDI is 
mostly related to developing countries (LDCs) due their political instability. Most of the 
literature and empirical findings have used basic components of political risk, such as 
government stability, socio-economic conditions, internal and external conflicts, 
13 corruption, ethnic violence and accountability 
13 For more components see, ICRG rating system-1994 (PRS group) 
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The economists have found different results with positive and negative correlations 
between PR14 and FDI. Some studies put more emphasis on economic variables as 
explanatory factors of FDI along with PR, whereas others concentrate on PR factors 
only. Thus, statistical empirical studies have dealt with the determinants of FDI with 
respect to two factors: political and economic (Singh et al -1995). 
While reviewing the empirical literature of political risk and FDI relationships, it is 
useful to distinguish two approaches. The first approach, which is based only on 
political risk and stresses the political factors as a determinant of FDI while the second 
approach is based on socio-economic as well as on socio-political factors as the 
determinants of FDI. 
Both socio-economic and socio-politically-based empirical studies on the determinants 
of FDI indicate that the flows of FDI are determined by the decisions of multinational 
enterprises according to the economic and political conditions of the host country (Root 
et al -1979). 
Earlier studies by Kobrin (1976) on the relevance of political risk statistics failed to 
establish a relationship between political risk and the flows of FDI. Kobrin (1976) 
examined the relationship between the number of new manufacturing subsidiaries 
established in each country and several variables measuring political structure and 
unrest, economic-size and growth, and socio-economic development. Despite a positive 
correlation of the results between economic variables, Kobrin could not find any 
relationship between PR factors and FDI. 
Nigh (1985) analyzed US FDI in manufacturing in 24 countries, including 11 
developing countries, during 1954-1975. He found that for the developing countries in 
particular, FDI flows are related to internal conflicts such as civil war. Other empirical 
studies such as Yu (1987) and Brewer (1985) found statistically insignificant correlation 
between PR in general and governmental instability in particular and FDI. 
14 PR: The exclusive definition of political risk (PR) includes in the sources of political risk concept all 
kinds of political motivated acts no matter where these are rooted. 
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On the other hand, many empirical studies on the economic theory of multinationals or 
economic theory of international production also try to account for political risk in the 
form of country-specific factors and to relate political factors with FDI. An overview of 
some studies dealing with the economic theory of MNCs and international production 
could therefore shed light on the relationship between political risk and FDI. These 
studies have found substantial and significant correlation between PR and FDI (Levis 
1979). 
One example of a theory of MNCs dealing with political risks is provided by the 
"eclectic" approach of international production as propounded by Dunning ((1973 
&1993). On the basis of surveys among entrepreneurs engaged in international 
production, Dunning distinguishes three sets of influences on FDI, (1) market factors 
such as size and growth of the market measured by the GNP of the recipient country; 
(2) cost factors such as the availability of labour law, labour costs and inflation; (3) the 
investment climate as measured by the degree of foreign indebtedness and the state of 
the balance of payments. It is only here that political factors play a role since the 
investment climate is considered partly to depend on political stability. 
Dunning (1981) in his eclectic model also accounts for political risk in the form of 
BERI (Business Environmental Risk Index) or tax burden as a determinant for FDI. In 
the classification of the determinants of FDI, Agarwal (1980) mentions two political 
factors namely political stability and the threat of nationalization in conjunction with 
other economic variables such as investment incentives or the degree of economic 
development. 
Root and Ahmed (1979) also tried in their model to account for political risks and tested 
economic factors along with social and political factors (government change, internal 
armed attacks, administrative efficiency, nationalism, per capita foreign aid, colonial 
affiliation and the role of government in the economy) and found a significant influence 
on FDI. 
The model proposed by Schneider and Frey (1985) incorporates a large number of 
possible determinants and looks successively at the results of the estimation of 
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determinants of FDI to developing countries compared with the results of estimates with 
three alternative models (the political, the economic and the amalgamated model). They 
conclude that FDI in developing countries is simultaneously determined by economic 
and political factors. 
Some of the empirical studies have put more emphasis on macro-economic variables as 
explanatory factors of FDI whereas others have emphasized the importance of political 
risk as a major determinant of FDI. So it has become necessary to test economic factors 
and political risk as joint determinants of FDI due to the difficulty of making a clear-cut 
distinction between political and macro-economic variables. 
4.5 Political Risk Measurement 
Despite the difficulty of quantifying the country risks in general and political risk in 
particular, it is possible to collect most of the information appertaining to events 
available for the series in Pakistan over the period 1970-2004. Most of the recent studies 
and a number of companies have analysed the risk by providing the risk indices on 
individual components of political risk to evaluate the credit rating of the country in 
terms of borrowing or foreign direct investments but in this research a cumulative 
political risk index for Pakistan has been computed for 1970-2004 for empirical 
analysis. 
Political risk indices are, as the name implies, indices measuring the level of host 
country political risk, which is a part of the total country risk. A high level of an index 
corresponds to either a high or low level of risk, depending on the specification of the 
index. What is meant by political risk is determined by the way the index is constructed. 
The use of sub-indices is a typical way of making a political risk index. In the section, 
the rating system of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) will be presented as 
in Coplin and O'Leary (1994). The methodology used for the assessment of the current 
risk has also been taken from ICRG as a guideline15 
The political risk assessments are made on the basis of subjective analysis of the 
available information and the risk assessments on a mix of subjective analysis and 
15 Source: ICRG rating system Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
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objective data. After a risk assessment (rating) has been awarded to each of the 12 risk 
components, labelled A to L in Table 4.1, the components within each category of risk 
are added together to provide a risk rating for each category. The risk ratings for each of 
these categories are then combined, on the basis of a formula, to provide an overall, or 
composite, risk rating for the country in question. 
Political Risk is comprised of the following risk indicators: economic expectations vs. 
reality; economic planning failures; political leadership; external conflict; corruption in 
government; the role of the military in politics; organized religion in politics; law and 
order tradition; racial and nationality tensions; political terrorism; civil war; political 
party development; and the quality of the bureaucracy 
Table-4.1 
POLITICAL RISK INDEX COMPONENTS16 
Sequence Components 
A Government Stability 
B Socioeconomic Conditions 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
Very High Risk 
High Risk 
Moderate Risk 
Low risk 
Very Low Risk 
Investment Profile 
Internal Conflict 
External Conflict 
Corruption 
Military in Politics 
Religious Tensions 
Law and Order 
Ethnic Tensions 
Democratic Accountability 
Bureaucracy Quality 
Max. Points 
GS 12 
Sc 12 
IP 12 
IC 12 
EC 12 
Crp 6 
MiP 6 
RT 6 
LO 6 
ET 6 
DA 6 
BQ 4 
00.0 to 49.9 % 
50.0 to 59.9 % 
60.0 to 69.9 % 
70.0 to 79.9 % 
80.0 to 100% 
The highest overall rating (100 points) indicates the lowest risk, and the lowest rating 
(0) indicates the highest risk. For general purposes, the overall degree of risk implied by 
the Composite Risk Rating calculated for any particular country can be estimated from 
the following broad categories: 
16 Soma ICRO taints trystem, CAeper-2, p 19-23. Political Risk Services USA-1994 
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00.0 to 49.5 points Very High Risk 
50.0 to 59.5 points High Risk 
60.0 to 69.5 points Moderate Risk 
70.0 to 84.5 points Low Risk 
85.0 to 100.0 points Very Low Risk17 
4.6 Risk Assessment of Pakistan (1970-2004) 
The turmoil end changes in the political structure of developing countries in general and 
Pakistan in particular in the 1970s and 1980s, tended to focus on the risk a private 
lender outside its home country can face. The analysis of country risk is used to analyse 
the potential shortfalls in the balance of payments, foreign exchange reserves and the 
economic and political condition of a host country. 
Pakistan has not been able to demonstrate political stability since its foundation. During 
the period 1949-1999, democratically elected governments have been overthrown at 
different intervals by a military dictator with the help of either left wing political parties 
or the corrupt bureaucrats (Talbot-1998). Four army generals Ayub Khan (1959-1969), 
Yahya Khan (1969-1971), Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) and Pervaiz Musharraf (1999-2004), 
governed Pakistan for a total of 29 years out of 56 years of independence, but the 
present military leadership displays little open enthusiasm for displacing the politicians 
once again (Macko 1998). 
During these 29 years of military dictatorship, the constitution was suspended and the 
country was run on temporary orders. The government instability caused by the 
intervention of military generals has shaken the international investors' confidence in 
building assets in Pakistan since 1947 in general and 1970 in particular (Noman-1985). 
The political unrest (1970) in the east wing of Pakistan also created an atmosphere 
which undermined law and order and encouraged ethnic violence and internal conflict 
whilst the need for property protection kept the international investors from thinking 
about investing in Pakistan whilst it was in such an unstable situation (Mahmood 2000). 
The religious and ethnic violence from 1988-2004 kept most of the international 
investors away from Pakistan. Despite a stable, so-called democratic government under 
"For further details see "ICRG PR indexation Methodology", Chapter-02 
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the power of a military general (1999-2005), Pakistan has still not been able to capture 
as big a share of FDI as other developing countries as shown on Tables 2.1 (page 31). 
Pakistan's economy at present is recovering after passing through a critical phase in its 
history, the 1999 military intervention and 2001 terrorist activities in the USA on 11th 
September 2001. GDP growth rate reached 8.4% for 2004-05 after dipping to 2.6% in 
2000-2001 as shown in Table 8.1. Also FDI remained at its lowest level during 2000-01 
at US$332 million during 1999-2005 as shown in Table 8.1. Frequent interruptions in 
the implementation of structural reforms and stabilization measures in the past have 
caused a deceleration in economic activity on one hand and serious macroeconomic 
imbalances on the other. Against an average growth of slightly above 6.0 percent in the 
1980s, economic growth slowed to an average of 5.1 percent in the 1990s. More 
importantly, real GDP growth decelerated to an average of 3.1 percent during 1996-99. 
Despite the low and declining economic growth, GDP grew by 4.8 percent in 1999- 
2000, which was supported by an impressive recovery in agriculture, which grew by 
7.1 % as against 1.9 percent in the preceding year. The large-scale manufacturing growth 
declined by 0.7 percent in 1999-2000 due to low levels of foreign investment of 
between 2.2 and 3.7% of total FDI in manufacturing, especially in textile, cement and 
sugar. 
Real GDP grew by 8.4 percent in 2004-05 as against 6.4% during 2003-04 and 
surpassed the target (6.6%) for the year by a wide margin. The sharp pick up in growth 
during 2004-05 is ably supported by a stellar performance in large-scale manufacturing, 
impressive recovery in agriculture and a strong growth in the services sector. Large- 
scale manufacturing grew by 8.6% against the target of 12.2% and last year's (2003-04) 
achievement of 18.2%. Growth in large-scale manufacturing has been broad-based as 
many sub-sectors registered a high double-digit growth and targeted 14.5% to achieve 
during 2004-05 (Economic Survey of Pakistan 2005-06). 
As stated earlier, growth has been underpinned by supportive macroeconomic policies 
and benign financial market conditions. Like growth, foreign direct investment was 
broad-based. Major growth in investment by the foreign sector was witnessed in 
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agriculture (10.2%), manufacturing (8%), mining and quarrying (12%), construction 
(2.8%), transport and communication (35%) and finance business (18%). As a result of 
the sharp rise in foreign investment, general FDI was up by 45% in 2004-05 due to 
leading investment by the UAE, 24% of total FDI, in the communications sector. 
Despite an overwhelming GDP growth rate, Pakistan's total stock of external debt and 
foreign exchange liabilities grew at an average rate of 6.2 percent per annum during 
1990-99 - rising from $21.9 billion in 1990 to $37.6 billion by the end of June 1999 and 
further to $37.9 billion by 1999-2000 but thereafter it exhibited a declining trend from 
$37.86 billion in 1999-00 to $36.62 billion by the end of March 2005.18 
Pakistan's external debt and liabilities had reached unsustainable levels by the end of 
the 1990-2005, posing a serious danger to the economic future and credit worthiness of 
the country. The empirical evidence suggests bidirectional causality between external 
debt and growth. Higher external debt lowers the growth rate whilst at the same time 
lower growth increases indebtedness (Fosu 1996). 
The geographical position of Pakistan is very important as it stands in between the vast 
hot Indian Ocean connected to the Gulf Sea and the approach to East Asian countries, 
especially to China. Its eastern border is entirely shared with its foundation rival, India. 
The relations with India are always in a very critical situation as they have fought two 
wars and now both of the countries possess nuclear weapons and have a claim for 
Kashmir, which is the basic cause of tension and conflict in the relations between the 
countries. Pakistan's relations with China are very friendly as China constructed a huge 
road crossing the Himalayas Mountains called Shahra-e-Raishem19. 
The strategic importance of Pakistan is recognised but the religious militancy is a 
threatening image for the international investor, particularly from developed countries 
like the EU and the US. This has not affected much of the FDI from the US and the UK 
but the other regional countries have been affected more20. 
"See httn: //www. finance. ov. pklsurvey/chapters/IO-exter d. PDF. table-10.1. pp-7 
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The geographical location of the host country has a causal relationship with FDI due to 
the increasing use of outsourcing. It has also been empirically shown that a safer 
location effect conveyed by the host country is a key explanation for a change in 
investors' sensitivity to the determinants of foreign direct investment (Waldkirch-2003). 
4.7 A Political Risk Index for Pakistan 
The index is calculated according to the formula mentioned above as taken from ICRG 
methodology. The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating comprises three 
categories of risk: political, financial and economic, with political risk containing 12 
main components. A separate index is created for each of the sub-categories. The 
Political Risk index is based on 100 points and different weightings have been given to 
each subcategory in political risk. The composite scores, ranging from zero to 100, are 
then broken into categories from Very Low Risk (80 to 100 points) to Very High Risk 
(zero to 49.5 points) table-4.1 (page 76). 
In general terms, if the points awarded are less than 50% of the total, that component 
can be considered as very high risk. If the points are in the 50-60% range the 
component is high risk, in the 60%-70% range represents a moderate risk, in the 70- 
80% range a low risk and in the 80-100% range a very low risk. This being a general 
guideline does not mean that the risk will be graded according to one component but 
one low risk component can compensate for a higher risk rating in another. 
Similarly a better financial or economic risk rating can compensate for a poor political 
risk rating. As only the political risk indices (PRI) will be used for the empirical 
analysis of FDI inflows to Pakistan (1970-2005), the risk calculated will be this 
dissertation's core and original work. The following section will have a detailed 
individual introduction of the 12 main components of PRI with a brief introduction to 
the sub-components. 
19 http: //www. hsbc. com. hk/pdf/corp/pk. pdf 
m See Appendix-4.3 for PR indexation references on killing of French and Chinese engineers May-2002) 
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4.8 Aggregate Political Risk 
The aggregate risk model system is based on a set of 22 different political, financial, 
and economic components, with political risk comprising 12 of the basic components 
and financial and economic risk comprising 5 each (ICRG-94). 
In this research, political risk is an important factor driving FDI so a political risk index 
has been prepared using qualitative information for Pakistan for the period 1970-2004. 
According to the PRS group methodology of calculating individual political risk index, 
the political risk index has been assigned with 12 basic components, the aggregate 
political risk has been given an overall risk-weighting of 100 with a risk index of 0 to 
100,0 meaning the highest risk and 100 the lowest. 
Of the 12 basic components, 5 have been assigned a risk weighting of 12; 6 have a 
weighting of 6; and a risk weighting of 4 has been assigned to the last remaining basic 
component. The basic 12 components have been divided into a different number of sub 
components. The risk weighting of all basic components has been distributed equally 
each of their subcomponents, as shown on Table-4.1 (page 76). 
The first 5 basic components carrying a weighting of 12 each have been considered as 1 
full contributing component in the total of 100 points. The next 6 basic components 
carrying a weighting of 6 each have been considered as 50% of any one of the first 5 
basic components, which means that 2 second-type basic components carry equal 
weighting with one of the first type of basic component. The 12th and last basic 
component carrying a weighting of 4 has been considered as 33.33% of any one first- 
type subcomponent. The following basic formula is proposed for the calculation of the 
aggregate political risk; where the variables are defined on Table-4.1 (page 76): 
PRI = [(GS+SC+IP+IC+EC+Crp+MiP+RT +LO+ET+DA+BQ)18.333] 
where weightings are expressed as: 
GS+SC+IP+IC+EC (5x12)/12 =5 
Crp+MiP+RT+LO+ET+DA (6x6)/12 =3 
BQ (1x4)/12 = 1/3 
8.333 
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For example the aggregate risk for 1973 will be calculated as follows21: 
PRI = [83.33 + 62.50 + 33.33 + 37.50 + 33.33 + 66.67 + 83.33 + 75.00 + 58.33 
+ 29.17 + 50.00 + 43.75]/8.333 = 78.75 
A very low risk during 1973 due to a new democratic government with a majority in the 
parliament of Pakistan made it easy for the government to implement its policies during 
its period in office from 1973 to 1977. The risk profile even remained above an average 
of 50% throughout 1978-2004 due to better economic and social policies along with 
new protective rules and regulations to facilitate and attract foreign investors to the 
country, despite its fragile economic and political environment22. 
The institutional strength and quality of the political stability is another shock absorber 
that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change23. Therefore, high 
points are given to countries where the political instability risk has been low. Countries 
that lack the cushioning effect of a strong political stability receive low points because a 
change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to- 
day administrative functions (ICRG-94). 
Correlations of - 4% and -30% have been found between government stability and real 
FDI flows and stock respectively for 1970-2004, which indicates that the political risk 
(PR) of the country domestically does not have much of an effect on the flows but 
affects the stock of FDI. The correlations of -11% and -5% between nominal FDI flow 
and stock and PR respectively has been found, which reveals that the political risk index 
does show a change in the correlation between nominal FDI flows and stock from the 
correlation between real FDI flows and stock and political risk (PR). This indicates that 
the political risk level does affect the risk-averse international investors' confidence as 
it reveals a negative correlation. The correlation results with a two-year lag between 
FDI flows and stock also do not reveal any significant change at -7% and -11%, as 
shown in Tables 4.3 to 4.6 on pages 119-120. The two-year lag correlation results also 
reveal a negative correlation between FDI flows, stock and Political Risk, where the 
correlation is -11%. 
21 See Table-4.2, page 117 
22 See Appendix-4.2, section-C (1970-2005) 
23 See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3 
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1: Government Stability 
Government stability in a country is a key determinant for growth, development and 
poverty alleviation. A stable government is dependent upon a small number of crucial 
elements, however, despite this, measuring the stability of a government in a country 
like Pakistan with a history of turmoil and political instability is a challenge not least 
because of issues surrounding the conception and definition of the concepts involved. 
The government stability component of the total political risk index for Pakistan 
measures the government's ability to stay in office through a democratic process and its 
ability to carry out its declared program(s) during its time in office. This component 
basically looks into the type of governance, the cohesion between governing and 
opposition parties, the implementation of law and legislation and the popularity of the 
government over time as an indication of the approval of its policies24. 
The government stability component of the political risk index has been assigned 12 
points out of the total 100 points because of the consecutive changes in the 
governments. The democratically elected political governments have been destabilized 
over time either by military intervention or by the use of presidential powers in the 
constitution. 
Despite the short durations of different governments in Pakistan, the government 
stability component has been divided into six sub-components such as ability to work, 
ability to stay in office, type of governance, interaction between political parties, 
command and implementation of law and an economic policies index. The sub- 
components have been assigned equal risk index points as all of the sub-components 
carry equal importance. 
The risk carries a similar weight to the main component, which is 0 for the highest risk 
and 2 for the minimum risk. The level of risk assigned to each of the sub-component is 
then added to a total named `actual risk points'. The Government Stability risk profile is 
calculated as follows: 
Government Risk Profile of 2 ARP25=2; TRP26=12; (2/12)* 100=16.67=very high risk27. 
I See Appendix-4.3 (A & B), section-A (1970-2005) 
25 Actual risk points (calculated through qualitative information for Pakistan 1970-2004) 
26 Total risk points (Total weight age points given to each component in ICRG methodology) 
27 Source: ICRG rating system Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
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A negative correlation of 14% and 18% has been found between government stability 
and FDI flows and stock respectively for 1970-2004, which indicates a negative 
influence for the government's inability to stay in office and inability to work for the 
best implementation of law and legislation along with its economic policies. This also 
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indicates that there has been no collusion between the governing party and the 
opposition to avoid any political violence and end unrest. The correlation is reached to 
-22% and -19% for nominal FDI flows and stock, which indicates the valuation effect of 
GS risk as shown on Tables 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6 (page 119-120). 
Dummy variable D {D=1 (1970-72), D=2 (1973-77), D=3 (1978-88), D=4 (1989-89), 
D=5 (1999-04)) for the aggregate political risk index has also been introduced due to 
consecutive changes in the government. 
Better understanding between the parties creates an environment of better law and order 
to attract international investors bringing in new technology and increasing employment 
opportunities. 
2: Socioeconomic Conditions 
The socioeconomic conditions play a vital role if a government's economic policies are 
to be implemented in justifiable way and the fruit are to reach to the basic roots of 
development resulting in growth in employment, increasing literacy, improvements in 
the health sector, decreased infant mortality and improved basic facilities for the general 
public (Samad 1993). 
The growth will bring satisfaction to the public and encourage confidence in the 
government. In general terms, the greater the dissatisfaction with a government's 
policies, the greater the chances that the government will be forced to change track, 
which possibly affects international investors' confidence and eventually causes the 
government to fail. 
The socioeconomic conditions index has been also divided into six subcomponents each 
assigned with equal risk points up to a maximum of 2, which indicates the lowest risk 
and better socioeconomic condition of the country due to better implementation of 
social and economic policies. This section comprises public reaction to policies, public 
facilities, employment, interest rate, housing market and, most importantly, the infant 
mortality rate. The infant mortality rate was recorded at 117 per 1000 in the 1970s. This 
fell to 90 per 1000 infants during 1990s and further went down to 74 per 1000 during 
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2000-2004. Similarly the risk points have been assigned according to the changing 
conditions of other sub-components during 1970-2004. 
Socioeconomic Risk Profile of 5 ARP=5; TRP=12; (5/12)* 100=41.6628, very nearly 
moderate risk towards higher risk. This was due to the 1970s change of government and 
civil war threat in the eastern wing of Pakistan. The upsurge of public reaction in the 
Eastern wing was due to the unjustified implementation of social and economic policies 
mainly in the eastern wing of Pakistan during the 1958-1969 period of military rule. But 
this risk went down as the new political government took over after the separation of the 
eastern wing (now Bangladesh) and gave more benefits to employees and spent more on 
social indicators like health, education and living standards by building houses for 
employees. The risk index reached 83.33 showing the lowest risk in 1976, which 
indicated the best socioeconomic conditions for the mass of the population. 
This attempt aims to identify those factors that are important for the society in question, 
i. e. those with the greatest political impact, and assess the component on that basis. For 
example a three percentage point rise in unemployment could have a significant 
political impact in a country that has enjoyed an unemployment rate of just 2%, but 
would be barely noticed in a society where unemployment is in excess of 30%. 
Similarly, a sharp rise in interest rates, which hit the housing market in a developed 
society, would have a negligible impact in a society where most people secure their 
everyday needs by barter29. 
A negative correlation of -14% has been found between socioeconomic conditions and 
FDI flows and stock respectively for 1970-2004, which indicates the socioeconomic 
conditions of the general mass of the country does not have much of an effect on the 
flows and stock of FDI, but it can still be considered as an important factor due to a 
correlation of -14%. A movement in FDI stock was found during the 1980s as the 
socioeconomic conditions improved to 67 index points, revealing lower risk and higher 
FDI flows and stock as shown on Tables 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6 (page 119-120). 
" ARP=Actual risk points (calculated through qualitative information for Pakistan 1970-2004) 
TRP=Total risk points (Total weight age points given to each component in ICRG methodology) 
Source: ICRG rating system Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
29 See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3 : section-B (1970-2005) 
87/240 
Chart -4.3 (a &b) 
1000-1 
Y 
V 
0 
y100 
r2 LL 
0! f 
x 
m 
c10 
Y 
0 
FK 
I 
Socioeconomic Conditions (SC) Risk Index 
Real FDI Flows & Stock 
ýý ,6 , °b-lb op 
h°ýry 
01 
"CO , °ýý "Cfp "* , -" "°P'6 ýýý ti4,104ti 10, ý°ý ý. °ý1~ , °b ý°ý 
Years 
SC -FDIS FDI 
1000 
, eloo 0 0 
N 
F3 
LL 
so lo- 
x 
Cf 
ß 
c 
Y 
d 
Socioeconomic Conditions (SC) Risk Index 
Nominal FDI Flows & Stock 
ý. 
, °bý0 
O `% 06 
K°ý N% KK 
0.1 
I. I. I. 
Pa 
`a 
ry 
-. 
` 
`o 
° 
40 tip , ticPry 1 
Years 
I =SC -FDIS FDI 
3: Investment Profile 
The rating for the stability of government gives the impression that a stable government 
can implement its economic and social policies in a better way, which will yield it 
benefits with the passage of time. This can be achieved by reducing the risk to property 
rights and/or taxation. 
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The labour cost is also a major subcomponent of the investment profile of the country's 
domestic investment. This can certainly affect the foreign investment but other factors 
such as interest and tax rates carry more influence than property rights3o 
The investment profile has been also divided into four subcomponents assigning equal 
risk points up to a maximum of 3, which indicates the lowest risk and better IP of the 
country due to the implementation of social and economic policies for the amendment 
of taxation and property laws. This section comprises contract viability, taxation, 
repatriation and labour costs. 
Investment Profile risk of 4 ARP=4; TRP=12; (4/12)* 100=33.3331. This represents a 
moderate risk tending towards higher risk due, in the 1970s, to the civil war threat in the 
eastern wing of Pakistan and the nationalization policies of the newly formed 
government 1973-1977. The risk profile remained above an average of 50% throughout 
1978-2004 due to better economic and social policies along with new protective rules 
and regulations to facilitate and attract foreign investors to a country with a fragile 
economic and political environment32. 
Correlations of -3% and -4% have been found between investment profile and real FDI 
flows and stock respectively for 1970-2004, which indicates that the IP of the country 
domestically does not have much of an effect on the flows and stock of FDI. Increased 
correlations of 10% and 5% between nominal FDI flow and stock and IP respectively 
have been found, which reveals that the IP risk index does not show any major change 
in the correlation between nominal FDI flows and stock from the correlation between 
real FDI flows and stock and IP. This indicates that the domestic IP risk level does not 
affect the risk-averse international investors' confidence as it shows a positive 
correlation. The correlation results for 02 years lag at 8% and 5% between FDI flows 
and stock also does not reveal any significant change Tables 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6 (page 
33 119-120). 
See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3, section-C (1970-2005) 
ARP=Actual risk points (calculated through qualitative information for Pakistan 1970-2004) 
TRP=Total risk points (Total weight age points given to each component in ICRG methodology) 
Source: ICRG rating system Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
32 See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3, section-C (1970-2005) 
33 See tables 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6 (pages 119-120) 
89/240 
Chart -4.4 (a & b) 
1000-1 
Y 
V 
0 
(%)i00ti 
G 
LL 
ad 
x 
W 
V 
c 10 
Y 
M 
OC 
o,, 
0 
o, `'' 4ý1k -°`fo -°ý1ý 
Invesment Profile (IP) Risk Index 
Real FDI Flows & Stock 
COP °o> CO? ' (be º. °ýý 
ý 
cigý cie 4 °JA tiý tiýry tiý 
Years 
1000 
100 
J9 V 
0 
ý N 
G 
LL. 
so lo- 
x 
m 
wI 
c 
Y 
M 
1 
k°) ý: 
0.1 
Years 
I =IP FDIS FDI 
In this attempt to identify those factors that are important for the international investors, 
such as protection of their capital and profits, despite higher labour costs, the investment 
profile showed a higher correlation of 50% with real FDI flows and stock. This reveals 
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the improved implementation of the 1976 investment act34. Meanwhile, an average 
correlation of 64% has been found between IP and nominal FDI flows and stock, which 
indicates that IP risk does not have much effect on the value risk of FDI either in flows 
or stock. 
4: Internal Conflict 
Internal conflicts can be either between political parties, i. e. governing party and the 
opposition parties, or it can be between small ethnic groups. The potential for good 
governance means that the government can ensure the supremacy of the law and the 
legislature. High levels of armed opposition will show a higher risk and lower conflicts 
shows a lower risk. The lowest points have been given to Pakistan (1982-83) for armed 
violence between political parties, e. g. in Karachi. 
The act of kidnapping for ransom, whether acts of violence are carried out for a political 
objective (i. e. terrorist operations) or carried out for the benefit of small groups, can also 
increase the risk rating for a developing country in general and Pakistan in particular3s 
The internal conflict component has been divided into four subcomponents each with 
equal risk points up to a maximum of 3, which indicates the lowest risk and better 
internal working relationships between the political parties of the country. This is only 
possible through democratic government as the military rule always generates aggrieved 
groups who carry out armed violence to get their rights. 
The internal conflict as a component has been divided into four sub-components: armed 
threats to public or private interests, threat of civil war, political violence and any armed 
violence carried out in the country. The subcomponents are assigned equal risk points 
with similar conditions as before. The lower the points the higher the risk and vice versa 
Internal conflict risk of 1.5 ARP=1.5; TRP=12; (1.5/12)* 100=12.536. There was a very 
high risk during 1971 due to a civil war threat in the eastern wing of Pakistan. The 
internal conflict in the eastern wing of Pakistan during 1970 was due to long-term 
34 See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3, section-C (1970-2005) 
35 See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3, section-D (1970-2005) 
36 ARP=Actual risk points (calculated through qualitative information for Pakistan 1970-2004) 
TRP=Total risk points (Total weight age points given to each component in ICRG methodology) 
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military rule by the dictator belonging to the western part of the country 37. The risk 
profile remained above an average of 21-50% throughout 1978-2004 despite better 
economic and social policies along with new protective rules and regulations to 
facilitate and attract foreign investors to a country with a fragile economic and political 
environment38. 
A correlation of 17% and 19% has been found between IC and real FDI flows and stock 
respectively for 1970-2004, which indicates that the IP of the country domestically has 
little effect on the flows and stock of FDI. The correlations of 11% between nominal 
FDI flow and stock and IC respectively, reveal that IC risk index does not show any 
major difference in the correlation between nominal FDI flows and stock and the 
correlation between real FDI flows and stock and IC. This indicates that the domestic IC 
risk level does not affect the risk-averse international investors' confidence as it reveals 
a positive correlation. The correlation results for the lag of two years between FDI flows 
and stock, which is 17% and 16%, also fails to reveal any significant change, hence 
there is no affect on the value of FDI due to the IC risk as shown on Tables 4.3,4.4,4.5, 
4.6 (page 119-120). 
The overall FDI flows and stock were not affected by the IC risk, except during 1983- 
84 when the IC risk index rose to a higher risk level of 15%. FDI flows and stock fell 
considerably due to civil disorder in Karachi posing a threat to foreign investments and 
properties. The whole country's IC risk level remained in the high-risk region for the 
period 1978-2004. 
Source: ICRU rating system Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
"See Appcndix-42, section-D (1970-2005) 
"See Appendix-42. section-D (1970-2005) 
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5: External Conflict 
The external conflict can be geographical or conflicts with neighbouring countries. This 
type of conflict poses a great risk for the economy as well as international investment. 
Pakistan has fought two wars with its biggest neighbour, India, on the issue of Kashmir. 
Also the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the after-effects of the Afghan war 1980- 
85 have also posed different categories of risk to the Pakistan economy in general and 
international investors in particular (Hussain 1997). 
These risks range from trade restrictions and embargoes, whether imposed by a single 
country, a group of countries or the whole international community, through 
geopolitical disputes, armed threats, exchanges of fire on borders, border incursions, 
foreign-supported insurgency or full-scale warfare. External conflicts can also adversely 
affect foreign business in many ways, ranging from restrictions on operations, to trade 
and investment sanctions, to distortions in the allocation of economic resources, to 
violent change in the structure of society (ICRG 1994)39 
The external conflict has been divided into four subcomponents each with equal risk 
points up to a maximum of 3, which indicates the lowest risk and better external 
relationships with neighbouring countries. 
The external conflict component has been divided into four sub-components: 
international trade restrictions and embargoes, investment sanctions, allocation of 
economic resources and the violent structure of the society. The subcomponents are 
assigned equal risk points with similar conditions as before. The lower the points the 
higher the risk and vice versa. 
The external conflict risk of 4.5 ARP=4.5; TRP=12; (4.5/12)* 100=37.5040 indicates a 
high risk during 1973-78 due to the nationalization of foreign and domestic industrial 
units by the government of Pakistan, which created a conflict with the western allies 
affecting trade relations. The military rule (1978-1988) also became another reason for 
39 See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3, section-E (1970-2005) 
10 ARP=Actual risk points (calculated through qualitative information for Pakistan 1970-2004) 
TRP=Total risk points (Total weight age points given to each component in ICRG methodology) 
Source: ICRG rating system Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
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the trade restrictions, which could not gain the international investors' confidence 
despite a change in the policy of nationalization. The prolonged military rule also 
generated violence in Pakistani society 41 
A correlation of 20% & -0.01% between EC and real FDI flows and stock respectively 
for 1970-2004 indicates that EC has a higher correlation with FDI flows than with FDI 
stock where there is little if any correlation. Increased correlations of 34% and 15% 
between nominal FDI flow and stock and EC respectively, reveal that the EC risk index 
for Pakistan has a valuation effect on the flows and stock of FDI as most of FDI comes 
from the western allies of Pakistan. This indicates that the EC risk level does affect the 
risk-averse international investors' confidence as it reveals a positive correlation. The 
correlation results for the two years lag between FDI flows and stock also reveal 
significant changes of 10% and 10%, indicating that the EC risk can affect the FDI flow 
or stock after a lag of at least two years as shown on Tables 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6 (page 119- 
120). 
The overall FDI flows and stock were not affected by the EC risk, despite a higher risk 
during the military regimes for 1978-1988 and 1999-2001 when the IC risk index rose 
to a higher-level risk of 40%. Pakistan carried out its first atomic bomb test during 1998 
and international trade restrictions were imposed, which affected the FDI flows and 
stock considerably but the international investors remained interested in investing in 
Pakistan due to denationalization and privatization of the most attractive industrial and 
financial units (Chart-4.5 a& b). The dummy variables used for the consecutive 
changes in the government can be used as the conflict dummies as the change in the 
governments gave rise to external and internal conflicts, which in return affected the 
international investors. 
11 See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3, section-E (1970-2005) 
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6: Corruption 
Corruption as a major component of risk indexation can either be through the political 
system or through the government establishment. As the political leaders are elected 
members of the government and have to stay in office for a limited time so the 
corruption can either be nil or very high. The corruption within the political system is a 
threat to foreign investment for several reasons. Firstly, it can distort the economic and 
financial environment; secondly, it can reduce the efficiency of government and 
business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than 
ability, and, last but not least, it introduces an inherent instability into the political 
process. 
The most common form of corruption can be defined as that in the form of demands for 
special payments and bribes from either the establishment or by political leaders in 
granting projects or import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, 
police protection or loans. Such corruption can increase the aim to earn more profits 
either by raising prices or by hiring low-wage labour. 
The overwhelming majority of the political government in the parliament in developing 
countries in general and Pakistan in particular has caused corruption in the form of 
excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, "favour-for-favours, " secret party 
funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. These sorts of 
corruption potentially cause much greater risk to foreign business; encourage unrealistic 
and inefficient controls on the state economy and the development of the black market. 
The greatest risk in political corruption is that major scandals of unlawful favouritism or 
a breakdown in law and order can sometimes render the country ungovernable. As 
events in recent years have shown, such corruption can affect both rich and poor 
countries as well as countries with democratic and non-democratic institutions. For 
example, corruption, of one kind or another played a key role in the change of 
government, the reorganization of the political system and the collapse of governmental 
authority and law and order in Pakistan (NAB-2002)42. 
42 National Accountability Bureau (NAB)-2002, " Report by NAB on defaulters before 2002 election" 
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One of the difficulties in assessing the degree to which political corruption represents a 
potential risk is that much of it is hidden from general view until it suddenly erupts in a 
major scandal. However, one possible early indicator of potential corruption is the 
length of time a government has been in power continuously. The most important 
feature is that Pakistan has had the same party or parties in government for decades. 
In assessing the corruption risk, therefore, we look first at how long a government has 
been in power continuously. In the case of a one-party state or non-elected government, 
corruption, in the form of patronage and nepotism, is an essential prerequisite and it is 
therefore corrupt, to a greater or lesser degree, from its inception. 
In the case of a democratic government, it has been our experience, almost without 
exception, that things begin to go wrong after an elected government has been in office 
for more than two consecutive terms, that is, eight to ten years. On that basis, the 
highest risk ratings as reported by Transparency International (1996), Pakistan was 
graded as the 2nd most corrupt nation in the world in reference to political leaders and 
the government establishment (Transparency International 1996)43 
Corruption is allocated a single subcomponent, the length of the government's stay in 
office, which indicates that the higher or lower risk of corruption is only dependent 
upon the government's period in office. If the governing party is efficient enough to 
implement its party constitution then the risk index can be lower, otherwise it is higher. 
Corruption risk of 2.50 ARP=2.50; TRP=6; (2.50/6)* 100=41.6744 This represents a 
moderate to high risk during the last days of democratically-elected party rule, which 
party had a mandate to deliver all basic facilities to the general masses of Pakistan. 
However, with the passage of time, the corruption in the government itself started 
growing and reached a higher risk index of 41.67 during 1976. The 1977 military coup 
11 See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3, section-F (1970-2004) 
"ARP=Actual risk points (calculated through qualitative information for Pakistan 1970-2004) 
TRP=Total risk points (Total weight age points given to each component in ICRG methodology) 
Source: ICRG rating system Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
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Corruption stands highly correlated with both FDI flows and stock at an average of 50- 
70%, which indicates that it has strong effects on the flows and stock of FDI. A higher 
correlation coefficient up to 70% between nominal FDI flow and stock and IP 
respectively has been found, which reveals that the CRP risk index does show a major 
change in the correlation between nominal FDI flows and stock from the correlation 
between real FDI flows and stock and IP. This indicates that the CRP risk level does 
affect the risk-averse international investors' confidence as it shows a negative 
correlation. The correlation results with a two-year lag between FDI flows and stock 
also does not reveal any significant change, which is 53% and 68% with an indication 
that the corruption has a delayed effect on FDI flow or stock but reacts at the same time 
as shown on Tables 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6 (page 119-120). 
In this attempt to identify the factors that are important for the international investors 
such as protection of capital and profits, the investment profile showed a higher 
correlation of 50% with real FDI flows and stock, which accords with the better 
implementation of the 1976 investment act46. A correlation of an average of 64% has 
been found between CRP and nominal FDI flows and stock, which indicate that IP risk 
does not have much effect on the value risk of FDI either in flows or stock. 
7: Military in Politics 
The military interventions in the political system of Pakistan since 1947 have created a 
big question mark in the decision-making processes of international investors, since the 
military is not elected by anyone. Therefore, its involvement in politics, even at a 
peripheral level, is a diminution of democratic accountability. However, it also has 
other significant implications (Burki 1991& ICRG 2004)47. 
Military intervention in Pakistani politics can be favoured due to actual or created 
internal or external threats, which allow the dictatorship to ban of any basic human 
rights activities and suspend property rights. This latter action causes international 
investors to have second thought s about investing in Pakistan. Such a situation would 
46 See Appendix-4.2, section-C (1970-2005) 
47 See Appendix-4.2 section-G (1970-2004) 
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imply the distortion of government policy in order to meet this threat, for example by 
increasing the defence budget at the expense of other budget allocations. 
The threat of military take-over has forced all elected governments of Pakistan to 
change policies to those more amenable to the military's wishes. Despite the low power 
of the military in politics, it still represents a high risk as the government is unable to 
function effectively and this makes the country an uneasy environment for foreign 
businesses. 
A full-scale military regime poses the greatest risk. In the short term a military regime 
may provide a new stability and thus reduce business risks. However, in the longer 
term the risk will almost certainly rise, partly because the system of governance will be 
become corrupt and partly because the continuation of such a government is likely to 
create an armed opposition (ICRG-2004). 
The `military in politics' component consists of a single subcomponent: involvement in 
government directly or indirectly, which is allocated six risk points thereby indicating 
that the higher or lower risk of the military in politics is only dependent upon their 
involvement in government. 
Military in Politics risk of 0 ARP=O; TRP=6; (0/6)* 100=048. The highest risk for the 
period of 1977-1981 was due to the military takeover in Pakistan and the imposition of 
martial law. The risk profile remained above an average of 50% throughout 1978-1999 
as the military involvement reduced but still the danger of intervention remained at high 
risk. The involvement risk again went high to 16.67% for 1999-2004 when an elected 
democratic government was toppled by a military general, despite a political 
government then coming into power. The actual powers remained in the hands of a 
military general as the uniformed civilian president of Pakistan, which has kept the 
involvement risk at a higher level of 41.67%49 
ARP=Actual risk points (calculated through qualitative information for Pakistan 1970-2004) 
TRP=Total risk points (Total weight age points given to each component in ICRG methodology) 
Source: ICRG rating system Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
41 See Appendix-4.2, section-C (1970-2005) 
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Correlations of -7% and -3% have been found between military in politics and real FDI 
flows and stock respectively for 1970-2004, which indicates that the MIP has little 
effect on the flows and stock of FDI. The correlation between nominal FDI flow and 
stock and MIP remained approximately at the same level, which reveals that the MIP 
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risk index does not show any major change in the correlation between nominal FDI 
flows and stock from the correlation between real FDI flows and stock and IP. The 
correlation results with a two-year lag between FDI flows and stock also failed to reveal 
any significant change with values of 12% and 5% as shown on Tables 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6 
(page 119-120). 
The factors that are important for the international investors during the military takeover 
of a country include a higher risk of changes in the policies and the viability of 
contracts, capital and profits. The data on FDI flows and stock showed the effect of 
military risk during 1977-1978 & 1999-2000, when the flow of FDI fell by at least 50%. 
This is a clear indication of international investors' fears about the viability of contracts 
despite promises by military rulers. 
8: Religious Tensions 
Religious tensions may stem from the domination of society and/or governance by a 
single religious group that seeks to replace civil law with religious law and to exclude 
other religions from the political and/or social process. The ordinance 298-B, 298-C in 
the Pakistan Panel Code by the military president created an environment in which the 
desire of a single religious group to dominate governance was supported and the 
suppression of religious freedom, which had ensured that the different communities 
could live together in the same environment, was threatened. This posed a threat of 
increasing religious tension (Burki 1991)50 
The religious tension has been also been divided into three subcomponents assigning 
equal risk points up to a maximum of 2, which indicates the lowest risk and less RT of 
the country. Despite the ascendancy of a single religious group rule, the suppression of 
the religious freedoms of other groups and the resulting tension between the different 
groups, RT in general does not have any relationship with the flow of FDI. However, 
the fears of a worsening law & order situation can still affect the international investors' 
confidence. 
60 See Appendix-42 & 4.3, section-H (1970-2004) 
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Religious Tension risk of 2.5 ARP=2.5; TRP=6; (2.5/6)* 100=41.6751 was equivalent to 
very nearly moderate risk tending towards higher risk during 1982-84 due to the killing 
of religious leaders by different religious groups. The risk profile remained above an 
average of 50% throughout 1970-1982 and 1985-2004 due to the involvement of 
different religious groups in government and a better environment for religious 
understanding. The risk level reached its lowest at 58% during 2000-2004 due to a 
coalition of all religious parties and groups being represented in the elected parliament. 
The opposition leader of the parliament is also a leader of a major religious party in 
Pakistan 52. 
Correlations of -23% and -17% have been found between religious tension and real FDI 
flows and stock respectively for 1970-2004, which indicates that RT does have a 
significant effect on the flows and stock of FDI showing a negative relationship 
An increased correlation of 28% between nominal FDI flow and stock and RT 
respectively has been found, which reveals that the RT risk index does show a major 
change in the correlation between nominal FDI flows and stock from the correlation 
between real FDI flows and stock and RT. This indicates that the domestic RT risk level 
does affect the risk-averse international investors' confidence as it reveals a negative 
correlation. The correlation results for a 2-year lag between FDI flows and stock also 
does not reveal any significant change, and at 23%, indicates that RT affect directly the 
FDI flows and stock as shown on Tables 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6 (page 119-120). 
In this attempt to identify those factors that are important for the international investors 
like protection of their capital and profits, despite higher labour costs, the investment 
profile showed a higher correlation of 50% with real FDI flows and stock revealing the 
better implementation of the 1976 investment act53. An average correlation of 64% has 
been found between IP and nominal FDI flows and stock, which indicates that IP risk 
does not have much effect on the value risk of FDI either in flows or stock. 
ARP=Actual risk points (calculated through qualitative information for Pakistan 1970-2004) 
TRP=Total risk points (Total weight age points given to each component in ICRG methodology) 
Source: ICRG rating system Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
See Appendix-4.2, section-C (1970-2005) 
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9: Law and Order 
Law and Order, according to governmet's definition, can be assessed separately. Since 
1947 Pakistan has mostly been ruled by the military. This dictatorship has been the 
main cause for the birth to different, small, ethnic groups. These groups started armed 
violence to control their areas. In order to restore law and order, the government tried to 
impose various laws. These laws were also used for political purposes to grab votes 
from the opponents for the extension to military rule in over the parliament (Hussain 
sa 1996) 
The component "law and order" has been also divided in four subcomponents each with 
up to 1.5 risk points, which indicates the lowest risk and a better LO situation of the 
country due to the implementation of government policies. This section consists of an 
impartial legal and judicial system, laws being ignored for political ends and strikes 
involving illegal practices. 
Law & Order risk of 1 ARP=1; TRP=6; (1/6)* 100=16.6755 showed that there was a 
very high risk during 1970-71 due to the civil war threat in East Pakistan, due to 
political unrest following a prolonged period of military rule in joint Pakistan (East & 
West). The risk profile remained above an average of 50% throughout 1973-76 due to 
the election of a political government with better economic and social policies. This 
level again went high to 25% during 1977 when again a political movement started 
against the rigging of a general election by the ruling political party, which ended with a 
military take over. It again deteriorated during 1980-84 due to political party clashes in 
Karachi. 56 
Correlations of -18% and -20% have been found between law & order and real FDI 
flows and stock respectively for 1970-2004, which indicates that the law and order of 
the country domestically does have a significant effect on the flows and §tock of FDI. 
The correlation between nominal FDI flow and stock and LO has not shown any 
significant change, being at minus 22%, which reveals that the LO risk index does not 
See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3 , section-I (1970-2004) "ARP=Actual risk points (calculated through qualitative information for Pakistan 1970-2004) 
TRP=Total risk points (Total weight age points given to each component in ICRG methodology) 
Source: ICRG rating system. Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
See Appendix-4.2, section-C (1970-2005) 
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any major change in the correlation between nominal FDI flows and stock from the 
correlation between real FDI flows and stock and LO. This indicates that the domestic 
IP risk level does affect the risk-averse international investors' confidence as it reveals a 
negative correlation. The correlation results for a two-year lag between FDI flows and 
stock also do not reveal any significant change, at -22% as shown on Tables 4.3,4.4, 
4.5,4.6 (page 119-120). 
In this attempt to identify those factors that are important for the international investors 
like protection of their capital and profits, despite higher labour costs, the investment 
profile showed a correlation of 50% with real FDI flows and stock, which reveals the 
better implementation of the 1976 investment act57. An average correlation of 64% has 
been found between LO and nominal FDI flows and stock, which indicates that LO risk 
does not have much effect on the value risk of FDI either in flows or stock. 
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10: Ethnic Tensions (ET) 
This component measures the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, 
nationality or language divisions. Lower ratings are given to countries where racial and 
nationality tensions are high because opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to 
compromise. Higher ratings are given to countries where tensions are minimal, even 
though such differences may still exist (Burki 1980)58. 
The ethnic tension component has been divided in three subcomponents with equal risk 
points of maximum two, which indicates the lowest risk and better ethnic understanding 
in the country and vice versa. This section comprises racial, nationality and language 
diversity and tension. The international investors have to be very careful in an 
environment where the ET factor is at a high-risk level. 
Ethnic Tension Risk of 1.5 ARP=1.5; TRP=6; (1.5/6)*100=25.0059. This indicates a 
very high risk during 1970-71 due to an ethnic and civil war threat in the eastern wing 
» See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3, section-J (1970-2004) 
S9 ARP=Actual risk points (calculated through qualitative information for Pakistan 1970-2004) 
TRP=Total risk points (Total weight age points given to each component in ICRG methodology) 
Source: ICRG rating system Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
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of Pakistan resulting from the nationalization policies of the newly formed government 
1973-1977. The risk profile remained above an average of 50% throughout 1978-2004 
due to better economic and social policies along with new protective rules and 
regulations to facilitate and attract foreign investors to a country with a fragile economic 
bo and political environment 
Average correlations of -32% and -38% have been found between ethnic tension and 
real FDI flows and stock respectively for 1970-2004, which indicates that ethnic tension 
within the country does affect the flows and stock of FDI. The correlation between 
nominal FDI flow and stock and ET respectively has indicated a similar level, which 
reveals that ET risk index does not show any major change in the correlation between 
nominal FDI flows and stock from the correlation between real FDI flows and stock and 
ET. This indicates that the domestic ET risk level does affect the risk-averse 
international investors' confidence as it reveals a negative correlation. The correlation 
results for a two-year lag between FDI flows and stock also do not reveal any 
significant change with values of -33% and -38% as shown on Tables 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6 
(page 119-120). 
In this attempt to identify those factors that are important for the international investors 
like protection of their capital and profits, despite higher labour costs, the investment 
profile showed a higher correlation of 50% with real FDI flows and stock revealing the 
better implementation of the 1976 investment act61. An average correlation of 64% has 
been found between ET and nominal FDI flows and stock, which indicate that ET risk 
does not have much effect on the value risk of FDI either in flows or stock. 
60 See Appendix-43, section-C (1970-2005) 
61 See Appendix-4.3, section-C (1970-2005) and Table 4.1 (Correlation Matrix) 
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11: Democratic Accountability (DA) 
This is a measure of how responsive a government is to its people, on the basis that the 
less responsive it is, the more likely it is that the government will fall, peacefully in a 
democratic society, but possibly violently in a non-democratic one. 
In the case of developing countries in general and Pakistan during the period 1970- 
2003, assessing democratic accountability is more complex in the context of free and 
fair elections. Even democratically elected governments, like that of Bhutto from 1970- 
1977, did not adopt the true democratic way of holding a general election in 1977. The 
involvement of government machinery in the election process gave way to armed 
political agitation and afterwards to a long military rule (Burki-80). 
Therefore, it is possible for the accountability of democracy component to have a lower 
score, i. e. a higher risk, than for a less democratic form of government. The democratic 
accountability has been assigned only one component bearing a maximum risk level of 
six, which indicates the lowest risk and better DA of a country's government in the 
successful implementation of social and economic policies. This section relates 
government policies on contract implementation 62. 
An Democratic Accountability (DA) Risk of 0.50 ARP=0.5; TRP=6; 
(0.5/6)* 100=8.3363 indicates the highest level of risk during 1970-71 because of the 
political situation and the civil war in East Pakistan. The nationalization policies by the 
newly-formed government 1973-1977 increased public confidence in implementing 
government policies and the DA risk reduced to a moderate level but still remained in 
the region of the higher risk level of 41.67 throughout 1978-2004 due to the 
unsatisfactory implementation of economic and social policies, despite the deregulation 
of government-owned financial and industrial units. The privatization policy could not 
gain public confidence due to irregularities in policies. Though this policy built a 
considerable level of FDI flows and stock, it still could not gain international investors' 
confidence. 64 
62 See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3, section-K (1970-2004) 
63ARP=Actual risk points (calculated through qualitative information for Pakistan 1970-2004) 
TRP=Total risk points (Total weight age points given to each component in ICRG methodology) 
Source: ICRG rating system Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
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63 See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3 , section-K (1970-2004) 63ARP=Actual risk points (calculated through qualitative information for Pakistan 1970-2004) 
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Source: ICRG rating system Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
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A high correlation of 73% has been found between DA and real FDI flows and stock 
respectively for 1970-2004, which indicates that DA of the country governments does 
have lot of the effect on the flows and stock of FDI. No change in correlation between 
nominal FDI flow and stock and DA has been found, which reveals that the DA risk 
index does not show any major change in the correlation between nominal FDI flows 
and stock from the correlation between real FDI flows and stock and DA. This indicates 
that the domestic DA risk level does affect the risk-averse international investors' 
confidence as it reveals a positive correlation. The correlation results for a two-year lag 
between FDI flows and stock also do not reveal any significant change with a value of 
73% as shown on Tables 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6 (page 119-120). 
Chart -4.12 (a &b) 
Democratic Accountability (DA) Risk Index 
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" Sec Appendix-4.3, section-C (1970-2005) 
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12: Bureaucracy Quality (BQ) 
The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that 
tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change65. Therefore, high 
points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to 
govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In 
these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from 
political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. 
Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points 
because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation 
and day-to-day administrative functions (ICRG-94). Recruitment to the bureaucracy 
was politically-based during and after 1970. This was the time when Pakistan actually 
needed talented youngsters to control the country as the eastern part was separated from 
Pakistan (Omar 1985)66. 
The bureaucracy quality component has also been divided in four subcomponents each 
with equal risk points up to a maximum of one, which indicates the lowest risk and 
`6' See Appendix-4.2 & 4.3, Section L (1970-2004) 
66 See Appendix4.3 section-B (1970-2004) 
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better BQ of the country due to greater expertise in the implementation of social and 
economic policies, the ability to handle crises, impartiality in regard to political or 
military governments and recruitment and training quality. 
Bureaucracy quality risk of 1.75 ARP=1.75; TRP=4; (1.75/4)* 100=43.7567 represents a 
nearly moderate risk tending towards higher risk during 1973-77 due to the new 
political government, which wanted to bring in the bureaucratic institutions to help 
implement government policies. This in turn affected the recruitment policies designed 
by earlier governments thus increasing the quality risk. The risk profile remained above 
an average of 50% throughout 1978-2004 due to the better, more impartial policies of 
different governments. During 1999, the military take-over again created chaos and the 
risk factor increased to 40% due to partiality in recruitment68. 
The correlation remained at the lowest level of -2 %& -9% between bureaucracy 
quality and real FDI flows and stock respectively for 1970-2004, which indicates that 
the BQ does not have a large effect on the flows and stock of real FDI. An increased 
correlation of minus 16% and minus 30% between nominal FDI flow and stock and BQ 
reveals that the BQ risk index does show major changes in the correlation between 
nominal FDI flows and stock from the correlation between real FDI flows and stock and 
BQ. This indicates that BQ risk level does affect the risk-averse international investors' 
confidence as it reveals a negative correlation. The correlation results for a two-year lag 
between FDI flows and stock also do not reveal any significant change with values of - 
2% and -19% as shown on Tables 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6 (page 119-120). 
67 ARP=Actual risk points (calculated through qualitative information for Pakistan 1970-2004) 
TRP-Total risk points (Total weight age points given to each component in ICRG methodology) 
Source: ICRG rating system Source: Political Risk Services USA-1994 
6' See Appendix-4.3, section-C (1970-2005) 
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4.9 Correlation Analysis 
Despite limitation of qualitative data provision for the last 36 years in the print media 
and government resources, the successful creation of PRI and a correlation analysis has 
been made for better comparison of the econometric relationship analysis between FDI 
and political risk. The correlation analysis has been done with individual component of 
aggregate political risk index. 
Despite the importance of each of the subcomponents of the risk indexation, the 
correlation test results shown in tables 4.3 to 4.6 reveal a different relationship for each 
of the subcomponents which confirm that some of the components carry more 
weightage in affecting FDI flows and stock in the country like Pakistan than few others. 
Some of them show a highly negative relationship (e. g. Corruption) whilst others show 
a highly positive relationship (e. g. Democratic Accountability) with FDI flows and 
stocks. Although not all of the components carry as much weight as the first five 
components they still have a strong relationship to the flow and stock of FDI. As 
explained earlier, the major contribution to FDI flow and stock in Pakistan is by the 
USA and European countries as shown on Chart 2.10 (page 20), which is not very much 
affected by the government stability, socioeconomic conditions, bureaucracy quality, 
`military in politics' etc. The investment is governed by international agreements, which 
are not affected by the changes in the government especially (Section 2.3.2). FDI flow 
and stock in the private power projects during 1993 has not been affected by changes of 
government, but by the corruption of governmental institutions and governing bodies. 
New FDI flows have not been seen in similar projects despite an increasing demand for 
power supply in Pakistan. 
The democratic accountability index has revealed a positive relationship with FDI flows 
and stock, which indicates that international investors feel themselves more secure from 
the law and order situation and that their property is protected. However, the rest of the 
subcomponents mostly reveal a negative relationship with FDI flows and stocks but the 
correlation is very small, which indicates that investors do not feel their investment to 
be secure in Pakistan. The reason may be linked to the privatization policy of the 
government, which is seeking to attract more investment. 
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4.10 A Comparison: PRI with ICRG PRI 
The actual PR indices have been calculated with the help of ICRG methodology using 
the data on chronological events for Pakistan from 1970-2004. In this section, the PR 
indices are compared with ICRG PR indices. The record of ICRG indices available is 
from 1984-1997 and shown in chart-4.15. Since 1980, the evolving international business 
scene has pushed ICRG to make changes to the basic methodology for the calculation of 
risk indices. The risk indices originally calculated by ICRG were based on the old 
component system with thirteen basic components with equally divided weightings. The 
most recent changes occurred in 1997, when the total number of political risk components 
was reduced from 13 to 12 by increasing the weight of some of the other components69. 
A sequence of a similar risk index from 1984 to 1993 computed by the PRS group has 
only been available on the company web site70. A steep increase in the ICRG PR indices 
from 1993 gives an indication of the lower political risks in Pakistan. Our PR indices 
still showed a risk range of 40-50%, a moderate risk, throughout the years 1984-2003. 
The reasons in favour of these calculations can be elaborated as follows: 
1: More reliable and detailed information has been made available for the political risk 
indices calculated in this research71. 
2: The steep decrease in the ICRG PR indices is due to changes in the structure of point 
assignments to individual components. 
3: The aggregate risk indices have been calculated using the aggregation methodology 
explained in chapter 2 of ICRG PR Indexation Methodology, which makes the 
aggregate risk index a proper index with equally distributed values. 
4: The detailed information gathered from the media and through self-experience has 
made for a more reliable weighting of the indices. The flat response can also be the 
habitual effect of the change of governments during 1970-1999. For example, during 
1990-92 ICRG considered Pakistan at higher risk due to weak political government 
having less hold on provincial governments. However, it was considered less risky 
during 1994-1998 due to more powerful political government with a strong hold of the 
69 The total number of political risk components was reduced from 13 to 12 by merging two old categories ("Political Violence" and "Civil 
War Threat") into the single category "Internal Conflict. " Other changes include the replacement of "Economic Planning" in the old 
system by "Investment Profile, " the replacement of "Party Development" from the old system by "Democratic Accountability, " and a 
slight adjustment in the weighting of two components ("External Conflict" has been increased by two points and "Bureaucracy Quality" 
has been decreased by two points) ( Curtsey PRS group Inc. ) 
'0 Only 12 years 1984-1997 were found free on the website as a sample 
71 For detail chronological events see Appendix-4.3 
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centre as well as the provinces. In this thesis, the risk index has been kept moderate for 
1990-98 due to the similar government economic policies, despite the governments 
being weak and rather unstable. The denationalisation and privatisation policies were 
not affected by the majority or minority of different political governments. 
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4.11 Conclusion 
To sum up, one can say that empirical studies on the relevance of country risk (CR) in 
general, and political risk (PR) in particular, for FDI is conclusive on the intuitive 
relationship between CR, PR and FDI with more specification of the nature, intensity 
and magnitude of this relationship. The relative empirical conclusiveness on the 
relevance of political risk for FDI is due to many factors associated with the different 
uses and definitions of political risk. Not only is the concept of political risk itself 
satisfactory, but the relationship between political instability measures and the 
multinational firm as a whole is frilly understood (Brewer-1983). The same applies to 
the relationship between macro-economic variables due to the instability in policy and 
FDI flows to host countries. 
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Furthermore, the attribution of macro-economic variables, such as monetary politics and 
fiscal politics to economic variables, is also statistically significant since macro- 
economic variables used in most empirical studies are political-economic in nature. 
Fiscal and monetary policies are also political in the sense that they do not exclusively 
obey market forces but depend largely on political decisions in general and, for Pakistan 
in the period 1970 to 2004, on the decisions of the dictator. 
In any case, perceptions of political risk are likely to continue to affect investor's 
inclinations about undertaking FDI projects in particular countries and regions and 
especially in LDC countries. Whereas the relative political stability in some countries 
like India and Bangladesh should encourage investors, the continuation of ethnically- 
based conflicts in Pakistan for several years has discouraged the international investors. 
One of the distinctive features of the rapidly growing Asian countries like India, 
Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia has been their basic political stability. By contrast, 
Pakistan has been torn apart by violent transfers of powers, coloured by radical 
ideologies, ethnic animosities and religious bloodshed due to Islamic fundamentalism. 
During the post-war period, Pakistan emerged from a century of internal and external 
conflict into relative political stability in the 1970s. 
Furthermore, many of the uncertainties in the economic future of Pakistan lie precisely 
in this realm of political stability or risk. For instance, the regimes between 1970 and 
1999 ended without a clear succession process and no one can predict the political 
future of the present government under a military general (199-2004) and in particular 
the post-dictatorship period; the consequences for investor confidence and their 
perceptions of risk are therefore unknown. Undoubtedly, political instability or stability 
has an influence on the perception of the risks by foreign investors in Pakistan. What 
remains to be demonstrated and assessed is the magnitude, the nature and the effects of 
the linkage between political risk and FDI. This demonstration is, however, because of 
the interrelation of psychological, politic, social, economic and cultural factors in the 
concept of political risk, very difficult to quantify. 
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When conducting the preliminary examination of the context of theoretical country 
risks in general and political risk in particular, it proved necessary to make an in-depth 
investigation into the existing theoretical background. The confusion of ideas as the key 
to understanding these ideas lies in the notion of risk or uncertainty. There is a 
fundamental distinction between the reward for taking a known risk and that for 
assuming a risk whose value itself is not known. It is so fundamental, indeed, that, as 
we shall see, a known risk will not lead to any reward or special payment at all. 
One possible division of country risk is into economic risk, commercial risk, and 
political risk. Economic risk is risk related to the macroeconomic development of the 
country, such as the development in interest and exchange rates that may influence the 
profitability of an investment. Commercial risk is risk related to the specific investment, 
such as the risk related to the fulfilment of contracts with private companies and local 
partners. The third category, political risk, may in many countries be the most important 
one (Nordl-2001). 
The rationale in prohibiting the receipt of any increase on the borrowed capital is to 
encourage the sharing of risk. In the Islamic economic system without the institution of 
interest, the lender of monetary capital is urged to share the risks of the entrepreneur 
and the investor is urged to undertake a joint venture with the opposite party. 
An empirical analysis of the empirical relationship of the macro-economic variables 
such as GDP (real), real interest rate (Discount rate minus Inflation), the openness of the 
economy and the exchange rate with FDI flows in general and stocks in particular; 
along with the political risk index for Pakistan (1970-2004) will be presented in 
chapter 7. 
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Apendix-4.1 
International Criteria of Country Risk Analysis72 
Rating Methodology Profile 
1: Intergovernmental Relations 
" Intergovernmental transfers 
" Authority of tax 
" Division of services responsibility 
" Borrowing regulations 
2: Administrative System 
" Legal limitations 
" Management system and control 
" Labour relations 
3: Economic Structure & Growth 
" Demographic Characteristics 
" Infrastructure 
" Natural resources endowments 
" Composition of output and employment 
" Growth performance and outlook 
4: Fiscal Performance and Flexibility 
" Expenditure structure and trends 
" Revenue composition and tax burden 
" Operating account balance 
" Capital spending and projections 
5: Financial Position and Policies 
" Accounting Practices 
" Liquidity management 
" Financing requirements and forecast 
" Debt Burden 
" Government owned enterprises and 
other contingent liabilities 
Selected Indicators 
1: Demographic Indicator 
" Population Growth 
" Population distribution by age category, 
incl those of working age and those 65 and 
older 
2: Economic Indicators 
" Per capita income 
" GDP growth 
" Investment patterns 
" Employment growth 
" Labour force participation rate 
" Unemployment rate 
3: Financial Indicators 
" Operating balance % operating Rev. 
" Overall balance % total revenue 
" Operating revenue growth 
" Inter Govt transfers % opt. revenue 
" Operating expenditure growth 
" Capital spending % total spending 
" Expenditure as percent of GDP 
"% of capital spending financed by non debt 
sources. 
4: Debt Indicators 
" Direct Debt % GDP 
" Direct Debt % Opt. Revenue 
" Total Local Govt Debt % GDP 
" Tax supported Debt % Opt. Revenue 
" Debt Services less interest earned % Opt. 
Revenue. 
72 Llewellyn, D. H. "The Handbook of Country and Political Risk Analysis"-1994 (p # 349 & 351) 
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Apendix-4.2 
Pakistan Political Risk Indices (1970-2004 
1970-1976 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
A Government Stability (12) 
1: Ability to work 0 0 12 2 2 2 
2: Ability to stay in office 0 0 12 2 2 1 
3: Type of governance 0 1 11 1 1 1 
4: Cohesion between parties 1 0 12 1 1 1 
5: Command of legislature 0 0 12 1 1 2 
6: Popularity of Government Policies 0 0 01 2 2 1 
Total 1 1 5 10 9 9 8 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 16.67 16.67 41.67 83.33 75.00 75.00 66.67 
B Socioeconomic Conditions(12) 
1: Public reaction on Government eco policies 0 0 22 2 1.5 1 
2 Public facilities 1 1 11 1.5 1 1 
3: Unemployment 1 1 1 1.5 1.5 1 1 
4: Interest Rates rise / fall 2 1 12 1.5 2 1 
5: Housing market 0 1 10 1 0 0 
6: Infant mortality 1 1 11 1 1.5 1.5 
Total 5 5 7 7.5 8.5 7 5.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 41.66 41.67 58.33 62.50 70.83 58.33 45.83 
C Investment Profile (12) 
1: Risk of expropriation or contract viability 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 
2) Taxation 1 1 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 2 
3: Repatriation 0 0 0.5 0.5 1 1.5 1.5 
4: Labor cost 1 1 1 1.5 1.5 1 0.5 
Total 2 2 44 4.5 5 5.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 16.67 16.67 33.33 33.33 37.50 41.67 45.83 
D) Internal Conflict (12) 
1: Armed threats to Government or Business 0.5 0 21 1.5 2 2.5 
2 Civil War Govt. involvement in violence 2 0.5 1 1.5 1 2 2.5 
3: Political violence 1 0 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 
4: Armed violence carried out all country 2 1 2 0.5 0.5 2 2 
Total 5.5 1.5 7 4.5 5.5 7.5 8 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 45.83 12.5 58.33 37.5 45.83 62.5 66.67 
E) External Conflict (12) 
1: Trade Restrictions & embargoes 2 2 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
2: Investment sanctions 2 0.5 1.5 0.5 1 1.5 1 
3: Distortions in allocation of Eco resources 1 0.5 11 1.5 2 2 
4: Violent change in structure of society 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1.5 1.5 1 
Total 5.5 3.5 54 5.5 6.5 5.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 45.83 29.17 41.67 33.33 45.83 54.17 45.83 
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Pakistan Political Risk Indices (1970-2004 
1970-76 1970 1971 1972 1 773 1974 1975 1976 
F) Corruption (6) 
1: Government stay in office 3 3 44 3.5 3 2.5 
Total 3 3 44 3.5 3 2.5 
Section Result (ARP/TRP)*100 50.00 50.00 66.67 66.67 58.33 50.00 41.67 
G) Military in Politics (6) 
1: Involvement in Government 0 0 5.5 5 6 6 6 
Total 0 0 5.5 5 6 6 6 
Section Result (ARP/TRP)*100 0.00 0.00 91.67 83.33 100.00 100.00 100.00 
H) Religious Tension (6) 
1: Govern. B single religious group 2 2 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
2: Suppression of religious freedom 2 2 2 1.5 1.5 2 2 
3: Tension between different religious groups 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1.5 1.5 
Total 5.5 5.5 5.5 4.5 4 5 5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 91.67 91.67 91.67 75.00 66.67 83.33 83.33 
I Law & Order (6) 
1: Impartial Legal system 0.5 0 0.5 1 0.75 0.5 0.5 
2: Impartial Judicial system 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.75 0.75 0.5 
3: Law ignored for political aim 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
4: Strikes involving illegal practices 0.5 0 1.5 1 1 1 1 
Total 2 1 3 3.5 3 2.75 2.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 33.33 16.67 50.00 58.33 50.00 45.83 41.67 
Ethnic Tension (6) 
1: Racial 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 
2: Nationality 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 1 1.5 1.5 
3: Language tensions 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 1.5 1.5 2 1.75 2 2.75 2.75 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 25.00 25.00 33.33 29.17 33.33 45.83 45.83 
K Democratic Accountability (6) 
1: Implementation of Policies by a 
Government 0.5 1 2.5 3 2.5 2 3 
Total 0.5 1 2.5 3 2.5 2 3 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 8.33 16.67 41.67 50.00 41.67 33.33 50.00 
L Bureaucracy Quality (4) 
1: Expertise in policy making 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
2: Ability to handle crises 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
_3: 
Iartiali 0.25 0.25 00 0 0 0 
4: Recruitment & Training mechanism 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Total 2.75 2.5 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 68.75 62.5 43.75 43.75 43.75 43.75 43.75 
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Pakistan Political Risk Indices (1970-2004 
1976-83 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
A) Government Stability (12) 
1: Ability to work 0 2 1.5 1.5 2 2 2 
2: Ability to stay in office 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 
3: Type of governance 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
4: Cohesion between parties 0 0 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 
5: Command of legislature 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
6: Popularity of Government policies 0 1 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Total 3 4 6 6.5 8 7 8 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 25.00 33.33 50.00 54.16 66.67 58.33 66.67 
B) Socioeconomic Conditions(12) 
1: Public reaction on Government eco 
policies 1 1.5 2 1.5 1.5 1 0.5 
2: Public facilities 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
3: Unemployment 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
4: Interest Rates rise I fall 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
5: Housing market 0 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 
6: Infant mortality 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Total 4.5 6.5 7 6.5 6.5 6 5.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 37.50 54.17 58.33 54.17 54.17 50.00 45.83 
C Investment Profile (12) 
1: Risk of expropriation or contract viability 0.5 1.5 2 2 1.5 1 0.5 
2: Taxation 2 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
3: Repatriation 1.5 2 3 3 3 3 3 
4: Labor cost 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 5 6.5 8.5 8.5 8 7.5 7 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 41.67 54.16 70.83 70.83 66.67 62.50 58.33 
D) Internal Conflict (12) 
1: Armed threats to Government or Business 1.5 2.5 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 
2: Civil War (Govt. involvement in violence) 1 2 2 2 1.5 1 0.5 
3: Political violence 0 2 2.5 1.5 1 1 0.25 
4: Armed violence carried out all country 1 2.5 2.5 1.5 1 1 0.5 
Total 3.5 9 9.5 7 5 4 1.75 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 29.17 75.00 79.17 58.33 41.67 33.33 14.58 
E) External Conflict (12) 
1: Trade Restrictions & embargoes 0.5 0.5 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
2: Investment sanctions 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2 2 2 
3: Distortions in allocation of Eco resources 1.5 1 0.5 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 
4: Violent change in structure of society 1 1.5 1.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 4.5 4.5 4.5 5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 37.50 37.50 37.50 41.67 45.83 45.83 45.83 
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Pakistan Political Risk Indices (1970-2004 
1977-83 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
F) Corruption (6) 
1: Government stay in office 3 3.5 3.5 3 3 3 3 
Total 3 3.5 3.5 3 3 3 3 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 50.00 58.33 58.33 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 
G) Military in Politics (6) 
1: Involvement in Government directly or 
indirectly 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Total 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 16.67 
H) Religious Tension (6) 
1: Govern. By single religious group 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2: Suppression of religious freedom 2 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1.5 
3: Tension between different religious groups 1.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 4.5 4 3 3 3 2.5 3 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 75.00 66.67 50.00 50.00 50.00 41.67 50.00 
I Law & Order (6) 
1: Impartial Legal system 0.5 0.5 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 
2: Impartial Judicial system 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
3: Law ignored for political aim 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
4: Strikes involving illegal practices 0.5 1.5 1.5 1 1 1 1 
Total 1.5 3 3.25 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 25.00 50.00 54.16 45.83 45.83 45.83 41.67 
Ethnic Tension (6) 
1: Racial 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
2: Nationality 1.5 2 2 2 1.5 1 1 
3: Language tensions 0.25 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 2.25 3.5 3 3 2.5 2 2 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 37.50 58.33 50.00 50.00 41.60 33.33 33.33 
K) Democratic Accountability (6) 
1: Implementation of Policies by a 
Government 1.5 1.5 2 2 2 2 1.5 
Total 1.5 1.5 2 2 2 2 1.5 
Section Result (ARP/TRP)*100 25.00 25.00 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 25.00 
L) Bureaucracy Quality (4) 
1: Expertise in policy making 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 
2: Ability to handle crises 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
3: Imartiali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4: Recruitment & Training mechanism 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 1 1 1 
Total 1.75 1.75 1.75 
- 
2 2.25 2.25 2.25 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 43.75 3.75 143.75 43.75 143.75 50.00 56.25 56.25 56.25 
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Pakistan Political Risk Indices (1970-2004 
1984-90 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
A) Government Stability (12) 
1: Ability to work 1.5 2 2 1.5 1 1 0.5 
2: Ability to stay in office 1.5 2 2 1.5 1 1 0.5 
3: Type of governance 1 1.5 1.5 1 0.5 1.5 0.5 
4: Cohesion between parties 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 
5: Command of legislature 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
6: Popularity of Government policies 1 1.5 1.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 6.5 8.5 8.5 6 4 5.5 3 
Section Result (ARP/TRP)*100 54.16 70.83 70.83 50.00 33.33 45.83 25.00 
B) Socioeconomic Conditions(12) 
1: Public reaction on Govt eco policies 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.25 1 
2: Public facilities 1.5 1.5 2 2 2 1.75 1 
3: Unemployment 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1 
4: Interest Rates rise / fall 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
5: Housing market 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1 
6: Infant mortali 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Total 6.5 7.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 7 6 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 54.17 62.50 70.83 70.83 70.83 58.33 50.00 
C Investment Profile (12) 
1: Risk of expropriation or contract viability 2 2 2 2 2 1.5 1.25 
2: Taxation 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
3: Repatriation 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 
4: Labor cost 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 8 8 8 8 8 6.5 6.25 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 66.67 66.67 66.67 66.67 66.67 54.17 52.08 
D) Internal Conflict (12) 
1: Armed threats to Govt or Business 0.5 1 0.75 1 1 1 1.5 
2: Civil War (Govt. involvement) 0.5 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.75 
3: Political violence 0.25 1 0.5 1 1 1 1.5 
4: Armed violence carried out all country 0.5 1.5 1 1 1 1 1.25 
Total 1.75 4.5 2.5 3.25 3.25 3.5 5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 14.58 37.50 20.83 27.08 27.08 29.17 41.67 
E) External Conflict (12) 
1: Trade Restrictions & embargoes 1.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2: Investment sanctions 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3: Distortions in allocation of Eco resources 1 1 1 1 1.5 1.5 2 
4: Violent change in structure of society 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6 6 6.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 41.67 45.83 45.83 45.83 50.00 50.00 54.17 
130/240 
Pakistan Political Risk Indices (1970-2004 
1984-90 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
F) Corruption (6) 
1: Government stay in office 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 2.5 2 
Total 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 2.5 2 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 50.00 58.33 58.33 58.33 50.00 41.67 33.33 
G) Military in Politics (6) 
1: Involvement in Government 1 2 3 3 1 3 4 
Total 1 2 3 3 1 3 4 
Section Result (ARP/TRP)*100 16.67 33.33 50.00 50.00 16.67 50.00 66.67 
H) Religious Tension (6) 
1: Govern. By single religious group 1 1 1 1 1 1.5 1 
2: Suppression of religious freedom 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
3: Tension between religious groups 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 2.5 3 3 3 3 3.5 3 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 41.67 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 58.33 50.00 
I Law & Order (6) 
1: Impartial Legal system 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 
2: Impartial Judicial system 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 
3: Law ignored for political aim 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
4: Strikes involving illegal practices 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 2.5 3 3 3 3 2.75 2.5 
Section Result (ARP/TRP)*100 41.67 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 45.83 41.67 
Ethnic Tension (6) 
1: Racial 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
2: Nationality 1 0.75 1 0.75 1 1 0.75 
3: Language tensions 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 2 1.75 2 1.75 2 2 1.75 
Section Result (ARP/TRP)*100 33.33 29.17 33.33 29.17 33.33 33.33 29.17 
K) Democratic Accountability (6 
1: Implementation of Government Policies 1 1 2 2 2 1.5 1.5 
Total 1 1 2 2 2 1.5 1.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 16.67 16.67 33.33 33.33 33.33 25.00 25.00 
L) Bureaucracy Quality (4) 
1: Expertise in policy making 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 
2: Ability to handle crises 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
3: Imartiali 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 
4: Recruitment & Training mechanism 1 1 1 1 1 0.75 0.75 
Total 2.25 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.25 1.75 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 56.25 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5 56.25 43.75 
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Pakistan Political Risk Indices (1970-2004 
1991-97 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
A) Government Stability (12) 
1: Ability to work 1 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 
2: Ability to stay in office 1 1 1.25 0.75 0.75 0.5 1.25 
3: Type of governa 1.25 1.25 1 1.25 1.25 1 1 
4: Cohesion between parties 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 
5: Command of legislature 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 
6: Popularity of Government policies 1 1 1.25 1 1 0.75 1.25 
Total 5.75 5.75 5.25 5 5 3.75 5.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 47.92 47.92 43.75 41.67 41.67 31.25 45.83 
B) Socioeconomic Conditions(12) 
1: Public reaction on Government eco policies 1.25 1 1 1 1 0.75 1 
2: Public facilities 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1 1 1 
3: Unemployment 1 1 1.25 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 
4: Interest Rates rise / fall 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 
5: Housing market 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
6: Infant mortality 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Total 6.75 6.5 6.75 6.5 6 5.75 6.5 
Section Result (ARP/TRP)*100 56.25 54.17 56.25 54.17 50.00 47.92 54.17 
C Investment Profile (12) 
1: Risk of expropriation or contract viability 1.25 1 1 1.25 1.25 1.25 1 
2: Taxation 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
3: Repatriation 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
4: Labor cost 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 6.25 6 6 6.25 6.25 6.25 6 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 52.08 50.00 50.00 52.08 52.08 52.08 50.00 
D) Internal Conflict (12) 
1: Armed threats to Government or Business 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.5 
2: Civil War (Govt. involvement in violence) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 
3: Political violence 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
4: Armed violence carried out all country 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 
Total 5 5 5 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.25 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 41.67 41.67 41.67 39.58 39.58 39.58 43.75 
E) External Conflict (12) 
1: Trade Restrictions & embargoes 2 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
2: Investment sanctions 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3: Distortions in allocation of Eco resources 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4: Violent change in structure of society 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 6.5 5.5 6 6 6 6 6 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 54.17 45.83 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 
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Pakistan Political Risk Indices (1970-2004 
1991-97 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
F) Corruption (6) 
1: Government stay in office 3 3 2.5 2.25 2.25 2 2.5 
Total 3 3 2.5 2.25 2.25 2 2.5 
Section Result (ARP/TRP)*100 50.00 50.00 41.67 37.5 37.5 33.33 41.67 
G) Military in Politics (6) 
1: Involvement in Government 4 4 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 3 
Total 4 4 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 3 
Section Result (ARP/TRP)*100 66.67 66.67 50.00 41.67 41.67 41.67 50.00 
H) Religious Tension (6) 
1: Govern. By single religious group 1 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
2: Suppression of religious freedom 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
3: Tension between religious groups 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 3 3 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Section Result (ARP/TRP)*100 50.00 50.00 50.00 58.33 58.33 58.33 58.33 
I Law & Order (6) 
1: Impartial Legal system 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
2: Impartial Judicial system 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
3: Law ignored for political aim 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
4: Strikes involving illegal practices 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 41.67 41.67 41.67 41.67 41.67 41.67 41.67 
Ethnic Tension (6) 
1: Racial 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
2: Nationality 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
3: Language tensions 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 29.17 29.17 29.17 29.17 29.17 29.17 29.17 
K) Democratic Accountability (6) 
1: Implementation of Government Policies 2 2.5 3 2.5 2.5 3 3.5 
Total 2 2.5 3 2.5 2.5 3 3.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 33.33 41.67 50.00 41.67 41.67 50.00 58.33 
L) Bureaucracy uali (4) 
1: Expertise in policy making 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
2: Ability to handle crises 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
3: impartiality 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 
4: Recruitment & Training mechanism 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 
Total 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.25 1.75 1.5 1.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 43.75 43.75 43.75 _ 56.25 43.75 37.50 37.50 
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Pakistan Political Risk Indices (1970-2004 
1998-2004 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
A) Government Stability (12) 
1: Ability to work 1 1.25 1 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 
2: Ability to stay in office 1.25 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.75 1.75 
3: Type of governance 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.75 1 1.00 
4: Cohesion between parties 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.00 
5: Command of legislature 0.5 0.5 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.75 
6: Popularity of Government policies 1.25 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.50 
Total 5.25 5.75 3.5 3.75 5 6.25 6.75 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 43.75 47.92 29.17 31.25 41.67 52.08 56.25 
B) Socioeconomic Conditions(12) 
1: Public reaction on Government eco 
policies 1.25 1.25 1.25 11 1 1.00 
2: Public facilities 1.25 1.25 1.25 1 1.25 1.25 1.00 
3: Unemployment 1 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
4: Interest Rates rise / fall 1 1 1 11 1 1 
5: Housing market 1 1 1 11 1 1.25 
6: Infant mortality 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 
Total 6.75 6.75 6.75 6 6.25 6.25 6.25 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 56.25 56.25 56.25 50.00 52.08 52.08 52.08 
C Investment Profile (12) 
1: Risk of expropriation or contract viability 1 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.00 1.00 1.25 
2: Taxation 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.75 
3: Repatriation 2 2 2 22 2 2.25 
4: Labor cost 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 6 6.25 6.25 6.25 6 6 6.75 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 50.00 52.08 52.08 52.08 50.00 50.00 56.25 
D) Internal Conflict (12) 
1: Armed threats to Government or Business 1.5 1.5 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
2: Civil War (Govt. involvement) 1 1 1 11 1 0.75 
3: Political violence 1.5 1.5 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.00 
4: Armed violence carried out all country 1.25 1.25 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.75 
Total 5.25 5.25 6 66 6 6.25 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 43.75 43.75 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 52.08 
E) External Conflict (12) 
1: Trade Restrictions & embargoes 2 2 2 2.25 2.5 2.5 2.00 
2: Investment sanctions 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.75 2 2 1.75 
3: Distortions in allocation of Eco resources 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 1 1.00 
4: Violent change in structure of society 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 
Total 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.25 6 6 5.50 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 39.58 39.58 39.58 43.75 50.00 50.00 45.83 
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Pakistan Political Risk Indices (1970-2004 
1998-2004 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
F) Corruption (6) 
1: Government stay in office 2.25 2.25 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.00 
Total 2.25 2.25 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.00 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 37.5 37.5 41.67 41.67 41.67 41.67 33.33 
G) Military in Politics (6) 
1: Involvement in Government 3.5 2.5 1 1 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Total 3.5 2.5 1 1 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 58.33 41.67 16.67 16.67 41.67 41.67 41.67 
H) Religious Tension (6) 
1: Govern. By single religious group 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.25 
2: Suppression of religious freedom 1 1 1.5 1.5 1 1.5 1.75 
3: Tension between religious groups 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 
Total 3 3 3.5 3.5 3 3.5 3.25 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 50.00 50.00 58.33 58.33 50.00 58.33 54.16 
I) Law & Order (6) 
1: impartial Legal system 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 
2: Impartial Judicial system 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 
3: Law ignored for political aim 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 
4: Strikes involving illegal practices 1 1 1 11 1 0.75 
Total 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2 
Section Result (ARP/TRP)*100 41.67 41.67 41.67 41.67 41.67 41.67 33.33 
Ethnic Tension (6) 
1: Racial 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 
2: Nationality 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
3: Language tensions 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.50 
Total 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 2 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 29.17 29.17 29.17 29.17 29.17 29.17 33.33 
K) Democratic Accountability (6) 
1: Implementation of Government Policies 3.5 2.5 3 3.5 4 4 4.25 
Total 3.5 2.5 3 3.5 4 4 4.25 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 58.33 41.67 50.00 58.33 66.67 66.67 70.80 
L) Bureaucracy Quality (4) 
1: Expertise in policy making 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.00 
2: Ability to handle crises 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.50 
3: impartiality 0 0 0 00 0 0 
4: Recruitment & Training mechanism 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.50 
Total 1.5 1.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2 
Section Result ARP/TRP *100 37.50 43.75 56.25 56.25 56.25 56.25 50.00 
135/240 
Appendix-4.3 
Pakistan Political Risk: Qualitative Information (1970-2004) 
A 1970- The nine-month civil war in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) had demoralized the armed for 
1971- The defeat of Pakistan in Eat Pakistan war Yahya Khan resigned in 1971. 
1972-Power handed over to People's Party and Z. A. Bhutto took office as Prime Minister 
1972-77 -Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government, stable but got week with time duration. 
1977- General election in country again destabilised a strong majority holding government. 
1978- Military take over after long unrest in general public and week law and order. 
1978- Zia being a military general declared himself as President of Pakistan 
1980-Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), for details see 
Noman, 0-1985, " Political Economy of Pakistan" ch # 1, part-3, p# 120-125 
1982-Political violence by opposition parties coalition MRD 
1983-Induction of Civilian ministers to Government 
1984-Announcement of general elections to be held in 1985 
1984- Law & Order situation in Karachi had shaken the Government ability 
1985- General elections held to established a coalition government under Army control 
1988- Dismissal of Democratic Government by Army General 
as President using B-52 constitution-1973 
1988- Plane crash killed the President & others destabilizing the whole system 
1988- New interim govt formed to hold party based election in 1988 
1988- Party based elections held and anti Zia policies party coalition govt formed 
1990-Democratic Govt dismissed by President and fresh election held 
1990-New govt formed, which was considered a pro Zia policies 
1993- Major alley JI quit IJI coalition for not backing JI favourite Afghan leaders 
1993- New coalition formed headed by PPP as no party got open majority 
Ref: "People's Verdict", News line Oct-1993, and Dawn 8 Oct-1993. 
1996- PPP govt dismissed by President using 58-2(B) despite being a PPP leader 
1997- PML (N) won by clear majority to form govt at National + 03 provinces 
and a coalition govt in Pakistan Peoples Party majority in Sind province 
Ref: Hussin, Z- Feb-1997 "Clean Sweep", News line Feb-1997, p# 36 5 Feb-1997. 
and " Latest Party position" Dawn 
1997- Jamat Islami and Jamiat Ulma Pakistan boycotted the election 
1998-National assembly approved 13th amendment to empower Prime Minister. 
1998- First row of clashes started with President and Chief Justice of Pakistan, 
ended by resignation by president and removal of Chief Justice from office 
1999- 2nd conflict with Army Chief, which ended with forceful Military rule 
2000- Military government headed by Army Chief, suspended constitution 
2000- Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) # 1-1999 approved by Supreme Court 
2000- General Musharraf held the office of Chief Executive of country 
2001- General Musharraf became president after dismissing an elected president 
2001- Local bodies non-party based elections held to check parties street power 
136/240 
2001- After 11/09 terrorist attacks in US, Military government decided to ally US 
2002-General elections held under Legal Framework Order (LFO) 
"an amendment in 1973-constituion, which legally protected military dictatorship" 
2003- LFO passed by assembly, a dictator got powers to dissolve assembly 
B 1977-1985 The increase in population shows better economic conditions. 
See Burki-1991, " Pakistan under Military", ch-4, p-87 
1978-Main attributes of Fifth Five Year Plan for Private sector confidence 
in security, which also helped Government with economic growth 
1983- Main attributes of the Sixth Five Year Plan (1983-1988) 
Redistribution, Poverty alleviation, & Social Justice. 
1986-New political govt social action program under sixth five year plan 
1988- Political Govt dismissed and Zia died in plane crash 
1989-Benazir sworn in as Prime Minister of Pakistan but no change in policies 
1990- Benazir government dismissed on mishandling on economy and corruption 
1990-Nawaz Sharif sworn in as a new Prime Minister after elections October-1990 
1992-Kashmir floods killed 2,000, government blamed for mishandling the crises 
1990- First speech by PM since elections-1990 with special slogan of genuine 
journey to poverty reduction, Ref: Dawn, 9th November-1990 
1993- Samad, A. "Economic Policies of Nawaz Sharif 1St term 1990-93" 
1993-1996 Despite PPP government 2nd term in office, 
Unemployment increased from 4.7% in 1993 to 5.4% in 1996 
1995- Budget June -1995 with low taxes but a mini budget in Oct-1995 
1995 - 7% devaluation of Rupee to boost exports raised dissatisfaction in public 
1997- Nawaz Sharif 2nd term as Prime minister faced many social and economic 
challenges like increased unemployment, external debt, corruption etc. 
1998- Slight decrease in unemployment rate from 6.09% in 1997 to 5.90% in 1998 
1998- Infant mortality decreased from 90/1000 in 1991 to 84/1000 in 1998 
1998- The decreasing trends in unemployment and infant mortality revealed better 
implementation and management of economic and social policies 
1999 The trends remained same despite the change in government 
2000- Unemployment increased from 5.90% in 1999 to 7.80% in 2000 
2001-2003 public dissatisfaction over the handling of economic situation 
C See Foreign Private Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act, 1976, BOI Pak, 
Annexure-XV, and also see "Political Economy of Pakistan-1988" p# 77 
1973-1975 Labour wages increase 
1988-1992 the economic investment policies remained unchanged despite 
frequent changes in governments 
1992- Economic Act to facilitate foreign investors, 
for further details see "http: //www. pakboi. gov. pk/html/annexure_xvi_. html 
July-1992 Labour wages were fixed as lowest to 1,500/- pm. 
1990-1992 investment policies to gain international investors confidence 
1994- $ 4billions FDI in energy sector, shows either international investors 
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confidence or a political corruption in contract 
1995-96 Rs. 40.8 billion taxes imposed to cover the debt and defence budget 
1996- The change in government created an atmosphere of political instability risk 
1998- Freezing of foreign current accounts created risk of repatriation of profits 
1999- The Military dictatorship in the country created a risk contract viability 
2001- 11/09 attacks in USA, increased the security risk particularly in Pakistan 
2002-03 The restoration of semi political government and Pakistan commitment 
to fight terrorism gained foreign investors confidence on security risk 
2002-03 2 6% growth in FDI inflows show foreign investors confidence 
D 1970-Fair & Impartial Elections by Government after long Military dictatorship 
1971-postponment of Assembly session & Delay in power transfer to Mujeeb. 
1973-Armed violence in Baluchistan Province & Military action in the province 
1974-Religious violence and Qadianis were declared Non-Muslims 
1977- General Elections & Political parties agitation against rigging in Election 
1977-Military intervention to control threat of civil war between FSF & public 
1979- Islamic Panel Code introduced, 
1979- Threats of violence as Bhutto hanged on 4th April-1979 
1980 Shia Muslims convention in capital Islamabad later turned into violence 
against Islamic Tax (Zakat), killed 01 person 
1981- Bomb explosion at Karachi Stadium just before arrival of Pop John Paul II 
1981-PIA plane hijacked by Al-Zulfikar Terrorist Organisation 
1981- Indian magazine India Today reported of infiltration of thousands of Afghan 
based guerrillas for armed violence in Pakistan 
1982- 25,000 teachers demonstration for pay rise turned into political violence 
later and with clash in police injured 15 and wounded 100. 
1982- Political leader detention extended for unlimited period for violence 
1983- Religious and political violence in public and governmentt 
1983- Religious tension among groups 
1983-1984 On violence see Burki-1991, "Pakistan Under the Military", # 167-172 
1985- General elections held to restore democratic institutions 
1985- President called off martial law & allowed political parties activities 
1986- Benazir returned home and started agitation against Government 
1986- Clashes between Pathans & Muhajirs in Karachi after an action by govt 
against drugs dealers Sohrab Goth Karachi killing 147 people 
1987- bomb blast in Karachi killed 22, uprise in civil war, Afghan refugees blamed 
1987- Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz leader arrested for political violence and armed threat 
1988-Army ammunitions Ojhri camp exploded killing 100's, fears of terrorist activity 
1988- A prominent shi'a scholar assassinated in Peshawar (Frontier province) 
1989-Banazir government dismissed by President using B-52 of constitution due to 
Failure in working relationship with opposition in 02 provincial governments. 
1990- Nawaz Sharif entered to the office as Prime Minister of Pakistan 
but still was not able to control armed violence in the country 
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1993- Conflict with President on 8th amendment in constitution, giving powers to 
President of Pakistan 
1993- Armed conflicts among the political groups created a law & order instability 
1993- Benazir reached from London and started attacking the govt for creating 
anarchy situation and tried to settle his dispute with his rival President to grab power 
1993- President of Pakistan dismissed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif government 
1993- Nawaz government reinstated by Supreme Court 
1994-1995 Armed violence in Karachi claimed 500 included Sind Chief Minister brother 
1995- Rs 120 billions of Market capitalisation were wiped off from 
Karachi Stock Exchange, Ref: News line, March-1995, p# 95 
1995- It was estimated a loss of Rs. 01 billion revenue for 01 day strike in Karachi 
1996- A political agitation was started due the huge increase of taxes in the budget 
1997- Lahore bomb blast claiming 19 lives raised religious tension in the country 
1998- Reduction in armed violence was observed due to elected governments 
representing four provinces and law and order enforcement helped by Army 
1999-2003 The armed violence in country reduced due to military government 
E 1971- Democratic government formed headed by Mr. Bhutto (1970-1977) 
1972- Shimla agreement between India & Pakistan 
1972- Credit Policy restructuring by State Bank 
1972- Nationalization of major industries started to end monopoly in business 
1972- 80% devaluation of Pak currency and highest inflation at 6.6% 
1973-change in oil prices effected the economy 
1977- General Elections, Political parties agitation against rigging in Election 
Military called to restore peace 
1977-peaceful change of regime, military take over 
1979- Introduction of Islamic Tax system increased uncertainty, the savings fell 
which compelled government to raise borrowing 
1979- Military & Economic sanctions lifted due to Russian invasion in Afghanistan 
1979- Record 7.3% GDP growth helped in better economy 
1980- IMF approved $ 1.7 billion loan for Pakistan to assist stabilization of economy 
1980-US government announced $3 billion 3 years aid package for Pakistan 
1980- US State department lifted ban on military & economic aid to Pakistan 
1981-Reagon Administration approved $ 275 million military aid to Pakistan 
1982-US senate foreign committee approved $ 500 million for Pakistan 
1984- Drop in foreign capital inflows by 20% from target due to regional tension 
1985- New development programme by elected democratic government 
1986- A fair drop in FDI due Nuclear development uncertainty 
1986- Despite nuclear capability allegations, US government continued 
aid program due to strategic importance of Pakistan 
1988- National Economic Council approved the 7th Five Year Plan (1988-1993) 
1988- After successful completion of 1St 6 years plan, US government approved 
$ 4.02 billion plus 57% (i. e. $ 2.28 billion) for economic & military assistance 
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1990- Started social reform program through privatisation, decentralization 
& Deregulation of the nationalised industries during 1971 
1992- Floods damaged cotton crops which effected the social reform program 
1993- Floods in country severely damaged the crops and effected the textile exports 
1994- President Clinton imposed sanctions on Pakistan using 1994 
Non-proliferation law, which also pinched India by $ 20 billion in aid. 
1994-96 Border conflicts with India damaged the economy and relations with US 
1996- US government released a military and economic aid package of 
$ 350 million due to Brown amendment 
1998- The nuclear tests set back the economic reforms due to subsequent 
economic sanctions by G-7 countries 
1999- The developed countries put sanctions on aid programs due to military rule 
1999- Pakistan survived a default risk by the rescheduling loans from IMF, Paris club 
2000-2003 Pakistan made a significant move to macroeconomic reforms 
F 1977-1988 Long military rule in the country for 11 years 
1977-1988 Long military rule in the country for 11 years 
1989- PPP government considered more corrupt than 1St term from 1971-1977 
1990- PPP govt dismissed by President with corruption charges 
1991- General elections held but the credibility of elections was questioned 
1993- Nawaz government was accused of mishandling public fund 
due to bankruptcy of 2 investment corporations owned by his cabinet members 
1993- The government accused of money laundering through Foreign 
Investment Bonds, without identity and money source of investor identification 
1996- PPP government dismissed by President due to mishandling of economy, 
judiciary, long term problems in narrow based taxing system. 
1996- Pakistan ranked 2nd most corrupt country, Transparency International's 
report-1996, Ref: Far Eastern Economic Review 159, no 26 (27 June, 1996), p 66 
1998- Pakistan Muslim League government ministers accused of taking out millions 
of $s from their accounts 01 night before freezing of FOREX accounts 
1999-2003 The military led democratic govt included 75% of cabinet members 
accused by National Accountability Beau rue (NAB) of being defaulters. 
Ref: NAB reports before election-2002 
G 1972- Military backed elected govt of Bhutto 
1973- Military action in Baluchistan against guerrillas 
1982- 350 members Majlios-e-Shura formed to strengthen Military government 
1985- Election held under Military regime to move a step forward to democracy 
1986- Martial Law lifted from country & army returned to barracks 
1988- National assembly dissolved by President using B-52 clause of constitution, 
to hold fresh elections in 1989 under a care taker government under military 
1988- President Zia died in plan crash & new general elections held in 1989 
1989- Party based elections held, new government considered to be anti Military 
1993- Military directly involved in resignation of Prime minister and President 
140/240 
1993-Fresh general elections held under Army supervision 
1996- The president dissolve Pakistan Peoples Party government considered 
to less loyal to Pakistan and was backed by army 
1999- 2001 Military again toppled the elected govt and suspended the constitution 
2002-2003 Military dictator captured the Presidency 
and became 3rd Military uniformed President of Pakistan after election-2002 
H 1973-Islamic contents of constitution 
1974- Tension between Qadianis and Muslims 
1974-Qadianis declared non-Muslims 
1977- Military rule headed by Zia-ul-Haq a strict Sunni Muslim 
1978- Tension between Sunni & Shia public started growing 
1979- Iran Islamic Inqalab effected religious understanding in Pakistan 
1980- Shi's convention in Islamabad against Islamic tax (Zakat), 
1980- Tension increased among Sunni group and Shi's group due to conflicts on 
the implementation of Islamic Taxation laws (Zakat) 
1981 -Shi's formed Tehrik Nefaz-e-Fiqh Jafari (TNFJ), the Sunni's formed 
Sunni Tehrik to pressurise the government for the implementation of their beliefs 
1981- Three Sunni Ulemas were appointed as high court judges 1St time in Pakistan 
1983- Shi's Muslims were given exemption from paying Zakat & Usher 
1984- Ahmedi's already declared as non-Muslims were ordered not to call 
themselves Muslims and their worship place as Masjid in ordinance 298-B, 298-C 
in Pakistan Panel Code, see Talbot-1998, "Pakistan a Modem History"Ch-9, pp-283 
Also see, Burki-1991, "Pakistan under Military", ch-6, pp-170 
1989- Benazir (PPP) considered to be Shia as her mother came from Iran 
1990-1993 Again IJI government more religious in general but Sunni in particular 
1993- Nawaz govt refused to help in Shia beliefs restriction through Shariat bill 
1994- Manzoor Masih gunned down due his remarks against Prophet (mpbuh) 
1993-1996 PPP government was broad based as compared to IJI during1990-1993. 
1996-1999 Pakistan Muslim League government replacing Pakistan Peoples Party 
also remained broad based but still under the fundamentalist elements of Army 
1999-2003 The take over by army was basically helped by religious group in army 
but later on it became a broad based govt. 
I 1970- Free & Fair general elections announced & held in Dec-1970 
1971- Pakistan National assembly session March-1971 postponed 
due to political violence in East wing of Pakistan. 
1973- Constitution passed fm National Assembly 
1973- Baluchistan provincial Govt dismissed 
1974 creation of FSF, a Para military force to take place of Army 
1977-General election under government, blamed of impartial & rigged elections 
1977- Military take over, the constitution, judicial, legal, political system paralysed 
1977-1979 political activities banned due to martial law 
1980-Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) under President order-1 to curb judges 
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1980- Chief Justice Lahore High Court retired due to court decision on the 
legality of military rule 
1980- The arrested journalist sentenced by military, trade union activities banned 
1981- Chief Justice along with 08 other senior judges were dismissed 
for not taking oath under Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) 
1983- The judiciary and press had been marginalized by military government 
to have strong hold of power 
1983- About 4,000 lawyers staged an anti govt protest against PCO 
1984- Zia ul Haq announced a referendum to extend his presidency tenure 
1984- Martial law lifted after general election but still PCO remained effective 
1985- Less than a week after polls Zia announced another presidential order, 
which gave tremendous powers in the hands of President 
1985-1988 Article 48 empowered the president to dissolve National assembly, 
appoint chiefs of forces, chiefs of supreme & high courts 
1989- New government could not amend the constitution 8th amendment due 
simple majority so the powers remained in the hands of pro Zia president 
1989- Additional judges in courts with political background and affiliation 
1989-1992 Political appointments in the law enforcing agencies and bureaucracy 
1993-Islami Jumhoori Ittehad (IJI) government was dismissed by the president 
for attempting to amend the constitution to reduce President's powers 
1994- New PPP government used their powers to pinch their political rivals 
1995- Asif Ali Zaradari, PM's husband used every method of trading to gain vote 
Ref: Zahid Hussain, Benazir Bhutto: The fall from Grace, Newsline-Nov-1996,24-31 
1996- Defence & National Security Council (CDNS) dominate the law & rule 
1996-1999 New government amended the constitution to reduce President powers 
1997- A controversial Anti-terrorist law was imposed despite International condemnation 
1998- A conflict between Chief Justice of Pakistan and Prime Minister ended 
with the resignation of Chief Justice and President 
1999- A conflict with Army Chief, military take over and martial law imposed 
1999-2002 constitution suspended and an LFO was introduced for interim period 
to take oath by Judiciary under LFO-99 
2003- LFO amendment passed by assembly and a dictator got powers to dissolve 
assembly and formation of Council of Defence & National Security (CDNS) 
J 1970-Uprise in ethnic tension in the Eastern wing of Pakistan 
1971- Despite fair & impartial elections the tension remained 
1972- Despite political Govt, the tension grew due to removal of 1300 
civil servants from central govt in general but from Sind in particular 
1973-Removal of Baluchistan govt raised ethnic tension between provinces 
1980- Bhutto death sentence by Supreme court bench considered to be a racial 
decision as Punjabi judges in favour of decision and non Punjabis against 
1981-Induction of more military generals to power created an atmosphere of 
Punjabi domination in the government (as all generals were from Punjab) 
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1982- Military also captured 43% Of foreign services as ambassadors 
1983- MRD national movement against military regime turned into violent 
regional struggle, Sind was mainly affected by political victimisation 
1984- Sindhis and non-Sindhis conflict claimed 100s of lives in Karachi only 
1985-1988 Tension decreased as the new prime minister of Pakistan is also Sindhi 
but the tension in Karachi remained highly risky 
1986- The ethnic tension among Pathans and Muhajirs in Karachi claimed 
174 lives pushing the Government to impose curfew 
1987- After a few months normalcy, ethnic tension again grew in Sind 
1987- Bomb blast in Bori Bazar Karachi killed 72 giving rise to tension among rise 
Pathans and Muhajirs 
1987- Troops called to control ethnic violence and Mahajir Qaumi Movement 
leaders with other 400 people arrested 
1988- Ethnic groups in Sind and Karachi in particular won provincial election 
1988- Benazir had to make a coalition govt with major ethnic group MQM in Sind 
1990- Conflict between Sindhis and Muhajirs in Pucca Killa Hyderabad 
claimed hundreds of lives, Ref: Talbot-1998, "Pakistan a Modern History" 
Ch-10, pp-296 & 314 (election-1988 & 1990) 
1990- The election results revealed the effects of conflicts between ethnic groups 
1993-1999 Ethnic tension claimed more than 1,000 lives of religious leaders 
2003-A religious leader and MNA assassinated near Islamabad by rival religious group 
K 1970- General Elections held by an unstable Govt. 
1971-Postponement of Assembly session. 
1972- New democratic Govt leader statement quoted on P#2 
"Pakistan Under Bhutto" (1971-1977) by Burki, S. J. -1980 
1972- Police strike to raise wages 
1972- Forceful retirement of 1,300 civil servants under martial law order 
1973- New constitution passed fm National Assembly 
1973- Baluchistan govt dismissed 
1974- first constitutional amendment to empower govt to ban political parties, 
restricted free press reporting 
1974- National press Trust was formed to sensor news before being published 
1975- Political parties leader were forcefully sent out of National Assembly session 
with the help of notorious Federal Security Force (FSF) 
1977- Zia implemented the martial law authority after suspending constitution 
1978- A censorship on newspapers imposed with aims to" responsible journalism" 
1978- Sharia courts formed to adjucate cases brought under Sharia law 
1979- Islamic law of taxation introduced as the first policy of the military govt 
1979- Punishments on crimes including alcohol drinking, theft, prostitution, 
fornication, adultery, & false witness were imposed according to Sharia law 
1980- local bodies governments elections held to form basic democratic institutions 
1981- A Majlis-e-Shura of 350 members formed to induct civilians in the government 
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1983 GDP growth from 4.9% - 6.2% revealed better implementation 
of fifth five years plan (1978-83) 
1984-1985 Government failed to raise domestic savings due to lack of 
implementation of policies advised in sixth five year plan (1983-88) 
1984- Poor performance in education (rate of 8%) A report by UNESCO -1984) 
1984- Referendum turn out showed dissatisfaction by public on Zia's govt policies 
1985- New Govt formed and still not in the stage to implement its policies 
1986- 1st success of the new govt in restoration of 1973 constitution 
1985-1988 Junejo government development program showed a GDP growth of 5%- 6% 
1993- Shafiq Hashmi criticized the privatization program by IJI government 
to be considered as government lack of implementation of accountability policy 
Ref "Privatization Policy" in Kennedy and Rais ," Pakistan in 1995"pp 31-47 
for more details see Talbot-1998 " Pakistan, A Modern History" pp 319-320 
1993-Ref: Samad, A. " Economic Policies by Government during 1990-93" on 
Government's Education Policy 
1994-1996 PPP government failed to implement the policies to service debt 
due to rising uncomfort from the traders 
Ref: Hussain Zahid, " The economic Squeeze", News line, Nov-1995 pp 22-7 
Also see Far Eastern Economic Review, 159, no 26 (June-1996) p-66 
1998- Govt implemented successfully General Sales Tax (GST) to cover up 
Rs. 4,127 billion unpaid local debt to banks despite government deadline of Feb-1998 
1999-2002 The rise in inflation and unemployment showed the failure of implementation 
of economic policies by the Military government. 
2002-2003 Semi democratic government headed by a military dictator 
still struggling to overcome inflation and unemployment despite rise in reserves 
L 1970-Yahya Khan also relied on bureaucracy, which played dominant role in elections 
1972- 1300 civil servants forcefully retired from central government and 
provincial government (Sind Province) to take from revenge political rivals 
1972- At the same time recruitment of more than retired civil servants (1,374) 
gives indication of employing pro government bureaucracy 
1972-1977 the whole bureaucracy recruitment was political based 
IRef. Noman, 0=1985, "Political Economy of Pakistan" chapter # 1, p# 62. 
2000-Finally the autocratic democratic rule from 1988 to 1999 was marked 
by a strong army and weak bureaucracy: " 
Ref: Ghazali A S. -2000, "Hegemony of Elite ruling in Pakistan", Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 
Empirical Models of FDI to Developing Countries 
A Review 
5.1 Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the most effective ways by which developing 
countries become integrated globally with developed economies as FDI provides not 
only capital but also the technology and management know-how necessary for 
restructuring firms in the host economies (Estrin et al 1997). There is also evidence that 
there is a positive correlation between FDI inflows and the economic growth of the host 
economy (Taylor et al 1997). An important question for policy-makers is what the host 
government can do to attract FDI. Trade theory argues that the location choices by 
investing firms are influenced by traditional factors such as economic growth, market 
size, low wages, skilled labour force, and infrastructure along with non-traditional 
factors such as political risk, business operation risk, and work days lost risk due to 
political unrest in the country such as labour unions demands. 
The focus of this chapter is to examine and analyse the empirical models of FDI in 
developing countries. In particular it examines the important empirical models utilizing 
most of the traditional factors such as economic growth, openness of trade, labour cost, 
infrastructure and non-traditional ones such as PR, WDL and the ORI index. First, 
political risk, PR, refers to risk of loss when investing in a given country caused by 
changes in a country's political structure or policies, such as tax laws, tariffs, 
expropriation of assets, or restriction in repatriation of profits. For example, a company 
may suffer from such loss in the case of expropriation or tightened foreign exchange 
repatriation rules or from increased credit risk if the government changes policies to 
make it difficult for the company to pay creditors. Second, work days lost, WDL, due to 
labour industrial action, political unrest and illness, and Third, the operation risk index, 
ORI, here refers to the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people, systems and management or from external events. External 
events include legal and regulatory risks, disasters and infrastructure failures, business 
risks, outsourcing and supplier risks. In determining the effects on the flow of FDI to 
the world in general and developing countries in particular for 1970-2004 in a structured 
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framework, statistical and theoretical ideas will be developed and reviewed in this 
chapter. 
Though the empirical studies have contradicted results on the individual role of 
traditional versus non-traditional determinants of FDI for different parts of world, there 
is still a need to investigate the joint effects of these determinants on the flow of FDI to 
developing countries 1970-2005 (Romita 2002). 
First, the empirical models used to access the determinants affecting FDI inflows to a 
country positively or negatively will be analysed. The second part of the chapter will 
present an empirical analysis of these main determinants in reference to Pakistan 
economy and economic policies. Empirical results of the composite mode173 of 
developing countries for the last three decades will also be presented. 
In the past, the impact of FDI on the economic development of the host country has 
been discussed thoroughly, leading to both positive and negative effects being 
identified. Most economists have also studied the factors affecting the inflows/outflows 
of FDI presenting a variety of results but there is still a need to construct a model for the 
future risks and returns to build investor confidence in the context of the previous risks 
and returns on their investments. 
Despite the necessity of a positive relationship between return on investment and the 
flows of FDI to a country, it has become necessary to consider some major macro- 
economic and socio-economic factors to analyse the effect of the risks involved on the 
expected or projected return on foreign investments in developing countries. 
It has been agreed universally that the eagerness of the developing world to host FDI is 
not only due to its contribution to the economic development but also to gain skills in 
the latest technology and organisational and managerial practices in order to compete in 
the international markets (Cho-2001). 
73 Composite model means political, economic and social variables included in model 
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The most commonly cited models are those of Singh et al (1995), Cho (2001), Erdal et 
al (2002), Venkataramany (2002), and Romita (2002), which are considered to be the 
most recent studies on the empirical analysis of traditional and non-traditional 
determinants of FDI flows to developing countries. In these models, the economists 
have analysed three major hypotheses of economic, social, and political determinants. 
Despite a positive relationship between most of the major traditional macro-economic, 
social and political determinants and FDI inflows to developing countries, the political 
risk has been found to be a vital determinant to attract FDI to a developing country. 
It is widely believed that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the less-developed 
economies (LDCs) have risen sharply in 1990s, and have therefore become an 
autonomous and dynamic factor in the industrialization and accelerated growth of 
economies (Morris 2004). 
The purpose of this section is to briefly analyze the possible locational variables, 
identified as potential determinants influencing FDI decisions. The most intrinsic and 
important characteristics used to define FDI is to analyze the determinants, such as the 
economic development, trade openness, discount rate, exchange rate, human capital; 
labour costs; political stability, work days lost and operational risks etc. Each of the 
above determinants affects the decision-making of investing abroad (Agiomirgianakis et 
al 2000). A number of theories have tried to explain the determinants of FDI with a 
variety of results and positive / negative correlations with FDI (Singh et al 1995). 
The aim of the international investors in gaining higher returns along with the security 
of their assets, leads them to look into the traditional macro-economic determinants of 
the FDI hosting country. These determinants have been tested and analysed by a 
number of economists since the 1980s, when there was a steep increase of FDI flows in 
the world in general and towards developing countries in particular. Some economists 
have studied the effect of major economic indicators by using different analytical 
approaches, e. g. econometric analysis, surveys etc. Most of the previous studies have 
analysed quite a number of macro-economic factors e. g. GDP, real exchange rate, 
exports, imports, trade balance, balance of payments, the openness of an economy and 
Forex Reserves etc. A few of the studies have analysed thoroughly the effects of socio- 
political factors, so it is required to study in depth the major macro-economic factors 
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such as. socio-political factors and the government policies for foreign capital inflows 
(FDI & FPI & Trade). 
It has been unanimously agreed that FDI has a strong relationship with the major 
traditional economic indicators including the trade volume of the host country with rest 
of the world (Tadesse et al 2002). 
The socio-political determinants including political instability. the business 
environment, law and order situation, ethnic violations, corruption. and infrastructure 
have been found to be insignificant (Mody 1992). Of course political risk is not only the 
main determinant of FDI since a strong correlation between political risk and FDI 
inflows has been found. In categorizing the political risk as a composite risk. Root 
(1979) has analysed the three major types of risk, first transfer risk related to trade. 
second operational risk related to the business operations and profitability of investment 
in the recipient country and finally the third type as ownership risk, which is closely 
related property rights of the investor. He found a strong relationship between all types 
of risk and FDI inflows to the recipient country. The country risk as a composite risk of 
political instability, work days lost, and operational risk, has also been negatively 
correlated to the investment decision and the expected returns on investments (Meldrum 
2000). 
What is important for FDI7`ý? 
Host-Country 
Determinants 
Policy I ramework 
I conomic Determinants Business Facilitation 
I 
Macroeconomic, 
political and social 
environment 
Depends of the investor's 
motives 
Activities aimed to 
boost the FDI 
"Adopted horn UNCTAD W112-1998 
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This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part of the chapter, we have reviewed the 
previous empirical studies of the determinants of FDI. In the second part, the 
methodology adopted by different empirical models has been reviewed to identify a 
practical methodology for an empirical study of Pakistan between 1970 and 2004. In the 
third part of the chapter, the empirical results of previous studies have been critically 
analyzed in the context of traditional and non-traditional determinants of FDI flows to 
developing countries. 
5.2 Empirical Studies Review 
A number of theories and perspectives have been developed to explain the level and 
pattern of FDI flow and stock to developing countries since the late 1950s, when the 
topic started to receive scholarly attention. Both theoretical and empirical research on 
FDI flows has emphasized differing causal variables. Extensive detail of empirical 
results of the most cited FDI models can be found in Table 5.2. While the theories on 
FDI present a much broader set of FDI determinants, including traditional and non- 
traditional determinants, the evidence from this study supports the contention that, while 
developing countries offer several location advantages to foreign investors in terms of 
market size; infrastructure; openness of the economy and market attractiveness, the 
instability of the exchange rate, economy and political system has hindered its efforts to 
increase the volume of FDI. The empirical work on FDI determinants generally comes 
in two forms: investor surveys and econometric analysis of the macro-economic data of 
the host country(s) either through time-series or panel analysis (Erdal et al 2002). 
Thus, most econometric models try to express financial linkages across countries in 
terms of interest rate parity conditions. The most important factor to influence the 
intentions of the foreign investors as foreign affiliates is a high interest rate on their 
term deposits, however, high commercial interest rates were viewed negatively 
(Venkataramany 2002). 
In addition to these economic and traditional fundamentals, government policies and 
capital market imperfections also determine international capital movements. The 
processes of deregulation, globalization, and innovation have a positive effect on the 
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flows of FDI to developing countries. The recent literature has also distinguished 
between two sets of factors affecting inward FDI. 
The first is country-specific pull, factors consisting of domestic opportunity and risk, 
such as developing countries' creditworthiness. FDI may be attracted by the opportunity 
to use local raw materials or employ a local labour force, property rights and 
infrastructure. 
The second set of determinants of FDI flows to developing countries is global-push- 
factors, which includes sharp increases in FDI flows from developed countries and the 
fall of U. S. discount rates (short, medium, and long term), as happened in the late 
1980s. One would expect that, as the governments of developing countries make macro- 
economic and institutional reforms, international investors will gain confidence and be 
more willing to direct capital flows toward the new markets (Taylor et al 1997). 
To explain the differences in the flow of FDI among developing countries, some 
analysts point to the salience of democracy, transparency and good governance, while 
others emphasize the need for a stable macro-economic environment and the capacity 
for economic management (World Bank 1997 & IMF 2001)75. 
As a number of studies proposed concrete models and methods to estimate the affects of 
traditional and non-traditional factors on FDI flows to developing countries, a general 
model can be stated in the following section. 
5.3 Review of General Explanatory Variables 
An important strand of literature has focused on an exclusive model of FDI 
determinants. A number of economists as show on Table 5.1 (page 150) used panel 
data and time-series techniques in order to identify the driving forces behind FDI for the 
period 1970-2004. The following factors are seen as FDI catalysts: i) size and growth 
rate of the domestic economy; ii) inflation; iii) human capital; iv) foreign trade 
openness; v) the extent and quality of the infrastructure, vi, level of interest rates, vii, 
75 World Bank, 1997, IMF, 2001, pp. 49-50 
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labour cost (wages) and viii, political stability, especially in those countries that have 
received large flows of FDI in the past. 
Dunning (1977) made an early theoretical analysis of multinational firms, which 
considered FDI as being determined by ownership, location, and internalization 
advantages. Recent theoretical treatments have come up with general equilibrium 
models in which multinationals arise endogenously. The early literature has treated 
horizontal (Markusen 1984) and vertical (Helpman, 1984) multinationals separately, 
while the recent work has provided a unified framework (Maskus 2001b). The theory 
appears to work well empirically for FDI that either originates or is targeted at 
developed countries but the vertical model is rejected in favour of the horizontal one 
(Markusen and Maskus 2001a). It has been argued that they offer an explanation of the 
determinants of FDI in the long-run, but cannot well explain short-run fluctuations. One 
important explanation for the latter is the exchange rate, which has no role in real trade 
models. Empirically, both real exchange rate levels and fluctuations have been found to 
matter in explaining FDI and there is a sizable literature addressing the short-run issue. 
Other researchers have used the gravity model, which has been shown to work well in 
explaining trade flows among countries, and adapted it to the study of the determinants 
of FDI (e. g. Brenton et al. 1999; Brainard 1997). The latter emphasizes the importance 
of economies of scale at the plant and the corporate level in determining multinational 
activity versus trade. 
The impact of multinational firms on developing countries is one of the most hotly 
contested issues in the current debate over globalization. Much has been written about 
the macro-economic impact of foreign investment. This work goes beyond these macro- 
economic implications to focus on the political and social effects of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), particularly on the developing countries. 
Despite a broad empirical literature on the determinants of FDI, the review of the 
literature shows that there is no clear agreement on the factors that determine FDI 
inflows to developing countries. The studies use diverse variables and often come to 
opposing findings on the relationship between certain variables and investment (table 
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5.1). Also included in the analysis are policy-related variables, tariff barriers proxied by 
import duty, corporate tax rates, openness to foreign trade and the quality of 
infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, we can use past work to specify a reasonable model for the determinants 
of investment as a basis for understanding the impact of determinants on FDI in the case 
of Pakistan between 1970 and 2005. The rationale for the review of studies and models 
for the determinants of FDI flows to developing countries, in which economists have 
used most of the traditional and non-traditional determinants to analyse the results 
according to their theoretical and empirical findings. These models can be used as the 
starting point for an assessment of the fitness of these traditional and non-traditional 
variables for the analysis of FDI flows and stock for Pakistan between 1970 and 2004 as 
shown on Table 5.1 (page 153). 
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1: Economic Growth 
The GDP of a host country indicates the economic strength of that country. A profit 
rational investor will favour investment in a country which has an acceptable growth 
rate of the economy (Khan et al 1999). Theoretical and empirical evidence considers 
two mechanisms playing an important role in attracting FDI: (a) the market size and (b) 
the level of economic development. Empirical investigations have found that the positive 
impact of FDI is generally higher for recipient countries with a higher level of 
development (Blomstorm et al 1994). 
In defining GDP as an explanatory variable of FDI, we do not distinguish between local 
market and non-local market seeking FDI (Asiedu 2002). There are a number of 
definitions of GDP and its growth rate76, and ideally we would like to specify and 
analyze the sensitivity of the results according to the different definitions. A substantial 
literature has developed confirming empirically the importance of the size of the host 
market and its growth rate. These are measured by real GDP, the growth rate of real 
GDP per capita or real GDP growth. The foreign investors that target the local market 
are assumed to be more attracted to the country with a higher growth rate of GDP as it 
indicates a larger potential demand for their products. In the literature, researchers have 
used both nominal and real GDP measures, as the variables (growth of real GDP and 
per capita real GDP) have shown bidirectional causality with FDI flows. Investment in 
capital-scarce poor countries is expected to yield higher returns, indicating an inverse 
relationship between GDP and FDI. Here we use GDP growth measured by the annual 
growth rate. We expect a positive association between GDP growth and FDI flows 
(Chowdhury et al 2006). 
Erdal & Tatoglu (2002), after the testing of their hypothesis for the relationship between 
FDI inflows to Turkey and the effect of locational determinants, suggested that growth 
in the domestic market with an increase in the number of customers is positively related 
to foreign direct investment inflows, since the growth of the host country's market 
increases the opportunities for foreign investors to earn more profit through trade. 
76 There are four other definitions of FDI found in the WDI data including: (i) net FDI, BoP in current US$, (ii) net FDI inflows as 
% of gross capital formation, (iii) net FDI inflows BoP in current US$, and (iv) gross FDI as % of GDP in PPP. 
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The general implication is that host countries with larger market sizes, faster economic 
growth and higher levels of economic development will provide more and better 
opportunities for these industries to exploit their ownership advantages and, therefore, 
will attract more market-oriented FDI. Even for export-oriented FDI, the market size of 
host countries is important because larger economies can provide larger economies of 
scale and spillover effects (Zhao, 1995). 
2: Interest Rate 
Another important push factor in the FDI literature is the level of interest rates in the 
home country. There is a general consensus that, all things being equal, high real 
interest rates hamper FDI. Albuquerque, Loayza and Serven (2002) find a significant 
and negative relation between the yield of the US T-Bill and FDI flows, both to 
industrialised and developing countries. Calvo et al. (2001) show that FDI flows to 
emerging countries are lower during U. S. monetary tightening. 
Interest rates play an important major role in an economy trying to gain foreign 
investors' confidence. It has been noted that foreign affiliates will be satisfied with 
higher interest rates on their term deposits but will be hesitant if commercial interest 
rates were high. Venkataramany (2002), has used the term deposit interest rates and the 
rates charged by commercial banks on bills purchased and discounted in his empirical 
testing. He concluded that interest rates affect the flows of FDI globally in general and 
in the developing world in particular. 
Although no empirical literature exists for the specific case of FDI, the same result 
should in principle be expected since low interest rates at home, leading to narrow 
interest margins and lower costs of capital at home, are one of the main reasons offered 
by banks to explain their operations abroad, particularly in emerging countries where 
margins tend to be much larger. Low international interest rates, which in turn favour 
the creditworthiness of emerging markets and make more appealing international 
investments, played important roles in the early inflows of the 1990s (Carlos et al 
1998). 
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Vankitramanay (2002) concludes that real interest rates and the real rate of return in an 
economy are the most important factors to influence the intentions of foreign investors. 
Foreign affiliates are always satisfied with higher real interest rates on their term 
deposits but are hesitant if real commercial interest rates are high. The international 
investors worry about the real interest rate77 and real rather than nominal rates of return. 
3: Openness of the Economy 
It is unanimously claimed and argued that international agreements on trade and 
investment also affect the volume and direction of FDI flows. First, the liberalization of 
capital inflows and outflows gains the confidence of foreign investors. Second, an 
export-oriented economy permits international firms (MNC) involved in different 
projects in the host country to acquire information about other markets to exports their 
production and gain profits through bilateral trade. From various studies, it has been 
found that the reasons for huge FDI inflows to China are only due to the exports 
policies of the country. Third, the MNCs can easily compete with other firms through 
the low cost production. Overall, a higher degree of openness is expected to be 
associated with a higher level of inward FDI activity as well as outward FDI. The 
exports plus imports level of a country is proposed as an approximation of its openness 
(Kyrkilis et a! 2003). 
The 1996 WTO report again stressed that empirical research suggests that to the extent 
that there is a systematic relationship between FDI and home country exports, it is 
positive but not very pronounced. Certainly, there is no serious empirical support for the 
view that FDI has an important negative effect on the overall level of exports from the 
home country. There is less evidence on the relationship between FDI and home 
country imports, but what exists tends to suggest a positive but weak relationship. 
Studies have found a positive relationship between openness and FDI flows 
(Chakrabarti 2001). However, the relationship between openness and FDI is very 
complex, and needs careful explanation. To simplify this complexity, this work 
distinguishes between two categories of openness - "openness to trade" and "openness 
to capital flows. " While the former refers to the ease by which goods and services are 
" If nominal interest rate= 1 and the inflation =7T then the real interest rate =r=i- 71- 
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imported and exported, the latter refers to the absence of controls on the movement of 
capital. Trade openness attracts export-oriented FDI, while trade restriction attracts 
"tariff-jumping" FDI, whose primary interest is to take advantage of the domestic 
market. 
In this study, I use the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP to measure 
trade openness. Contrary to previous studies, however, expect the sign of the coefficient 
of an open economy to be indeterminate a priori. While a positive sign is the norm, a 
negative sign suggests that FDI in a country is tariff-jumping, as foreign investors seek 
to locate in the host economy to avoid high tariffs. 
According to the sensitivity analysis of Chakrabarti (2001), openness to trade (proxied 
by exports plus imports to GDP) has the highest likelihood of being correlated 
(positively) with FDI among all explanatory variables classified as fragile. 
Taylor (2000) resembles most other studies in that he does not assess changes over time 
in the importance of openness as an FDI determinant. His results do suggest, however, 
that a globalization-induced increase in the relevance of openness cannot be taken for 
granted. The positive correlation between openness and FDI is restricted to the 
manufacturing sector, whereas the correlation is insignificant for FDI by MNEs from 
the United States in the services sector. Considering that the recent boom in FDI to 
developing countries is largely because of FDI in non-traded services, the relevance of 
openness may even have declined. 
Singh and Jun (1995), tested two basic hypotheses: 
Hypotheses 1: Do overall favourable business operating conditions affect positively the 
inflows of FDI? And (II): What Types of exports78 are related to FDI inflows? 
Business operating conditions are created by host government policies. The major types 
of business operating conditions can be stated as tax holidays, restriction on doing 
business, and relaxation or removal of protective tariff barriers. The question in 
78 Type of exports, particularly manufacturing exports, is a significant determinant of FDI flows. Singh (1995) has quoted an 
example of Singapore, where exports are highly significant determinant of FDI flows to the country. 
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hypothesis II has been explored using index values. Theoretically the facilities provided 
for better business conditions can be either productive or non-productive. 
Despite the different results of the economic relationship, Singh et al (1995) tried to 
find out the types of exports, which can show better results. Singh (1995) found a 
positive relationship between manufacturing exports and FDI. 
Erdal and Tatoglu (2002), after the testing of their hypothesis for the relationship 
between FDI inflows to Turkey and the effect of locational determinants, suggested 
that, since FDI is mostly in the form of physical investment, foreign investors would 
prefer host countries with better and more liberal economic policies. 
Cho (2001) added more variables including trade openness (openness of the economy), 
labour cost etc. as determinants of FDI to China and found statistically significant 
results. 
Venkataramany (2002) has analyzed the determinants of FDI inflows to India and 
included exports, imports, export intensity, import intensity, trade, balance of trade, 
terms of trade and the effects of these variables to be reflected in the exchange rate, 
GDP and also the inflation rate in India. The rationale for using the term `trade' is to 
capture the influence of trade in creating a potential for FDI along with its causal role in 
a country's FDI. It is has been proved and analyzed by a number of economists, that the 
movement in the macro-economic factors like GDP, exchange rate, does effect the flow 
of FDI as show on Table 5.1 (page 150). 
4: Exchange Rate 
In reference to stable financial health, the exchange rate of the country is a major 
indicator of economic stability. An investor will try not to invest in a country with an 
unstable exchange rate as the volatility of the exchange rate has been found to be 
negatively correlated to the FDI inflows of the country (Lucas-1993). The investors will 
also decide not to invest in a country with unstable exchange rates, such as when Forex 
reserves are scarce, and this is expected to continue for the next twenty or so years 
(UNCTAD 1985). Exchange rates may affect FDI through several channels. The most 
significant path, however, lies in its effects on labour and other costs, which change the 
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comparative advantages of certain goods between two countries and thus encourage the 
transfer of production bases from one country to another. 
The financial crises of the late 1990s have just begun to stimulate a small but growing 
literature on the effects of large, sudden, real exchange rate swings on a variety of 
economic variables, including FDI by MNEs. The effect of real exchange rates on FDI 
has been examined both with respect to changes in the bilateral level of the exchange 
rate between countries and in the volatility of real exchange rates. 
Blonigen (1997) provided an analysis in which changes in the level of real exchange 
rates may affect inward FDI for a host country. If FDI by a firm is motivated by the 
acquisition of assets that are transferable within a firm across many markets without a 
currency transaction (e. g., firm-specific assets, such as technology, managerial skills, 
etc. ), then an exchange rate appreciation of the foreign currency will lower the price of 
the asset in that foreign currency. Until Froot and Stein (1991), the common view was 
that (expected) changes in the level of the exchange rate would not alter the decision by 
a firm to invest in a foreign country. Other studies have generally found consistent 
evidence that short-run movements in higher exchange rates lead to increased inward 
FDI, with limited evidence that the effect is larger for merger and acquisition FDI. 
A final, related strand of empirical studies shows how uncertainty and expectations 
about future exchange rate movements may affect FDI decisions. An early analysis by 
Cushman (1985) lays out a firm-level model of international investment that depends on 
the interaction of a firm's exchange rate expectations, trade linkages and financing 
options. One related issue that likely deserves more attention is how one measures 
expected exchange rate levels, uncertainty, or even volatility. Each of these papers has 
their own way of measuring these variables, but further investigation into appropriate 
measures and the sensitivity of results to alternative measures also deserves some 
attention (Blonigen-2004). 
Erdal and Tatoglu (2002), after the testing of their hypothesis for the relationship 
between FDI inflows to Turkey and the effect of locational determinants, suggested 
that, since FDI is mostly in the form of physical investment, foreign investors would 
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prefer host countries where exchange rate instability appears to have a negative impact 
on FDI inflows. A highly volatile currency would discourage foreign investors from 
engaging in FDI in a host country's economy due the risk instability in the value of their 
investment. 
5: Infrastructure 
Foreign investors prefer economies with a well-developed network of roads, airports, 
water supply, uninterrupted power supply, telephones, and Internet access. A poor 
infrastructure increases the cost of doing business and reduces the rate of return on 
investment. Other things being equal, production costs are typically lower in countries 
with well-developed infrastructures than in countries with poor infrastructures. 
Countries with good infrastructures are therefore expected to attract more FDI (Morisset 
2000). Infrastructure is proxied by the number of telephone lines per 1000 people in a 
country, and is expected to be positively correlated with FDI. The use of this proxy is 
informed by the fact that countries with a large number of telephone lines are more 
likely to have better roads, modern airports/seaports, Internet access, and 
water/electricity supply. 
Erdal and Tatoglu (2002) also suggested that, since FDI is mostly in the form of 
physical investment, foreign investors would prefer host countries with better 
infrastructure. 
6: Labour Cost 
An economically active and skilled labour force in particular has been found to be a 
major determinant of FDI inflows to a country as the low cost labour plays a vital role 
in attracting the foreign, profit-maximizing, rational investors. The profit-seeking 
international firms like to invest in a country that is highly populated. The reason behind 
the high growth of FDI inflows to China and India is that they are heavily populated 
countries with low production costs (Erdal, et al 2002). 
Labour costs are a controversial issue and it is agreed internationally that the low wages 
for labour are unfair but still most of the international firms pay low wages to their 
workforces in the developing countries to compete in the world markets (Cho 1998). 
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The exchange rate directly affects the labour cost, which, along-with exchange rate, has 
been found to be a statistically significant determinant of FDI in flows to recipient 
countries (Oyama et al 1998). 
Labour market conditions include the wage rates and the quality of labour. Since the 
cost of labour is a major component of the cost function, various versions of the wage 
variables are frequently tested in the literature. A higher wage rate, other things being 
equal, deters inward foreign direct investment (FDI). This must be particularly so for 
the firms which engage in labour-intensive production activities. Therefore, 
conventionally, the expected sign for this variable is negative. However, there are no 
unanimous empirical results for the effect of labour cost on investment incentives in the 
existing literature. While some studies have shown no significant role for labour costs, 
others have shown a positive relationship between labour costs and FDI. The latter 
result is often attributed to a level of labour productivity or quality of human capital that 
may be reflected in the wage variables. 
Cho (2001) and Rodrik's (1996) hypothesis about labour standards acting as a major 
determinant of FDI flows forms the basic model for their study in which they analyzed 
labour standards as an important and significant determinant for the FDI inflows to a 
country. Later, they included the political risk in the basic model, which revealed that 
the labour standards became statistically insignificant when the political environment 
was taken into consideration. In the final section of their study, they built an extended 
regression model to look into the behaviour of political risk and labour standards along 
with other determinants of FDI inflows. The model included, the population of the host 
country, the gross domestic product per capita of the recipient country and selected 
labour standards in the context of the cost of wages for the workforce. 
The population is the main source of greater manpower available at lower costs along 
with higher DGP growth, which always encourages the international investors to move 
cross-border to reduce the cost of capital to secure higher returns on their investment 
(Cho 2001). 
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7: Human Capital 
Human capital, in terms of both quality and availability, has been found to be an 
important determinant, considered to be promoting labour-intensive and export-oriented 
FDI. In the presence of human capital, the capital stock created by FDI expands the 
productivity potential of a firm or a country and enables FDI growth. Although it has 
been shown that the population increase has a negative relationship to the GDP growth 
and badly affects a country with limited resources, it is still considered as a positive sign 
for the attraction of FDI to a country with an abundance of human capital (Kyrkilis et al 
2003). 
The presence of workforce populations that are educated and trained to work in modem 
business organizations has been recognized as an important determinant of FDI flows 
(Rivlin 2001). The Republic of Ireland, for instance, has been a major recipient of FDI, 
partly because of the presence of an educated workforce in the country. In this study, 
human capital is measured by secondary school enrollment as a percentage of the 
population in the secondary school age category. This indicator is expected to be 
positively correlated with FDI flows. The level of human capital is demonstrated to be 
another important determinant of the marginal productivity of capital. It has been shown 
in various studies that skill-related variables are host-country specific. When a host 
country is more appealing to labour-intensive foreign investment that requires a 
relatively low level of skills, the importance of the human capital variable tends to be 
small. On the other hand, labour skills can be a more significant factor for a host 
country, in which more capital- and technology-intensive investment projects are 
concentrated. In this analysis, we use the illiteracy rate as a proxy for the level of human 
capital. 
The study by Noorbakhsh et al (2001) offers insights into the non-traditional 
determinants of FDI in developing countries, though not with regard to trade-related 
variables. The focus of this study is on human capital as a determinant of FDI. As 
explained above, the human capital will provide more labour force at lower costs, which 
in return reduces the cost of capital and increases the real rate of return on investment. 
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8: Political Instability Risk (PR) 
Analysts have established a link between political instability and FDI. Other things 
being equal, democratic and politically stable economies attract more FDI than despotic 
and unstable countries (Schneider and Frey 1985). Democratic regimes are also more 
likely to respect civil liberties, the rule of law and property rights; features that are more 
conducive to the flow of FDI. 
Ngowi (2001) argues that many developing countries have attracted little FDI because 
they are regarded as "high risk and are characterized by a lack of political and 
institutional stability and predictability. " A lack of political rights (PLOR) is expected 
to be negatively correlated with FDI flows. 
Wei (1997) presents an alternative explanation for the large negative and significant 
effect of corruption on FDI. Unlike taxes, corruption is not transparent and involves 
many factors that are more arbitrary in nature. The agreement between a briber and a 
corrupt official is hard to enforce and creates more uncertainty over the total 
questionable payments or the final outcome. Wei demonstrates that this type of 
uncertainty, when induced by corruption, leads to a reduction in FDI. The political 
stability of a government and a sound rule of law can also be important factors to foster 
the inflow of FDI. Uncertain political environments and their related risks can impede 
FDI inflows in spite of favourable economic conditions. Since the indices of corruption, 
instability and the rule of law assign higher scores to better, less corrupt, law 
enforcement or a more stable country, the expected signs of the variables, CORRUPT, 
GOV and LAW, are all positive. 
We will also be examining the significance of institutional factors in the determination 
of FDI by incorporating the level of corruption as an indicator of the rule of law and an 
indicator of the stability of each government. Corruption as well as a lack of the rule of 
law can discourage FDI by inducing a higher cost of doing business. 
To analyse the effect of socio political instability, Singh & Jun (1995) used the Political 
Risk Index as the explanatory variable. This variable has been taken from Business 
Environment Risk Intelligence, S. A. (BERI), which includes; linguistic, ethnic, 
religious and societal conflict along with street violence. The analysis ranges from 0 
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(high instability) to 100 (high stability). In the model, RFDI was taken as the dependent 
variable for high and low FDI countries. 
Despite the potential opportunities in a growing market, FDI flow to a country has 
become a complex phenomenon due to the involvement of political instability risk. At 
the same time, investors are interested in benefits that the new business can offer them. 
The international firms will be looking forward to a competitive rate of return to ignore 
the turmoil of the host country (Oleksiv-2000). 
Cho (2001), in the final section of his study, builds an extended regression model for 
China to look into the behaviour of political risk and labour standards along with other 
determinants of FDI inflows. Cho (2001) also found political risk to be a significant 
determinant of FDI flows, as do Singh (1995) and Erdal (2002). 
Despite being a major ingredient and a complex phenomenon of socio political 
determinants of FDI, there are still very few studies that have analysed the effects of the 
PRI on the inflows of FDI. PRI also includes the other risks of the host country like 
economic risk, regime legitimacy, ethnic violence and law & order risks. These risks, 
represented in total as the PRI, exert a negative impact on international investors' 
decisions to go abroad and invest in a country where there is turmoil and high risks 
(Singh 1995). Despite the negative effect of the PRI, the changes of political 
government have been found to have a significant effect on the inflows of FDI (Roots & 
Ahmed 1979). Many investors have paid heavily for overlooking disorder in the host 
country's political situation (Khan et a! 1999). 
9: Work Days Lost (WDL) 
WDL is also a major determinant of FDI inflows to a politically unstable country with 
unreliable law & order, religious militancy and ethnic violence. 
WDL happens due to different activities e. g. political agitation, strikes and natural 
disasters like floods or earthquakes. The first has been found insignificant for the 
inflows of FDI to the recipient country but the other two have dual effects on the 
international investors' decisions (Singh 1995). 
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3: Operation Risk Index (ORI) 
ORI is an assessment of the general business condition in a country and consists of the 
investment policies of the host country government. It has a variety of effects on the 
inflow of FDI to a country. The relaxation of laws governing inward/outward capital 
flows and the tax holidays have a positive impact on FDI inflows. However, on the 
other side, frequent changes in investment policies have a negative impact upon FDI 
inflows. In reference to Pakistan, the general perception of the international investor is 
that there is a big gap between the government policies and their implementations 
(Khan et al 1999). 
5.4 Empirical Results 
The resilience of foreign direct investment (FDI) during the financial crises of the 
1980's may have led many developing countries to regard international capital flow as 
private capital inflow. But evidence on the size of the specific benefits of FDI inflows to 
emerging markets is still very sketchy (Razin 2002). 
Like the theoretical part, the empirical work has tended to focus either on underlying 
factors that explain the trends of FDI flows across developing countries, or macro- 
economic variables assessing the contribution of FDI flows to growth. 
The independent variables, trade openness, the growth rate of market size and past 
changes in FDI inflows appear to be the strongest factors in attracting FDI examined in 
the analysis. They are believed to exert an influence on inward FDI in developing 
countries. These are variables that can be identified from the literature review as being 
important. 
A substantial literature has developed confirming empirically the importance of the size 
of the host market and its growth rate. These variables have been measured by GDP, the 
growth rate of real GDP per capita or real GDP growth. The foreign investors that 
target the local market are assumed to be more attracted to the country with a higher 
growth rate of GDP as it indicates a larger potential demand for their products. In the 
literature, researchers have used both GDP, the growth of real GDP and per capita real 
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GDP as indicators of market size and the potential for the products of foreign investors. 
The empirical results are positive as expected in the theoretical literature (George et al 
2006) as show on Table 5.1 and 5.2 (pages 150 and 170). 
Labour market conditions include the wage rates and the quality of labour. Since the 
cost of labour is a major component of the cost function, various versions of the wage 
variables are frequently tested in the literature. A higher wage rate, other things being 
equal, deters inward foreign direct investment (FDI). Therefore, conventionally, the 
expected sign for this variable is negative. However, there are no unanimous empirical 
results for the effect of labour cost on investment incentives in the existing literature. 
While some studies have shown no significant role for labour costs, others have shown 
a positive relationship between labour costs and FDI. The latter result is often attributed 
to a level of labour productivity or quality of human capital that may be reflected in the 
wage variables. 
The level of human capital is demonstrated to be another important determinant of the 
marginal productivity of capital. It has been shown in various studies that skill-related 
variables are host-country specific. Economic fundamentals, namely, large market size; 
low labour cost and human capital are the most important determinants of FDI inflows. 
Trade openness, the growth rate of market size and past changes in FDI inflows appear 
to be the strongest factors in attracting FDI. 
The results from the selected empirical studies reported in table-5.2 are suggestive of 
the increasing importance of economic and socio-political factors over time. It can be 
concluded that political risk plays an increasingly important role over time in attracting 
FDI. 
We also reviewed the significance of institutional factors in the determination of FDI by 
incorporating the level of corruption, an indicator of the rule of law and an indicator of 
the stability of each government. Corruption as well as a lack of the rule of law can 
discourage FDI by inducing a higher cost of doing business. The political stability of a 
government and a sound rule of law can also foster the inflow of FDI. Uncertain 
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political environments and their related risks can impede FDI inflows in spite of 
favourable economic conditions (Singh et a! 1995). 
The studies given in table-5.1 also included policy-related variables, tariff barriers 
proxied by import duty, corporate tax rates, openness to foreign trade and the quality of 
infrastructure in the analysis. The effect of higher tariffs imposed by the host countries 
may encourage the international investor to invest in a country with relatively low tariff 
barriers. Therefore, the expected sign of trade terms is negative (Venkatramanay 2001). 
Given the fact that FDI from developed and developing countries are attracted to 
different selective polices of the host governments, the question that arises is should the 
host governments in developing countries aim at attracting FDI from developed 
countries and formulate their policies accordingly, e. g. signing investment agreements 
with developed countries, or should they concentrate on policies like fiscal incentives to 
attract FDI from developing countries? The answer to this question is, however, beyond 
the scope of this study and is also country-specific in nature since FDI from developed 
and developing countries constitute different shares of the total FDI inflows in a 
particular country. But what comes out clearly from the analysis is that policies with 
respect to cost factors, e. g., lower tariff rates, tax concessions, tax holidays etc. play an 
important role in attracting FDI from developing countries but these policies may not 
attract FDI from developed countries. What matters more to them are the policies that 
facilitate the businesses of foreign firms in the host country. 
OE is included to examine the importance of the openness of an economy to 
international trade. This variable measures the degree of general trade restrictions of 
each country. Given that there is a negative relationship between trade tariffs and 
market-seeking FDI, a positive relationship has been found for export-oriented FDI as 
show on Table 5.1 and 5.2 (pages 150 and 170). In addition, in some economies, 
openness can be an indicator of economic reforms, where domestic reforms and foreign 
trade reform go hand in hand. FDI can be attracted to a country with more economic 
and policy reforms. Another policy-related variable that can influence the host country's 
location advantage is the host country's corporate or other tax rates. The evidence of the 
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significant negative influences of corporate tax rates is reported in a previous study by 
Wei (1997). 
Political risk is likely to be an influential determinant of FDI while labour standards are 
not likely to have this effect. Empirical findings strongly support the hypothesis that 
political risk is significantly associated with FDI. Countries with higher political risks 
tend to attract smaller amounts of FDI. Once political risk is controlled for, regression 
results also show that labour standards are not strongly related to the value of FDI. The 
result for the relationship between political risk and FDI supports the theory that 
securing private property rights is important in investment decisions. The result may 
also explain the correlation between political risk and labour standards; because 
governments that are more committed to policy promises concerning property rights are 
also likely to be more responsible in observing labour standards. From the empirical 
finding on the effect of labour standards on FDI, we can draw an important implication. 
Although regression results reveal that labour standards do not influence the increase of 
FDI, neither do they deter FDI (Cho 2001). 
Results show that lower tariff rates attract FDI inflows. However, fiscal incentives 
offered by the host governments are found to be less significant as compared to the 
removal of restrictions in attracting FDI inflows. The results of the analysis with respect 
to FDI from developed and developing countries show that economic fundamentals 
differ in terms of their significance in attracting FDI from developed countries and 
developing countries. FDI from developed countries is attracted to large market size, 
higher levels of education, better financial health, high standards of transport and 
communication and lower domestic lending rates, while FDI from developing countries 
is attracted to large market size, potential markets, lower labour costs, higher stock of 
transport and communication, lower lending rates and stable exchange rate. The impact 
of selective government policies on FDI also differs between developed and developing 
countries. Those that rely exclusively on low-cost, low-skill labour or natural resources 
to attract FDI will find it difficult to recruit FDI into high value-added industries and 
may suffer slower economic growth. Lall (1998) argues that, given minimum levels of 
skills and infrastructure, low labour costs may now matter only in a handful of low- 
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technology activities, such as low-end garment manufacture, since the semiconductor 
industry has become highly automated and capital intensive. 
The results of the studies highlighted in Table 5.1 also emphasise the importance of 
government policies in attracting FDI inflows into developing countries. They show 
that, apart from the economic fundamentals of the economy, which may attract FDI 
inflows, selective policies of the host governments and investment agreements also play 
an important role. Within the selective policies adopted by the government, it is the 
removal of restrictions on the operations of foreign firms in the host country that matter 
the most, especially to FDI coming from the developed countries. Bilateral investment 
agreements and regional investment agreements can therefore form an important policy 
instrument for attracting FDI inflows into developing countries. 
In a developing country, the foreign investors will require a higher rate of return on 
their investment as a premium for their risk-taking in a country with an unstable 
political environment. Along with this, the investors also look to the financial 
institutions to charge less for their purchases. For this analysis, interest rates will be 
used as an explanatory variable (Venkatramanay 2001). 
The preliminary estimation results support many of the findings from the previous 
research in this area. In particular, (i) there is a positive relationship between the flow of 
FDI and economic growth; (ii) openness to trade has a positive impact on FDI flows; 
and (iii) the level of risk affects FDI negatively. Being highly indebted is a significant 
deterrent to FDI. In addition, the results indicate the presence of regional and income 
group heterogeneity in FDI flows, which is to be expected since the motives for FDI 
vary considerably across regions (Addison et a! 2003). 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has evaluated the results of most of the independent empirical studies into 
the determinants of FDI flows into developing countries over the period 1970-2004. In 
this chapter, the effect of three major macro-economic and socio political determinants 
on FDI inflows to developing countries have been examined with special emphasis on a 
few selected empirical models. The approach is important because developing countries 
in particular, have experienced fragile economic conditions and an unstable political 
environment since the 1970's. 
The standard determinants considered include market size variables (real GDP growth 
rates, growth rates of real per capita income and GDP), policy variables (the degree of 
openness, corporate tax rates, import duties, quality of infrastructure), institutional 
characteristics (indices of corruption, degrees of government stability, indices of the 
rule of law) and labour market conditions (illiteracy rates and wage rates). Specifically, 
market size variables and policy variables, such as the lower corporate taxes and higher 
degrees of openness, play larger roles in attracting investment. 
Despite a number of studies, there is an element of dissatisfaction with the existing 
empirical literature analyzing the determinants of foreign direct investment in 
developing countries. In particular, most studies concentrate exclusively on either 
political or economic determinants, instead of taking into account their joint and 
simultaneous effect. 
The empirical models analyzed and reviewed in this chapter come from the existing 
literature. The purpose has been to compare the quality of the estimates and (ex post) 
forecasts of a model which concentrates exclusively on (a) a political determinant 
(political instability) and (b) which concentrates exclusively on economic determinants 
(growth of GNP. inflation, balance of payments, wage costs, skilled labour force). It 
may be concluded that foreign direct investment in developing countries is 
simultaneously determined by economic and political factors. It may further be 
concluded that an amalgamation of economic and political influences into a credit risk 
indicator is not advisable because it is not able to do justice to the complexity of 
politico-economic interdependence. 
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The most important economic determinants seem to be a country's level of development 
(as measured by real per capita GNP) and the balance of payments. The higher the per 
capita income and the lower the balance of payments deficit, the more foreign direct 
investment is attracted. Among the less important economic influences for attracting 
foreign direct investment are the growth of GNP, the workers' skill level and inflation 
whilst high wage costs reduce the inflow of foreign direct investment. 
Another relevant factor is political instability, which significantly reduces the inflow of 
foreign direct investment, while the government's ideological position (right or left 
wing orientation) does not have a statistically significant influence. (Friedrich 1985)79 
The location determinants tested in the next chapter will consist of three categories: the 
first are country-specific advantages such as low-cost labour, A large local market, 
skilled labour force, sufficient infrastructure and proximity to the West. The second 
group of variables to be tested is macro-economic policy and policy that facilitates 
business-operating conditions. 
79 Economic and political determinants of FDI 
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Chapter 6 
A General model of FDI and 
The Econometric Methodology 
6.1 Introduction 
The distribution of foreign direct investment depends on both economic and political 
determinants. A country in which there is economic fragility and political unrest or in 
which there is a threat of having the investment nationalized (without adequate 
compensation) is more of a risk and therefore, all other things being equal, less 
attractive to invest in than a country offering political stability and a guarantee of 
property rights (Schneider et al 1985). In this chapter, a model is developed to 
investigate how economic factors and political risks in a country like Pakistan may 
influence the amount of FDI that the country attracts (section 6.2). 
This general model is based on essentially neo-classical features, but with political 
features and other country specific factors integrated into the model. Moreover, by 
utilising an error correction estimation framework, both stock and flow aspects of the 
FDI decision can be modelled simultaneously. Both of these features are novel to this 
thesis. 
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 discuss the estimation and regression methodology used to test the 
model and section 6.3 also reports the results of the preliminary unit root tests on the 
variables believed to affect FDI stock as discussed in the model for Pakistan in section 
6.2. 
6.2 A Model of FDI for Pakistan 
A formal model describing the determinants of FDI in a country with a volatile macro- 
economic and political environment has been developed by augmenting the neo- 
classical approach to FDI by the addition of politico-social variables. The traditional 
approach to modelling FDI (see, for example, Kwok, 1970; Boatwright and Renton, 
1974; Barrel and Pain, 1997) is to regard any FDI as underpinning part of the total, 
physical, domestic capital stock. Thus the model begins with the production function, 
which is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas form, such that: 
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Y= AK 'L6 6.1 
where Y is output, K is the capital stock, L is labour input and A is a constant term which 
can capture Hick's neutral technical progress. Parameters a and 8 represent the 
homogeneity of the function such that ifa +, 8 = 1, there are constant returns to scale, 
from 6.1 the marginal product of capital (MPK) is: 
MPK= a(Y/K) 6.2 
Neo-classical economic theory argues that perfect competition prevails in all markets, 
hence the MPK should be equal to the real rental price of capital, defined as 
approximately equal to the real rate of interest, r= i- ;r, in the absence of capital 
consumption. In practice, i is equal to the long-term bond yield and ;r is the expected 
rate of inflation, therefore a (Y / K) = (i - ; r) and rearranging gives the optimal capital 
stock, K* as: 
K*=aYl(i-; r) 6.3 
However, only part of the optimal, national capital stock is financed by direct foreign 
investment, the remainder being financed from domestic sources. So the real stock of 
FDI, denoted by S, is only a fraction, a, of the optimal capital stock, such that: 
S/K*=c 6.4 
The proportion o is likely to depend upon a vector of country-specific factors, Z, such 
that the proportion of FDI increases as the specific country conditions for FDI are 
perceived to become more favourable. Substituting (6.3) into (6.4) gives: 
S=Q(Z)aY/(i-)r) 6.5 
Finally, postulating a log-linear relationship gives an (equilibrium) estimating equation 
of the form: 
J 
in S, = yo + y11nY + y2r, + yj 1nZj, +s, 
j=3 
6.6 
where In denotes a natural logarithm, ct is the random error term and yß)0 and 72(0. 
The country-specific determinants included in Z are postulated to be the real exchange 
rate, E, defined as the domestic price of a unit of foreign currency deflated by the 
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domestic to foreign price ratio, the degree of openness with respect to trade, OP, and the 
degree of political risk, measured by an index of political stability, PRI, and a set of 
dummy variables capturing sudden shifts in the political environment. 
In view of these considerations, the estimated long-run model becomes: 
In S, = yo + yl In Y, + y2r, +7 3 In E, +Y4 In OP, +y5 In PRI, +c, 6.7 
where the expected signs are 
YJ > 0, Y2 < 09 Y3 °0, Y4 >0 and ys > 0. 
This general model can be tested empirically with the following interpretation: 
i) A high level of GDP is an indicator of good development potential and rising 
market size in the future. This suggests a positive influence on FDI. 
ii) A lower real interest rate is a better sign of internal economic activities and of 
stability in the growth rates. As a rule, the lower the interest rate, the more foreign direct 
investment decision-makers are inclined to engage in the country due to a lower cost of 
borrowed capital. A negative relationship is hypothesized, as shown in the model. 
iii) On the one hand, a rise in host country competitiveness -a rise in E- is likely to 
increase the stock of FDI as foreign investors attempt buy into or set up local production 
facilities in the host country from which to export. On the other hand, the increase in the 
relative value of the host country currency will have the effect of increasing the real 
value of the existing stock of FDI and making further acquisitions relatively more- 
expensive. 
iv) The ratio of goods traded (imports plus exports) to GDP is often used as a measure 
of the openness of an economy. This ratio is also often interpreted as a measure of trade 
restrictions. The impact of openness on FDI depends on the type of investment. When 
investments are market-seeking, trade restrictions (and therefore less openness) can 
have a positive impact on FDI. The reason stems from the "tariff jumping" hypothesis, 
which argues that foreign firms that seek to serve local markets may decide to set up 
subsidiaries in the host country if it is difficult to import their products to that country. 
In contrast multinational firms engaged in export-oriented investments may prefer to 
locate in a more open economy since the increased imperfections that accompany trade 
protection generally imply higher transaction costs associated with exporting. The lower 
the wage costs are, the more profitable it is directly to invest in the country concerned. 
A negative relationship to the foreign direct investment flow is hypothesized. 
176/240 
v) PRI is the index of political stability and expected to be positive, as a greater 
political stability should encourage further FDI. 
vi) Dummy variables are also included in the model since the political instability of 
constitutional transfers of power in the host country does not have a significant 
influence on US foreign investment (Green 1972). Among the determinants of foreign 
direct investment in developing countries, economic instability is the prime determining 
with political variables being only of secondary importance. The political variables 
considered are political instability, a political competition index (the higher it is, the 
more legitimate is the political system, and the more foreign direct investment is 
expected to flow in), and the relations with neighbouring countries (which may be an 
indirect indicator for political risk) (Levis 1979). 
Due to sudden changes of governments in Pakistan over the sample period, 1970-2004, 
and an expected effect of the policy changes by different governments (democratic or 
military dictatorship), several dummy variables have also been introduced into the 
model. These dummies are defined as follows: 
Dummy (D1) has been chosen to explore the effect of joint Pakistan (present Pakistan 
and Bangladesh, which were separated into two countries in 1973) when a new 
government was formed in present Pakistan. Thus D1=1 in 1970-1972 and zero in all 
other periods. 
The second period has been chosen for the elected political government for the period 
of 1973-1977 to explore the effect of the government's nationalisation policy. The 
dummy D2 has a value of unity for the period 1973-1977 and zero otherwise. 
The third period, 1978-1988, has been chosen for the change in regime from political to 
military dictatorship to explore the effect of changes in major policies by the 
dictatorship government in order to denationalize the industries nationalized by the 
previous government. So dummy D3 has the value of 1 for 1978-1988 and zero 
otherwise. 
177/240 
The fourth period is for the change of government from military to elected democratic 
political governments 1979-1999. Despite a quick change and new governments 
through fresh general elections, the policies of different governments during 1978-1999 
remained approximately the same. (i. e. deregulation, denationalization etc). So dummy 
D4 has a value of 1 for 1989-1999 and zero otherwise. 
The fifth period has been chosen for another period of military rule beginning with the 
toppling of the elected political government in September-1999. Despite the policies of 
the present military dictatorship remaining unchanged, it is important to explore the 
effects on the democratic institutions and other components of PRI in the country for 
the period 1999-200480. The dummy variable D5 has been assigned a value of unity for 
81 this period, 1999-2004. 
To sum up, we can define dummy variables as those which are constructed by 
researchers in order to include non-quantitative factors in a regression model. These 
factors can distinguish two or more categories so that each dummy variable takes one 
value for the category we consider and a zero value for the rest of the categories. In 
other words, what we mean is that a sample can be divided into two or more partitions 
in which some or all of the coefficients may differ. 
Political instability may disrupt the economic process and affect foreign investment in 
particular. Internal political troubles may be projected outwards and create additional 
difficulties for foreign-owned firms, including the threat of partial or total 
nationalization. This danger exists quite irrespective of whether the government is of 
left-wing or right-wing persuasion, because both types may resort to nationalism to 
strengthen their position. Because it is hypothesized that increased political instability 
induces marginal decision-makers to undertake less direct investment; a negative 
relationship is expected. 
80 See appendix 4.2 & 4.3 
s' See appendix 4.2 & 4.3 
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6.3 Estimation Procedure 
Time-series Analysis is the set of statistical methodologies that analyzes the kind of data 
used in the proposed model. The main tool in Time-series Analysis is a model that 
should reproduce the past behaviour of the series, exploiting its autocorrelation 
structure. The objectives of Time-series Analysis are basically two: to describe the 
regularity patterns present in the data and to forecast future observations. Since a pure 
time-series model does not include explanatory variables, these forecasts of future 
observations are simply extrapolations of the observed series at the end of the sample. If 
we consider a single variable in our study, we shall construct what is called a univariate 
time-series model. But if two of more variables are available, the possibility of dynamic 
interactions among them may be important. We can think, for instance, of economic 
variables such as consumption, investment and income that influence each other. In this 
case, multivariate time-series models can be constructed to take into account these 
relations among variables (Lütkepohl 1991). 
During the discussion of stationary and non-stationary time series, it is required to test 
the presence of unit roots to avoid spurious regression results. The series containing a 
unit root can be called as non-stationary time series, which, when regressed with other 
variables of the series also containing a unit root, can produce spurious results showing 
a false economic relationship. 
So, in principle, it is necessary to test the order of integration for each variable in the 
series to avoid such false relationships. If any variable is found with unit root, it is 
differenced until the non-stationary hypothesis is rejected to form a co-integrated 
equilibrium relationship. 
There are several ways to test for the presence of unit roots in a time-series variable to 
establish co-integration between variables. The methods can be named as the Dickey 
and Fuller (1979) DF test, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) ADF-test and the 
Phillips-Perron tests (PP) [1987] based on the Phillip Z-test. The different tests are 
achieved assuming the presence of a unit root (non-stationary variable) in the null 
hypothesis (Ho) and a stationary variable in the alternative hypothesis (Ha). If the 
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calculated statistic is higher than McKinnon's critical value then we do not reject Ho and 
the considered variable is non-stationary, if not it is stationary. 
Beginning by estimating the equation 
Yº= pbY - I+fu 
6.8 
or 
AY=(pe-1)Yt-I+jU - pnYt -I +µ 6.9 
Either variant of the test is applicable, with the null being Ho: Pa =1 (the unit root) 
against the alternative H1: Pa <182. 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the variable is differenced until the null hypothesis 
is rejected. However, it is also very important to select the appropriate lag length; too 
few lags may result in over-rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true, adversely 
affecting the size of the test, while too many may reduce the power of the test (reducing 
the numbers of observations) (Harris 1995). 
In a preliminary step, unit root tests were performed using the Dickey Fuller 1979 test 
(DF) and the Augmented Dickey & Fuller-1981 (ADF) testing method to explore out 
the non-stationary / stationary properties of the data on FDI inflows and stock, real GDP 
(Y), openness of economy (OE), real interest rate (IR), real exchange rate (exgr), and 
political risk index (PR). 
6.3.1 Testing for Unit Roots and Stationarity 
As we have seen, the properties of a time-series depend on its order of integration, d, 
that is on the presence of unit roots. It is important to have techniques available to 
determine the actual form of nonstationarity and to distinguish between stochastic and 
deterministic trends if possible. There are two kinds of statistical tests: one group is 
based on the unit root hypothesis while the other is on the stationary null hypothesis. 
There is a large literature on the theory of testing for unit roots. A good survey may be 
found in Dickey, Bell and Miller (1986), among others. The most common values for 
°= It should be clear that testing for a unit root (p, = 1) corresponds to testing 
for a coefficient on y, -,. For expositional reasons, we 
have chosen to suppress the augmented part of the ADF test that requires that several 
lagged values of Ay, be included as additional 
explanatory variables, to account for possible additional 
lagged values ofy, in the original specification, or to accommodate an 
autocorrelated p,. Critical values are the same as those used 
for the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, which does not include lagged Ay, 
values. Finally, we note that Ayat and Burridge 
(2000) also include a quadratic trend term; as is typical in the applied literature, we 
ignore this and other possible nonlinear trend specifications (Elder et al, 2001). 
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d are zero and 1 in economic and business time-series. That is why we have 
concentrated so far in testing the null hypothesis of one unit root against the alternative 
of stationarity (possibly in deviations from a mean or a linear trend). But it is possible 
that the series presents more than one unit root. If we want to test, in general, the 
hypothesis that a series is I(d)against the alternative that it is I (d -1) , Dickey and 
Pentula (1987) suggest following a sequential procedure. First, we should test the null 
hypothesis of d unit roots against the alternative of d -1 unit roots. If we reject this Ho , 
then the null hypothesis of d -1 unit roots should be tested against the alternative of 
d-2 unit roots. Lastly, the null of one unit root is tested against the alternative of 
stationarity. 
If we want to check the stationarity of a time-series or a linear combination of time- 
series, it would be interesting to test the null hypothesis of stationarity directly. Bearing 
in mind that the classical hypothesis-testing methodology ensures that the null 
hypothesis is accepted unless there is strong evidence against it, it is not surprising that 
a good number of empirical works show that standard unit-root tests fail to reject the 
null hypothesis for many economic time-series. Therefore, in trying to decide whether 
economic data are stationary or integrated, it would be useful to perform tests of the null 
hypothesis of stationarity as well as tests of the unit-root null hypothesis. 
In reference to studies explained in the previous section, a regression has been run for 
the last 35 years (1970-2004) by using major macro-economic and socio-economic 
indicators of Pakistan's economy to discover the relationship between these macro- 
variables like GDP, GDP growth, trade openness, inflation, discount rate differential 
with respect to the US discount rate, exchange rate stability, unemployment, labour 
costs, infrastructure and, most importantly, political instability (1970-2004). 
The unit root results sown in Table 6.1 show that all variables are integrated of order 1, 
except from the political stability index which is 1(0). 
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Table-6.1 
Unit Root Test Results 
a) Unit root tests (ADF Method) 
with constant and no trend with constant and trend 
levels first differences levels first differences 
LIS -1.049 -2.493 -1.197 -2.294 
LISatI(2) -5.488* -5.506* 
LI -0.846 -6.737* -5.784(2)* -6.670* 
LY -0.705 -3.466* -1.217 -3.685* 
LOE -2.164(2) -4.924* -3.178(2) -4.804* 
LIR -1.757 -4.581* -4.500* 
LEXGR -1.777 -7.810* -3.193(2) -7.699* 
LPR -5.810* -6.704* 
C. V: -2.953 -2.9558 -3.551 -3.5562 
Notes: All critical values are at 5% level, lags mentioned in parenthesis 
b) Unit root tests (PP Method) 
with constant and trend with constant and no trend 
levels first differences levels first differences 
LIS -0.509 -3.315* -1.739 -3.174 
LI -1.081 -6.837* -4.563* -6.835* 
LY -0.156 -4.557* -1.267 -4.534* 
LOE -3.463 4.266** -3.393 -4.421 
LIR -1.716 -4.423* -1.792 4.216* 
LEXGR -1.548 -5.479* -3.176 -5.486 
LPR 4.089* -4.097* 
C. V: -3.531 -3.535 -2.940 -2.942 
Notes: All critical values are at 5% level except for LOE at 1% CV=3.639 with ** 
LIS = log FDI stock, LI =log FDI inflows, LY =log GDP, LOE =log Openness of Economy LIR = 
log discount rate, LEXGR =log exchange rate, LPR = log political risk index, C. V = critical value. 
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6.4 Regression Methodology 
In econometrics, the relationships between the economic variables proposed by the 
theory are usually studied within the framework of linear regression models. The data of 
many economic and business variables are collected in the form of time series. As has 
been discussed in section 6.3.2, many of the macro-economic, finance and monetary 
variables are nonstationary presenting trending behaviour in most cases. In this section 
we deal with the problems that may appear when estimating regression models with 
time-series data. When nonstationary time-series are used in a regression model one 
may obtain apparently significant relationships from unrelated variables. This 
phenomenon is called spurious regression. Granger and Newbold (1974) estimated 
regression models of the type: 
Y, = Qo + Qi x, + fir 6.10 
where y, and x, were unrelated random walks: 
Dy, =V 6.11 
&l=Cii 6.12 
Since x, neither affects nor is affected by y, , one expects the coefficient 
8 to converge 
to zero and the coefficient of determination, R2, to also tend to zero. However, they 
found that, frequently, the null hypothesis of no relationship is not rejected along with 
very high R2 and very low Durbin-Watson statistics. It should be noted that the 
autocorrelation of the random walk x, is projected into y, which, also being a random 
walk, is also highly correlated. Following these results, they suggest that finding high 
R2 and low D-W statistics can be a signal of a spurious regression. These results found 
by Granger and Newbold (1974) were later analytically explained by Phillips (1986). 
Due to the problems raised by regressing nonstationary variables, econometricians have 
looked for solutions. Phillips (1986) shows that the standard results could be misleading 
as it does not solve the problem even if the series are integrated and a spurious 
regression result appears. Philips further suggested a second approach to working with 
nonstationary series, which is to look for relationships between stationary differenced 
series. However, the information about the long-run relationship is lost, and the 
economic relationship may be different between 
levels and between increments. 
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6.4.1 Cointegration Methods 
The concept of cointegration is associated with the long-run equilibrium relationship 
between two or more variables. The economic interpretation of cointegration is that if 
the two series are linked to form a long-run equilibrium relationship, then, even though 
the time-series are non-stationary, they will move together until the difference between 
them becomes stationary. If the series are cointegrated, then regression analysis can 
give information about the long-run relationship, whereas if it is not cointegrated we 
return to the problem of spurious correlation. Once the tests of integration (that is unit 
root tests) are achieved, it is possible to implement tests of co-integration to check the 
existence of a stable, long-run relationship between the series (Harris and Sollis 2003, 
p. 34). 
Cointegration is also closely linked to short-run error correction models (ECM), thus 
providing a useful and meaningful link between the long-run and short-run approaches 
to econometric modelling (Harris 1995). There are few other techniques and approaches 
in the literature for testing and estimating cointegration relationships to identify the 
parameters associated with causality (Shan eta! 1997)83. 
6.4.1.1 Engle-Granger (EG) approach 
With the help of this procedure it is possible to examine the long-run relationships 
between two time-series' X, and Y variables. If the two time-series are integrated as 
I(d), the linear relationship will also be I(d); i. e. the residuals obtained will also be I(d). 
The model developed by Engle-Granger (1987) can be used as a method of reconciling 
the short-run behaviour of an economic variable with the long-run behaviours between 
the two variables (Gujarati 2001) and the estimation is also possible through an OLS 
estimation method and there is no limitations on the number of observations, wh ich 
makes it easy to use the annual time-series data. 
If both of the time-series are I(1), and the residual term ct- 1(0), the two series would be 
cointegrated of order C1(1,1). This implies that if we wish to estimate the long-run 
"' With no stationary economic variables, VAR models cant' much more economic content if modified in such a way that they can 
embody random walk and cointergration restrictions which reflect 
long-run equilibrium relationships among economic variables. 
This VAR-based cointergration method (Engle and Granger, 1987,1988) is now known as vector error correction modelling 
(ECM). ECM models have received wide attention in other commodity markets, such as agricultural commodities, because of the 
economic realism and forecasting performance. 
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relationship between yt and xt, it is only necessary to estimate the following static 
model: 
Y, =fixt +. a 6.13 
Testing for a single equation can be problematic if n >2 variables in the model, and if n- 
1 of these is weakly exogenous, the single equation approach may be misleading. If an 
unrestricted dynamic approach is used in the single equation estimation, it is most likely 
to get unbiased estimates of the long-run relationship with appropriate t and F statistics. 
Harris (1995) further concludes that, if the number of cointegrating vectors is unknown, 
there seems little advantage starting with the single equation model. The multivariate 
VAR approach developed by Johansen (1988) would prove to be a better method of 
testing cointegration. 
6.4.1.2 The Johansen (1988) and Juselius (1990) Approach 
Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) maximum-likelihood test procedure 
is the most efficient approach as it tests for the existence of a third cointegrating vector. 
Mallik et al, (2001) notes that there is a limitation on the number of observations, which 
makes it restrictive to use half-annual or quarterly data for estimation. Due to this 
limitation this method is not in very much used in the literature as it is mostly not 
possible to find out half-yearly or quarterly time-series data for most of the macro- 
economic variables. 
As suggested by Johansen (1988) (also see Johansen, 1995), such a restriction can be 
analyzed by maximum likelihood methods. Maximum likelihood estimation requires 
solving a generalized Eigenvalue problem. Durnik et al (2001) claim that the standard 
method proposed in the statistical literature for solving this Eigenvalue problem is 
numerically undesirable. The first two methods above require that the variables in the 
system be of equal order of integration i. e. either 1(0) or I(1). These methods do not 
include the information on structural breaks in time-series data and also suffer from low 
power. Due to these problems associated with the standard test methods, the OLS- 
based, autoregressive, distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration has become 
popular in recent years. 
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6.4.1.3 Auto Regressive Distributive Lag Approach (ARDL) 
The ARDL modelling approach popularized by Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), Pesaran 
and Smith (1998), Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al . (2001) has numerous 
advantages. The main advantage of this approach lies in the fact that it can be applied 
irrespective of whether the variables are 1(0) or I(1) (Pesaran and Pesaran 1997, pp. 302- 
303). Another advantage of this approach is that the model takes sufficient numbers of 
lags to capture the data-generating process in a general-to-specific modelling 
framework (Laurenceson and Chai 2003, p. 28). Moreover, a dynamic error-correction 
model (ECM) can be derived from ARDL through a simple linear transformation 
(Banerjee et al. 1993, p. 51). The ECM integrates the short-run dynamics with the long- 
run equilibrium without losing long-run information. It is also argued that using the 
ARDL approach avoids problems resulting from non-stationary time-series data 
(Laurenceson and Chai 2003, p. 28). 
To illustrate the ARDL modelling approach, the following simple model is considered: 
yt= a+ßxt+&: +a 6.14 
where, yt, x, and z, are three different time series; e, is a vector of stochastic error terms; 
and a, ß and y are the parameters. For the above equation, the error-correction 
version of the ARDL model is given by: 
z, -, 
) 6.15 Ay, =f (Ax,, Azl) - A(Yl-l -a-ßx, _1 -15 
The ARDL model testing procedure starts with conducting the bounds test for the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration. The calculated F-statistic is compared with the critical 
value tabulated by Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) or Pesaran et al. (2001). If the test 
statistic exceeds the upper critical value, the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship 
can be rejected regardless of whether the underlying orders of integration of the 
variables are zero or one. Similarly, if the test statistic falls below a lower critical value, 
the null hypothesis is not rejected. However, if the sample test statistic falls between 
these two bounds, the result is inconclusive. When the order of integration of the 
variables is known and all the variables are I(1), the decision is made based on the upper 
bound. Similarly, if all the variables are 1(0), then the decision is made based on the 
lower bound. 
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The ARDL method estimates (p+1)k number of regressions in order to obtain optimal 
lag length for each variable, where p is the maximum number of lags to be used and k is 
the number of variables in the equation. The model can be selected using the model 
selection criteria like Schwartz-Bayesian Criteria (SBC) and Akaike's Information 
Criteria (AIC). SBC is known as the parsimonious model: selecting the smallest 
possible lag length, whereas AIC is known for selecting the maximum relevant lag 
length. 
In the second step, the long-run relationship is estimated using the selected ARDL 
model. When there is a long-run relationship between variables, there exists an error- 
correction representation. Therefore, in the third step, the error-correction model is 
estimated. The error-correction model result indicates the speed of adjustment back to 
the long-run equilibrium after a short-run shock. 
To ascertain the goodness of fit of the ARDL model, the diagnostic test and the stability 
test are conducted. The diagnostic test examines the serial correlation, functional form, 
normality and heteroscedasticity associated with the model. (Shrestha-2005). 
The autoregressive distributed lag approach to cointegration (ARDL) following the 
methodology outlined in Pesaran and Shin (1999) is employed in this study. The main 
advantage of this procedure is that it can be applied regardless of the stationary 
properties of the variables in the sample and allows for inferences on long-run 
estimates, which is not possible under alternative cointegration procedures. Moreover, 
the number of variables in the model may be large, contrary to the VAR models. 
More recently, however, Granger (1986) and Engle and Granger (1987) have also 
suggested modified causality tests for non-stationary variables that are cointegrated (i. e. 
variables whose long-term movements are related to each other). These tests are 
performed based on a dynamic model, referred to as the "error-correction model" 
(ECM) (Mahdavi et al, 1994). As simplified by the above discussion, an error- 
correction model (ECM) is a neat way of combining the long-run, cointegrating 
relationship between the levels' variables and the short-run relationship between the 
187/240 
first differences of the variables. It also has the advantage that all the variables in the 
estimated equation are stationary; hence there is no problem with spurious correlation. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The unit root test of the data set for Pakistan suggests that the relevant variables are a 
mixture of 1(0) and I(1) variables (table 6.1). In this case the ARDL procedure is the 
appropriate estimation technique. Chapter 7 therefore examines the econometric results 
for the general model set out in this chapter using this procedure. 
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Chapter 7 
Econometric Results and Analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
The theoretical model developed in the previous chapter is empirically tested in this 
chapter, to investigate how economic and political risks may influence the volume of 
inward FDI in a country like Pakistan. The basic theoretical model and hypothesis is 
based on the host country's economic factors, where predictable and stable political 
environment protects private property will influences the volume of FDI flows that 
Pakistan can attract and hold (Cho 2001). The ARDL methodology of macroeconomic 
and socio-political modelling for econometric analysis explained in the previous chapter 
will also be used to develop the final empirical model. 
In economics "sensitivity analysis refers to the operation of a numerical model that 
represents the structure of the empirical analysis process" (Mier et al 1969, pp 1). Frey 
et al. (2002) define sensitivity analysis as the assessment of the impact of changes in 
input values on model outputs. Similarly, Saltelli et al (2000) define sensitivity analysis 
as the study of how the variation in the output of a model can be apportioned, 
qualitatively or quantitatively, among model inputs. The answers sought from the 
application of sensitivity analysis should always be clearly listed. The usefulness of 
sensitivity analysis can then be assessed based on whether the available methods of 
sensitivity analysis can address the questions under consideration in a manner that is 
appropriate to the characteristics of the model. Key motivations for performing a 
sensitivity analysis include the identification of key sources of variability and 
uncertainty in order to facilitate model development, verification and validation along 
with the prioritization of key sources of variability and uncertainty in order to prioritize 
additional data collection, research and general model refinement (Frey et al., 2002). 
In this chapter the estimated empirical model is to be used to generate out-of sample 
forecasts of FDI inflows into Pakistan. In addition to a central forecast, sensitivity 
analysis will be used to develop alternative scenarios, based on alternative perceptions 
of political risk. Sensitivity analysis of the final empirical model in chapter 6 and three 
forecasting results have been presented in the next section. 
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7.2 Empirical Evidence 
Prior to testing for non-causality, it is necessary to establish the order of integration 
present. To this end, an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) was carried out on the 
time-series in levels and differenced forms. The tests were carried out on the 
macroeconomic variables LFDIS, LGDPR, LIR, andLEXGR for Pakistan for the period 
1970-2004. The null hypothesis that a time-series is non-stationary (i. e. has at least one 
unit root) has been accepted and a further test to investigate the stationarity of the 
variables applied the procedure of transforming the series into its first differenced form 
(see Table 6.1). The null hypothesis of non-stationary (when the time-series is 
expressed in first differenced form) has been rejected, which means that the macro- 
economic variables are integrated with an order of one, I (1). The results have been 
presented in Table 6.1 & 6.2 to finalize the methodology to be used for econometric 
analysis to reach a final dynamic model. 
The political risk indices (LPR) have been tested for stationarity and the results 
revealed that the risk indices are stationary at 1(0) (Table 6.1 & 6.2). The difference 
between the levels of integration in macro-economic variables 
(LFDIS, LGDPR, LI, LEXGR) and the political risk (LPR) has confirmed the use of the 
ARDL co-integration methodology as it does not take into account the level of 
integration of variables being used for the theoretical model. 
7.2.1 ARDL Co-integration and ECM Estimation: 
The ADF tests of the key variables revealed that LFDIS, LGDPR, LI, andLEXGR are 
stationary in their first differences and are I(l) but PR is stationary at 1(0). The level of 
LFDIS, LGDPR, LI, LEXGR and LPR is at the constant market prices as at year 2000. 
ARDL co-integration methodology has been adopted as it does not depend upon 
whether a variable is 1(0) or I(1). The error-correction co-integration analysis (ARDL) 
has been undertaken for the period as a whole (1970-2004) to display the short-run and 
long-run relationship between the stock of FDI and LGDPR, LIR, LEXGR and LPR 
as an explanatory variable. 
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7.3 Results: an analysis 
7.3.1 Specification of Test 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 present the results from models with lag length 1 and 2 respectively. 
The purpose of presenting the results for the model with lag length 1 is to show the 
actual empirical results. The tests were run separately for the individual effect of the 
aggregate political risk components with lag 1 ARDL estimation. A variety of results 
were found revealing some of the components to be highly significant (government 
stability (GS), investment profile (IP), internal conflict (IC), and bureaucracy quality 
BQ) while some others showed insignificant effects in contradiction of the correlation 
test described earlier in chapter 4 (Tables 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6). The inclusion of the 
aggregate political risk index (PRI) into the lag 1 estimation model also did not reveal 
any significance despite being a major socio-economic determinant of FDI stock in 
Pakistan. The R2 values in the lag 1 sample case also remained at an average of 50% for 
the model with PRI or the models with sub-components of PRI. Although there is a 
statistically significant error-correction term adjustment with the right sign at 5%, the 
macro-economic determinants along with PR still did not reveal a coefficient with the 
theoretically expected sign. From the regression and the correlation coefficients, we can 
draw the conclusion that a lag 1 model might not be the appropriate lag length for the 
estimation. 
A number of tests have been run for the selection of the lag length, e. g. first, an F-test 
under a `joint test for several regressions' hypothesis for the comparison of R2 values 
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld 1981) and second, a J-test for the hypothesis of the significance 
of the residuals / fitted values of non-nested models. Firstly, a joint test of several 
regressions was done to find out the model lag length (Verbeek 2005). Finally, a model 
with lag length of 2 was chosen for the estimation and the results reported in Table 7.2. 
7.3.2 Estimation Results 
The analysis of the results is based on the `within-estimation' method with a lag length 
of 2. It revealed that all the variables with aggregate political risk index were significant 
with the correct theoretical sign but that some of the variables in the sub-components 
model still did not show significant results, which is an understandable situation and 
found in the correlation test in chapter 4. The macro-economic variables economic 
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growth, interest rate and exchange rate, as well as the political risk index (PRI), have 
been found to be statistically significant in the short-run as well as in the long-run 
relationship with FDI stock by giving an indication of a significant increase or decrease 
in the stock of FDI if the explanatory variables are increased by I%. 
The results from Table 7.2 can be summarized as follows: 
Levels of GDP (LY): This is positive and highly significant in its effect on FDI stock 
with a lag of two years revealing that the higher effects on FDI stock start after 
consistent economic growth in the host country for at least the previous two years. 
The real interest rate (LIR) does not show a significant effect on the stock of FDI 
despite being statistically significant but with the wrong theoretical sign. The 
significance of interest rate revealed that, if the interest rate is kept either at 0% or lower 
than in the investor's country of origin, it will have a positive relationship with FDI 
stock. This is also found in the correlation test in Chapter 4. 
The real exchange rate (LEXGR) showed a negative effect on the FDI stock but was 
statistically significant due to its pegging properties (Hussain 2006), which remained 
unstable historically in Pakistan (Table 6.7). The results reveal that, if the exchange rate 
remains unstable in the host country, it will have a negative effect on the FDI stock as 
can also be seen in the correlation matrix in Chapter 4. 
Political risk (PR) is an aggregate risk index of political stability in Pakistan. Being a 
major socio-economic explanatory variable, it also revealed a statistically significant 
negative effect on the stock of FDI due to the political instability risk in the country 
during the period 1970-2004. The time profile of the adjustment effect of the PR effect 
on the stock of FDI is also presented in the following section for more analysis of PR 
and its effect on the future FDI stock. The error-correction coefficient is significant at 
the 10% level of significance and gives an indication of the co-integration of dependent 
and explanatory variables and also suggests a rapid adjustment process. The high value 
of R2 shows that the overall goodness of fit of the models is satisfactory. With the F- 
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statistics measuring 5.07 (3.81) the co-integration variables in the model are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
The long-run test statistics (Table 7.2) also reveal a significant long-run relationship 
between LGDPR, LIR, LEXGR and LPR and LFDIS in Pakistan. The coefficients of 
GDP, and IR, are positive and statistically significant (Table 7.2), whereas negative 
values for the variables EXGR and PR have been found, revealing the pegging property 
of the exchange rate (Hussain 2006) and that the instability of the political environment 
can have a negative effect on the FDI (Schneider et al 1985). The real interest rate 
(discount rate) coefficient does not give the correct theoretical sign but it can be 
accommodated by reference to the Islamisation of the economy and making it interest 
free. This might be helpful in attracting international investors to borrow in Pakistan 
and invest in the same place. PR has been found to be significant in the short-run along 
with its affective relationship in the long run. Theoretically political stability does not 
affect the international investor in the short-run but it shows its positive effects in the 
long-run after a lag of approximately 2-3 years (Table 7.2). 
The sub-components of the PR index have also been tested to find out the relationship 
of the individual components to FDIS, which revealed mixed results with a few 
components being significant and other components not significant. Again this is 
similar to the results shown in the correlation matrix in chapter 4 for nominal and FDI 
stock and flows (Table 4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6). 
The results from table-7.2 and dynamic equation 7.1 clearly revealed that income 
growth is positively related to the flow of FDI to a country like Pakistan, where the 
economy has been fragile for decades. The interest rate has not shown a significant 
effect on the FDI, which perhaps indicates that international investors have not been 
interested in borrowing from Pakistan. The negative effect of the exchange rate may be 
due to the dual nature of exchange rate control (by government and free market) and the 
instability of the exchange rate, through changes in governments. The political 
instability risk index has revealed the right sign indicating that any movement in the 
political scenario will directly affect FDI to a country like Pakistan. 
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The diagnostic test results also reveal that no serial correlation, non-normality, or 
heteroscedasticity exist in the model and the functional form is not inappropriate. Thus 
the final model is stable and the estimation results are empirically robust. 
7.4 ECM Adjustment: A time profile analysis 
According to the results revealed for the short-run and long-run relationships between 
LGDPR, LI, LEXGR LPR and LFDIS during ARDL co-integration and error- 
correction testing methodology for the Lag 2 model (Table 7.2), it will be very useful to 
present a time profile chart for a better individual analysis of the relationship between 
ALPR and ALFDIS of the dynamic adjustment, as revealed by the dynamic equation. 
The following equation 7.1 is the estimated result of long-run model equation 6.7 along 
with estimation results for model 6.7 (lag-2) as shown on Table 7.2 (page 194, column 
2). 
AS, = -4.22 - 0.17ecm_, )+0.830LS, _, + . 
810L Y+0.040LIR - . 89ALEXGR + 1. O 10LPR 
7.1 
=> S, _ (1- 0.17)S, _, + 
0.83AS, 
_, 
S, = 0.83S, _, + 
0.83S, 
_, - 
0.83Sr_2 
S, =1.66S, _, - 
0.83Sr_2 
7.2 
7.3 
7.4 
From dynamic equation 7.1, it can be seen that the rise of I% in ALPR leads to a rise of 
1.01 % of ALFDIS(AS, ) . 
The time profile of the adjustment for the period of 1994-2004 
can be presented as follows: 
Table 7.3 Time Profile Table for FDIS adjustments 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
LPR 1% 1`%º 1% 1%º 1`%' 1% 1% 
S, 1.01 1.67 1.93 1.74 1.28 0.68 -0.06 
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Chart-7.1 
EEM adjustments :A Time Profile of the Stock of FDI 1999-2004 
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The time profile chart reveals the adjustment remained high for 4 years and was 
completed after 6 years according to the error correction term adjustment properties. 
This also tells us that following a 1% rise in LPR, the stock of FDI rises for five years; 
increasing sharply in the first year before flattering out and then falling over the next 
three years. 
7.5 Sensitivity Analysis of PRI 
The mathematical model in the preparation of PR simulation enables us to carry out an 
econometric analysis of the long-run relationship of the exogenous and endogenous 
variables for different values. 
The simulation of an exogenous variable, such as PR, is done by altering the values of 
certain relevant components of PR and then testing the effect of these new values on the 
long-run relationship between FDI stock and PR. ADF tests for the analysis of causality 
and ECM tests for the analysis of the long-run relationship have used Microfit 4.1. 
i) PRA -A 25% increase in TRP of PR 
ii) PRB- A 50% increase in TRP of PR 
iii) PRC- A 25% decrease in TRP of PR 
iv) PRD -A 50% decrease in TRP of PR 
7.6 Forecasts and Future Prospects 
At the same time as the current risk assessments are produced, one- and five-year risk 
forecasts are produced using the same methodology. Three forecasts produced for each 
time period can be explained as follows: 
i) Worst Case Forecast (WC Forecast) 
ii) Most Probable Forecast (MP Forecast) 
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iii) Best Case Forecast (BC Forecast) 
7.6.1 Worst Case Forecast (WC Forecast) 
The WC Forecast is produced by extrapolating the negative/positive trend for each 
factor to produce a WC Forecast for GDP, IR, EXGR, and PR. 
It has been assumed for 2005-08 that real GDP (Y) will show a negative trend of 8.4%, 
the real exchange rate and real interest rate (discount rate) will show positive trends of 
4.1% and 5.2% respectively, while political risk (PR) will show a 1.8% negative trend 
thus giving an indication of higher risk in the political context as expected through the 
theoretical model. The FDI stock also captured the downtrend of the economy and the 
unstable exchange rate effects and the stock levels reducing at an average of minus 25% 
each year for the period 2005-2008, which indicates a long-run effect of economic 
growth, unstable exchange rate and higher interest rates along with highly unstable 
political factors, which in another way indicates that the FDI stock is dependent on the 
economic growth and exchange rate stability. PRI as in the co-integration test is also a 
major factor affecting the stock of FDI in Pakistan over the period 2005-2008 according 
to the long-run scenario. 
Table-7.4 
PAKISTAN (2000-2008) 2000-2004(actual), 2005-2008 (forecasts) 
Actual 2000-2004 FDIS WC forecasts 2005-2008 
Variables 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
IS 1571 1582 2051 1687 1858 1413 1191 863 542 
Y 71357 73783 77546 82509 89440 81927 75045 68741 6296' 
IR 8.60 6.50 4.40 2.90 -1.80 2.90 4.40 6.50 8.60 
EXGR 100 115.10 109.24 104.90 101.13 104.90 109.24 115.10 120.96 
PR 62.50 63.50 68.50 70.75 69.50 68.27 67.06 65.88 64.72 
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Chart-7.2 
Dynamic Worst Case forecasts for the level of FDI 
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7.6.2 Most Probable Forecast (MP Forecast) 
The MP Forecast is produced by extrapolating the most probable trend for each of the 
economic and political components to produce an MP Forecast for FDI stock during 
2005-08. 
In the first case of the most probable scenario, the indicators were assumed to show a 
0% growth trend remaining the same in the years (2005-2008) along with PRI also at 
the same level as expected in the theoretical model. The FDI stock is affected by the 0% 
economic growth rate as well as the political risk factors. Since it is also dependent upon 
the FDI flows of the current year, it showed a downward trend despite the perceived 
stability in the economy and the political environment. Despite a positive trend in the 
flows of FDI (see Table 8.4), FDI stock had a minus 6.4% trend due to the 0% 
economic growth predicted for 2005-08. This indicates that FDI stock is not only 
dependent on the economic growth, exchange rate stability and interest rate in the short- 
run but also in the long-run scenario. Along with PR, it is as a major factor affecting the 
FDI stock in Pakistan (2005-2008) in the long-run but not in the short-run on Table 7.5 
(page 204). 
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Table-7.5 
PAKISTAN (2000-2008) 2000-2004(actual), 2005-2008 (forecasts) 
Actual 2000-2004 FDIS MP forecasts 2005-2008 
Variables 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
IS 1571 1582 2051 1687 1858 1740 1746 1749 1751 
Y 71357 73783 77546 82509 89440 89440 89440 89440 89440 
IR 8.60 6.50 4.40 2.90 -1.80 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
EXGR 100 115.10 109.24 104.90 101.13 101.13 101.13 101.13 101.13 
PR 62.50 63.50 68.50 70.75 69.50 69.50 69.50 69.50 69.50 
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7.6.3 Best Case Forecast (BC Forecast) 
Extrapolating the best-case trend for each factor including Y, YC, EXGR, INFL, and 
PR produces the BC Forecast. 
It has been assumed for 2005-08 that real GDP (Y) will grow at a rate of 8.4%, the real 
exchange rate and real interest rate (discount rate) will go down at rates of 4.1% and 
5.2% respectively, while political risk (PR) will show a 1.8% upward trend, indicating 
the lower political risk predicted by the theoretical model. The FDI stock also captured 
the positive growth of the economy and stable exchange rate effects as the stock levels 
increased at an average of 1.13% during 2004-05 but is expected to grow faster for the 
remaining years at an average rate of 6% each year for 2005-2008. This indicates a 
long-run effect on the FDI stock of economic growth, the stable exchange rate and 
lower interest rates (as low as 0%) along with the stable political environment. In 
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another way this indicates that FDI stock is dependent on economic growth and 
exchange rate stability. PRI, as in the co-integration test, is also a major factor affecting 
the stock of FDI in Pakistan 2005-2008 in the long-run scenario. 
Table-7.6 
PAKISTAN (2000-2008) 2000-2004(actual), 2005-2008 (forecasts) 
Actual 2000-2004 FDIS BC forecasts 2005-2008 
Variables 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
FDIS 1571 1582 2051 1687 1858 2001 2424 3026 3749 
Y 71357 73783 77546 82509 89440 96953 105097 113925 123495 
IR 8.60 6.50 4.40 2.90 -1.80 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
EXGR 100 115.10 109.24 104.90 101.13 97.36 93.73 90.24 86.88 
PR 62.50 63.50 68.50 70.75 69.50 70.75 '2.00 '3.27 74.56 
Chart 7.4 
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7.7 Conclusion 
The theoretical fitness model of FDI stock postulates that economic and political 
variables give a country a competitive advantage in the global FDI market. 
The testing of the FDI Fitness model found that economic and political stability plays 
the central role in attracting and stocking FDI in a host country like Pakistan. Economic 
growth, law and order, and a corruption-free environment for investment are the 
governmental fitness factors. Market fitness is reflected in a stable exchange rate and 
lower discount rates, which attract the international investors to borrow from the host 
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country. Political stability also contributes positively to FDI inflows and stock, probably 
through institutional strengths and democratic accountability. 
Given that market fitness is largely determined by economic policies, governmental 
fitness proves, in a certain sense, to be the FDI Fitness sub-concept with the greatest 
explanatory power. The econometric results strongly suggest that economic growth, a 
low discount rate, stable exchange rate and a more generally stable political 
environment are instrumental in attracting FDI. In other words, the fewer obstacles the 
foreign direct investors encounter, the more they will invest. The more the government 
does to provide an economic and politically stable framework conducive to FDI, the 
more FDI it will obtain. This is not surprising at all: most people go where they feel 
most welcome and/or where they can succeed in their endeavours. What is remarkable 
is what makes foreign direct investors feel welcome: it is policies and their 
implementation, rather than intransigent conditions. The results are very encouraging 
for policy-makers seeking to increase FDI inflows. 
Overall, the empirical analysis carried out in this chapter suggests that the relationship 
between politico-economic determinants and FDI stock is more complex than that 
implied by the conventional wisdom. The results of our estimation have reinforced the 
results presented by earlier studies discussed in chapter 5, section - 5.3. 
Major traditional economic indicators like, GDP and exchange rate stability, along with 
socio-economic indicators in general and political risk (PR) in particular, have shown 
positive relationships with and effects on FDI stock in Pakistan in the short-run as well 
as in the long-run. The diagnostic test analysis gives the indication of a stable model for 
Pakistan, showing no sign of serial correlation, non-normality or heteroscedasticity on 
Table 7.2 (page 196). 
The preliminary statistical examination and the empirical testing of FDI flows and stock 
in Pakistan (1970-2004) in the context of theoretical economics of investment required 
a fundamental investigation and assessment of the empirical results and the ideas behind 
the notions of risk or uncertainty as applied to FDI. For further confirmation of the 
empirical model, sensitivity estimation has been run for the effect of political risk on 
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FDI in Pakistan. Four new risk indices were produced by increasing and decreasing the 
risk index by 25% and 50% respectively. The results revealed that there is not a big 
change in the relationship of the PR index with FDI stock along with similar macro- 
economic determinants. 
While looking at the historical economic and political data, it has been found necessary 
to put forward the future expected FDI stock in the context of historical data. Three 
forecast cases have been tested empirically using the basic ICRG forecasting 
methodology. 
The results revealed that, if the economy grows at the same rate of the previous years 
along with other macro-economic factors like lower discount rate, stable exchange rate 
and lower political risk the FDI stock is boosted (Table 7.6). In the second case, the 
most probable economic and political situation of country (the MP scenario) also 
revealed good results encouraging the international investors to invest in Pakistan, 
which is expected in the future to increase the level of FDI stock in the country. The 
third case is the worst case future situation during which the economy will suffer due to 
lower growth rates, the increase in the discount rate on borrowing from Pakistan and 
investing in Pakistan, the unstable exchange rate decreasing the worth of foreign 
currency exchange and, most importantly, the increase in the political risk factor. This 
situation will affect negatively the flow of FDI, in turn affecting the stock of FDI, as the 
investors will tend to withdraw their investment to find more stable countries in the 
region. 
The best case (BC) and the most probable case (MP) scenarios encourage the 
Islamisation process of the Pakistani economy and financial sector. The zero interest 
rate charge on the borrowing also encourages international investors to become 
involved with modes of Islamic investment such as Musharqah and Mudharabah 
(Chapter 3, section 3.3), as direct investment is considered to be the method nearest to 
the Islamic investment methodology. 
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Chapter 8 
Summary and Conclusion 
This thesis has attempted to explore the principal economic and political factors that 
determine the stock of FDI capital in Pakistan. This is the first such study of this aspect 
of Pakistan's economic development. This thesis shows that an aggregate, neo-classical 
type, production function can be used to capture the main features of the stock of FDI 
capital. That is, it is largely determined by the level of income in the home economy, 
although other economic factors such the exchange rate can also play a role. 
A second finding is that non-economic factors, such as political risk, are also important. 
To this end, several alternative indices of political risk have been computed and nested 
within the model. The coefficients move invariably and are statistically significant, 
although the stock of FDI responded only in elastically until the incorporation into the 
model of changes in political risk. New flows, however, are empirically more sensitive 
to risk. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis of FDI and risk shows that political stability is 
important for the growth of FDI in Pakistan. 
With respect to country risk, Pakistan can be considered a high-risk state because of 
both serious domestic crises and the danger of cross-border conflicts. The federal 
structure, the threat of the state being captured by conservative religious militants, 
ethnic and sectarian divisions, chronic economic difficulties, alienation of the people 
from the state and the degrading of the institutions of civil society also pose a great 
threat to international investment. On the external front, the dispute with India continues 
to pose the danger of a war in which nuclear weapons could be used. 
The presence of the military in politics has aggravated the economic and financial 
policies as in the first period of military rule in 1959. Sometimes, the military regimes 
(1977-1988) have encouraged fundamentalist religious lobbies that decry constitutional, 
democratic and human rights and there remains the unresolved question of the 
succession to the military regime (Rehman-2002). 
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Keeping in mind the following risks, this may affect the overall performance of the 
economy in the current fiscal year and have effects on future overall economic growth. 
Along with the risk of prolonged military dictatorship, Pakistan is also exposed to the 
following major risks that may affect the economic, financial and political system. 
a) The geographical location and relations with neighbouring countries pose a threat 
of a third war with more sophisticated, possibly nuclear, weaponry. 
b) Agriculture is the backbone of the economy of Pakistan. The majority of the 
irrigation is done through the canal system and shortages of irrigation water of up to 40 
percent may adversely affect the performance of agriculture in general, especially major 
crops including wheat, sugar cane and, in particular, cotton. The major part of GDP is 
contributed by agriculture and the drops in the production of major crops due to drought 
have severe effect upon the economy. 
c) The real GDP grew strongly by 7.5% during 2003-04 after the lowest growth of 
1.8% during 2000-2001. (Table 8.1)84. 
d) The major factor of this burden is the instability of the governments, which has 
adversely affected investor's confidence. The remittances from the workforce abroad 
have also decreased over the period 1970-2004. 
The thorough study of the political economy of Pakistan acknowledges the relationship 
of the state of the economy and polity as being at the forefront of the necessary 
development of a country. This means that an economic science that does not account 
for the political aspect of the country is less than satisfactory. So it can be concluded 
finally that an economy must be a political economy (Bruno 1978). 
The successive attempts at authoritarian rule over the country have created gaps 
between different ethnic, linguistic and regional groups, which have given rise to ethnic 
violence and political instability. As the political governments have been weak and 
hostile towards the opposition, the bureaucracy has been provided with an opportunity 
84 http: //www. finance. gov. pk/survey/sur_chap_05-06/01-Growth. pdf 
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to operate independently and `play its own game'. All the above policies were pursued 
at the cost of the ordinary people of the country whose lives became harder and more 
miserable day-by-day. The present socio-economic conditions of Pakistan are not up to 
the mark by any standard. The country has yet to attain political stability. The labour 
force is undisciplined and largely unskilled. The country seems to be caught in a vicious 
cycle of corruption and looting. On the economic front, exports are almost stagnant and 
consist of traditional agro-based products with little value-addition. The possibility of a 
reduction in the import bill is remote. Despite being a predominantly agro-based 
economy, every year billions of rupees are spent on the import of edible oil and wheat. 
The budget and current account deficits are seemingly unmanageable. Problems of 
unemployment and inflation are unprecedented. On top of this, ethnic problems and the 
bad law and order situation in Karachi are major areas of concern for every patriotic 
Pakistani. It is very disturbing to think about what the 21st century holds with the 
current sluggishness on almost all fronts. The picture of the economy portrayed above 
is, no doubt, grim and gloomy, but not beyond salvation (Ahmed, 2000). In a country 
where no elected government has ever completed its full term in office and the rule of 
law has rarely applied to the rich, powerful and corrupt, another such failure could 
encourage those who argue that Pakistan must try a new formula (Macko, 1998). 
After considering the political economy (PE) of Pakistan, it became necessary to look 
into the short- and long-run relationships between foreign direct investment stock and 
economic growth, the openness of the economy, interest rates (discount rate), the 
exchange rate and political risk for 1970-2004. The effect of economic instability was 
negative but not statistically significant. Hence, the evidence from this study supports 
economic stability, the openness of the economy for trade with lower barriers on trade 
and a lower discount rate. First, while most of the studies cited in the literature suggest a 
positive and significant relationship between FDI and the economic stability and growth 
of the host country, they usually fail to establish a statistical relationship between 
foreign direct investment and other variables such as economic growth, the openness of 
the economy, interest rates (discount rate), the exchange rate and political risk. 
This may be explained, to a great extent, by such factors as the nature of the data and 
the data process, estimation techniques, the sample chosen, and the country's own 
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characteristics. Secondly, unlike the other works drawing on cross-sectional data, using 
time-series data for a single country appears to be a useful approach by which to capture 
relationships between FDI and its locational determinants (Erdal, 2002). 
Because of the small sample size and the unavailability of data on some important 
variables, which has hindered the control of their impact on FDI inflows in Pakistan, 
caution has been exercised when interpreting the results. However, the results show 
clearly the factors which have influenced foreign investors' decisions in choosing a 
location in the estimated directions for their investments. For a further exploration of 
FDI in Pakistan, the political risk was added as a major factor to find out the joint affect 
on FDI inflows to Pakistan. 
In the light of the study of country risk in general and political risk, an attempt has been 
made to calculate a quantitative risk index with qualitative information on politics, the 
economy, and different internal and external issues for the period 1970-2004. These 
particular risk indices known as PRI may constitute a large part of the total risk 
investors may face when investing in emerging markets. We have examined how PR 
may be defined and the sources of information on which an analysis of political risk 
may be based. We suggest a valuation model based on the contingent claims valuation 
methodology, where PRI has been used as the independent variable along with GDPR, 
EXGR and IR. We report summaries of tests made to examine whether the assumptions 
underlying this model are reasonable. How such a model may be implemented when 
evaluating FDI inflows and stock under political risk in Pakistan has also been 
demonstrated. 
Finally, it is suggested that economic and political instability risks play a vital role when 
assessing whether a country is to be favoured with FDI. The majority of empirical 
studies investigate certain determinants of FDI in certain regions or groups of countries. 
Although literature on the empirical determinants of FDO flow and stock in the Asian 
countries in general, and the South Asian region in particular, is wide and varied, the 
empirical work has not directly and fully addressed the effect of political instability risk 
on FDI in the region in general and Pakistan in particular. However, some of the recent 
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studies (Singh, 1995) shed some light on FDI in the South Asian region as the influence 
of these determinants has been tested to a lesser extent. 
The first contribution made in this study is the indexation of political risk during the 
period 1970-2004 and afterwards the estimation of the political risk index along with 
other macro-economic variables linked to the FDI stock in Pakistan (1970-2004). 
However, the estimation results allow the presentation of an empirical model of the 
determinants of FDI capturing the influence of structural breaks in the political system 
through dummy variables. This model aims to provide long-term guidance and support 
to the policy makers in Pakistan as they set the targets to be achieved by the government 
and may have a role to play in developing countries in general and Muslim countries in 
particular. 
The sensitivity analysis of PR has also revealed that increases or decreases in the PR 
index can have similar short-run and long-run effects on the flow and stock of FDI in 
Pakistan. 
The forecasts also revealed that, even if a host country such as Pakistan remains 
politically stable, the level of FDI stock shows the same trend as in the BC and MP case 
scenarios. The forecasts of the level of FDI stock show the effects of the WC scenario 
for the socio-economic factors. 
The sensitivity analysis and the forecasts also lead to an assumption that the indication 
of international geographical and political factors might also be playing a major role in 
the flow of FDI to a country like Pakistan with such a turbulent economic and political 
environment. 
While looking at the forecasting results (Table-7.4,7.5,7.6), it can be analyzed that 
many challenges exist for Pakistan to allow it to benefit from globalization and become 
integrated into the world economy. One of the challenges is to attract more FDI to reap 
the benefits of international capital flows. These benefits include improved technical 
knowledge and skill, access to external markets and increased employment. 
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In the critical analysis of data on FDI flows and stock, Pakistan did not do as well 
during the time frame 1970-2004 as other countries in the South Asian region like India, 
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The other regional countries have improved their share of 
the South Asian FDI stock while Pakistan's share has declined (Table-2.8). 
Policy changes and improvements are needed in Pakistan, spurring improvements in 
economic stability, controlling the inflation rate and the exchange rate, promoting more 
liberal trade policies, facilitating foreign investors, encouraging privatization and, most 
importantly, improving the law and order situation in order to provide more security for 
foreign investors. More political stability is required to defuse misunderstandings and 
give more property rights to investors. 
Due to the broad field of study of FDI, the opportunities for the future work with respect 
to this study are considerable. Possible future research has been identified, including: 
(i) 
(ii) 
After finding a long-run effect of PR on FDI stock, the next field of research 
might examine the relationship between the rate of return on FDI and FDI stock 
using more macro-economic determinants such as the availability of skilled 
labour, the quality of the infrastructure and wage costs. 
If the discount rate and interest rate (given by banks on deposits) is reduced to 
zero according to the Islamic Financial system, the theoretical prediction that FDI 
flows will increase but FDI stock will decrease seems highly likely. In the context 
of the recent decision by the Supreme Court of Pakistan (1999) to Islamize the 
economy of Pakistan according to the rules set up by the Islamic Economic 
System, the effect of the interest-free economy on the flows of FDI into the 
country and the FDI stock already in the country can be tested. The Supreme court 
of Pakistan had ordered Pakistan government to conform all banking and financial 
laws according to Islamic Sharia laws by end-2001 (BBC-1999). This decision 
though created a panic situation to the foreign investors but the still the 
government had time to work on the system as Pakistan already practises a liberal 
version of Islamic banking under which banks are not supposed to use the word 
"interest"85. 
85 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/576435. stm 
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(iii) Due to the reverse decision by Supreme Court of Pakistan in 2002 (BBC-2002)86, 
on the abolition of interest from economic and financial system of Pakistan, the 
government has got an opportunity for some breathing space to carry on with its 
policies to try to revive the country's faltering economy and to develop the 
banking and financial system gradually and bringing it fully in conferment of 
Islamic Financial laws. This gradual change towards an interest free economy will 
also not create a panic situation in the foreign investors already dealing in a 
conventional interest based system. 
(iv) Utilizing the methodology of PR indexation, a research project on the risk analysis 
of developing countries in South Asia as compared to the Gulf Region would 
prove useful. 
86 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/business/2062679. stm 
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Table-8.1 
Economic Growth & Key Macro-economic Indicators Performance (1970-2004) 87 
Years GDPR 
$ mill 
GDPRC 
$ 
FDI 
$ mill 
FDIS 
$ mill 
OE 
$ mill 
IR 
Q-7 r) 
EXGR PR Pop (mill) 
1970 16,635 268 12 238 0.69 3.03 29.93 52.5 62 
1971 16,713 265 11 238 0.63 3.03 29.66 44.76 63 
1972 16,849 259 9 247 0.45 1.03 53.09 78.7 65 
1973 18,039 269 0.001 247 0.39 6.03 53.12 79.28 67 
1974 18,678 271 2 198 0.4 6.53 45.76 80.77 69 
1975 19,465 274 8 168 0.38 5.94 41.26 83.77 71 
1976 20,468 280 2 153 0.39 5.57 40.83 81.76 73 
1977 21,276 280 4 144 0.38 6.16 39.36 57.64 76 
1978 22,989 295 8 140 0.38 5.82 39.94 67.17 78 
1979 23,853 298 13 144 0.46 5.55 41.11 70.72 80 
1980 26,289 317 13 146 0.45 5.16 41.73 67.48 83 
1981 28,372 334 21 133 0.37 4.69 41.12 66.75 85 
1982 30,227 347 11 116 0.34 6.15 49.24 63.74 87 
1983 32,276 359 5 118 0.37 7.12 52.91 61.01 90 
1984 33,910 369 8 103 0.37 3.42 55.7 58.98 92 
1985 36,485 384 19 157 0.36 3.12 62 70.51 95 
1986 38,492 397 14 183 0.37 2.90 63.74 74.01 97 
1987 40,976 410 17 182 0.37 2.58 65.96 71.72 100 
1988 44,100 428 23 155 0.33 1.90 65.31 65.67 103 
1989 46,288 441 24 162 0.35 1.20 72.38 66.21 105 
1990 48,351 448 19 152 0.33 -2.17 73.96 61.89 108 
1991 50,988 459 24 197 0.34 -0.60 75.59 68.74 111 
1992 54,983 482 34 271 0.38 0.20 75 67.97 114 
1993 56,036 471 31 225 0.41 -1.30 78.78 66.21 119 
1994 58,219 481 33 298 0.37 2.00 78.24 66.7 121 
1995 61,200 494 68 514 0.36 6.20 74.04 63.7 124 
1996 64,266 506 80 595 0.36 8.20 78.75 61.92 127 
1997 65,054 500 77 1184 0.35 10.20 82.42 67.71 130 
1998 67,201 505 66 1622 0.28 10.80 86.43 65.96 133 
1999 69,821 510 131 1995 0.25 9.40 93.14 63.47 137 
2000 71,357 510 73 1571 0.24 8.60 100 62.91 140 
2001 73,783 516 139 1582 0.28 6.50 115.1 63.92 143 
2002 77,546 528 257 2051 0.29 4.40 109.24 68.95 147 
2003 82,509 550 207 1687 0.34 2.90 104.9 71.23 150 
2004 89,440 588 164 884 0.34 -1.80 101.13 69.98 152 
Y=GDP real; YC GDP per capita; I=FDI flows (real); IS= FDI stock (real); OE= (Exports + Imports)/GDP; 
IR=Pak Disc. Rate- Inflation Rate; EXGR= Exchange rate (real); PR= Political Risk Index; Pop=Population (mill) 
" Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics Pakistan, Economic Surveys of Pakistan (1970-2005), Ministry of Finance Pakistan, 
Board of investment Pakistan, World Bank CD-ROM (2005), IFS (1970-2004) by IMF, WIR (2000-05) by UNCTAD, and 
World watch Global Trends. 
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Appendix-1.1 
Introduction to Political Economy of Pakistan 
Pakistan appeared in the world map as a second largest independent Muslim State in 
1947 with an estimated population of 150 million, with Eastern and Western wings 
named East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Today it is an Islamic republic, with 
domination of Islamic standards in the national political discourse, discussions about 
democratisation, economic reform, and state-society relations. 
Despite the opposition of the most prominent Muslim thinkers like Abul-Kalam Azad 
(d. 1958) and religious institutions such as the Jam'iat Ulama-i Hind (Indian Ulama 
Party), who participated in the independence movement under the leadership of the 
Indian Congress Party, but on the other hand large majority of political elite joined the 
intellectuals such as Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) and politicians such as Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah (d. 1948) in the Muslim League. They prominent Muslim thinkers believed that 
the major issue is to get freedom from British and thought it better to live as a minority 
in a predominantly Hindu state and to seek to safeguard for Muslim communal interests 
before an uncertain future. 
Though religion being the dominant slogan in the freedom movement, still for the 
leaders of the Pakistan movement Muslim nationalism was not so much a religious 
notion. Jinnah being of secular thinking wanted to identify Muslims as a people 
belonging to a distinct cultural group and sharing a common identity separate from that 
of the majority population. He did not think Islam as the basic religion of Pakistan but 
still wanted the identity of Muslim's aspirations and wanted Pakistan to be a secular 
state. Despite these thinking he was not able to keep Pakistan a secular state because of 
the strong impact of Islamic symbols in the separatist struggle during the last phase 
compelled him to change his ideology from secular to pure Islamic state which opened 
the door to thinking of Pakistan as an Islamic State. 
After Pakistan the creation of Pakistan, the political elite with secular ideology resisted 
giving Islam a prominent role in national politics. Despite Islam being the major slogan 
of freedom movement to create a Islamic brotherhood for the Muslim homeland 
confronted with insurmountable ethnic, linguistic, and class conflicts, economic 
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collapse, a serious refugee problem, and war with India quickly succumbed to the 
temptation of mobilising Islamic symbols in the service of state formation. Due to these 
problems in the early stages of freedom, the country was destabilised and the 
governments failed to address fundamental socio-economic issues, even carried out 
meaningful land reforms, but the ethnic issues and provincials freedom demands 
compelled government to consolidate power in the centre. 
After a great resistance of the secular political elite to form an Islamic status of the 
newly created state, the religious parties found a door for Islamic practices in politics by 
1949 as the secular political elite accepted a political role for Islamic forces. The debate 
for the Islamisation of Pakistan constitution was included in the Objectives Resolution. 
So the first decade of independence Islamic forces got up to some how involved in the 
politics of Pakistan which changed the political environment in the country after 
culmination of the 1956 constitution. But still the secular political elite wanted the hold 
of politics and was not willing to abandon the secularism or to Islamise the society and 
politics as a whole. The anti-Ahmadiya movement in 1953-54 and removal of Ahmadi 
foreign minister from the government pressurised the government to commit himself for 
the Islamisation. Despite strong reaction by the government against the religious parties 
and imposed the martial law in the country abandoning the basic rights, the government 
had to include formally to some form of Islamicness of Pakistan in the constitution of 
1956, declaring the state an Islamic republic, still the Islamic forces once again 
demanded adoption of Islamic laws and precepts. 
After the military coup in 1958, General Ayub Khan assumed powers (1958-69), and 
tried to use his military force to resolve the issue of Islamic parties by nationalising the 
Islamic institutions and imposing the cotrovertial secular family laws and also removed 
" Islamic" from the name of state in the constitution of 1962. He tried to use his paid 
Ulema to define Islam in the modem way by including the secular thinking and 
teachings in the interpretations, which increased more tension between Ayub Khan's 
government and the religious parties and resulted as the downfall of Ayub Khan's self- 
made empire. Soon after the downfall of Ayub Khan, the movement for independent 
state in East Pakistan gave way to a civil war in 1971, which resulted to an end after 
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creation of independent state called Bangladesh. The religious parties condemned the 
military government of it's policies and secularism thinking for the fall of East Pakistan. 
In the decades after 1970s, the religious parties gained ground in the politics through the 
student unions, labour unions and professional associations. This built up a pressure for 
the new political government headed by Prime Minister Zulfika Ali Bhutto (1971-77), 
eventually accepted the demands by the Islamic parties and declared Ahmedis a non- 
Muslim minority in 1974 and also banned the use of Alcohol, closed casinos and night- 
clubs, and prohibited gambling and all other social activities proscribed by Islamic law. 
He thought that by accepting the demands of the religious parties he will be able to 
govern for long time but the political agitation against the rigging in the general election 
of 1977 ended his power to another military coup lead by General Zia-ul-Haq (1977- 
1988). Being a devoted Muslim, Zia understood the power of Islamic parties and 
harnessed them to protect the supreme position of the state. Due to the Islamic attitude 
of the government, the bureaucracy and the military became more Islamic openly to 
initiate the Islamisation of the whole system of Pakistan with a gradual change from 
1979-1984. 
Zia period is considered as the major player in the Islamisation of the legal and 
economic system of Pakistan as most of the reforms like introduction of Islamic panel, 
commercial and inheritance laws, religious taxes (Zakat and Usher), the institution of 
Federal Shari'at Court to review the compatibility of all laws with Islamic dictums and 
initiating public to appear as a true Muslim e. g. women dressing etc. This was also 
enforced by the role of Zia government in Afghanistan Jihad against the Russian 
invasion in 1984. 
Despite all these activities in favour of the Islamic political parties, the government still 
remained reserved in using the pure Islamic Economic System to be practices in legal 
and financial system. It kept running the conventional economic system in parallel to 
the Islamic laws, which created a gap between the Islamic movements and Zia 
government. Due to commitment of Zia government with Islamic Parties, it provided a 
strong base to the Islamic status of Pakistan and even after the death of Zia in a plane 
crash in 1988, the predecessor governments could not keep themselves away from this 
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effect, and had to coop with the religious parties. Though the secular political elite ruled 
the country during Benazir and Nawaz Sharif governments, the historical decision was 
made by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 1999 to fully change the system of the 
government and economy according to Islamic Sharia Laws by July-2000. This 
deadline was extended till July-2001 by the request of another military ruled 
government lead by General Pervaiz Musharaf. Due to the political situation in the 
region after the terrorist attacks on USA on September 11th, 2001, the process of 
Islamisation of economy had to be postponed till further representation of Shari `at bill 
by the Federal Shari `at Court to the Supreme Court of Pakistan but not abandoned. 
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Appendix-1.2 
Introduction to Principles of Islamic Economics 
Islam being a complete code of life, it should be implemented in every aspect of our life 
and Economic System. Islamic Economics with quite simple and straightforward basic 
principles based on solid principles brought forth by the Koran and the Sunna, it 
represents an independent and alternative economic system to the world today. Though 
Islamic banking is a quite new phenomenon with an historical background of only 20- 
30 years but the main paradigm of Islamic economy history goes back over to 1400 
years. Due its is very old historical background, the Islamic Economics is considered as 
a non-western economic system. Islamic economic block is considered as one of the 
biggest economic blocks in 900 AD, its boundaries were spreaded from Morocco to 
China. 
Islamic Economics is considered as an integral part of social life, which can be defined 
as caring of others with actual meaning of economics in human relationship. Care for 
others as institution of Waqf (charitable endowments) in opposition to individualism or 
self interest, morality, ethical actions, human behaviour in production, consumption and 
in exchange of goods are considered as the heart of Islamic economic culture. 
By laying down certain principles for the economic activity of man, Islam does not bind 
the methods and techniques in practising of the above said rules. The major concern in 
the Islamic law is the similarity of the underlying principles. As it is a universal truth 
that Allah the all Mighty is the only creator of human being, so it is the basic right of 
the human being in sharing the wealth of the world. I slam does not allow the monopoly 
in the economic system but asks for equal opportunities to every kind of human being of 
either race, class or group. 
Every human being has equal rights to benefit from the benefits according to his needs 
from the fruits, jungles, and minerals. A monopolistic possession of the creation of 
Allah is not right, and keeps the things in idle and useless. This is the basic principle in 
Islam in which the basic right of ownership is originated in the world. Islam does not 
allow the principles of economic system, which do not abide by the Shari `a principles 
of property rights. In an Islamic economic system it is duty of the state government to 
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protect the legal rights of individuals' along with compelling them to fulfil the 
obligations set by Shari `a for better social system. 
Islamic Shari `a laws have asked the wealthy Muslims to give Zakat from their wealth 
every year to help the needy individuals to create an atmosphere of equality and social 
justice in the society. In moral teachings of Islam, the paying of Zakat creates the 
feeling of mutual love and affection between the rich and the poor. Islam has 
commended Zakat at the rate of two and a half percent per annum on the total 
accumulated wealth [of each individual] in the country, as well as on invested capital; 
five percent or ten percent, depending on the method of watering, should be collected 
on agricultural produce; and twenty percent on certain mineral products. A specific rate 
on cattle exceeding the allowed number is levied to Zakat. 
According to Syed Maududi (1948) "this system provided a means of social insurance 
where by everyone in an Islamic society is provided with at least the necessities of life. 
No worker can ever be forced, through fear of starvation, to accept conditions of 
employment, which may be unfairly imposed on him by employer. " 
The five major Islamic economic and financial instruments as elaborated by Choudhry 
(1997) are, (1) abolition of interest, (2) profit-sharing under economic co-operation 
between labour and capital, (3) joint ventures, principally though not wholly through 
equity participation; (4) the institution of charity; (5) avoidance of wasteful use of 
resources. 
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Appendix-1.3 
Introduction to Political Economy of Islam 
The basic principles of Islamic Economics are the just distribution of resources 
according to the devine rules and laws given by Qur'an and Sunnah. The concept of 
social justice in the political economy of Islam is the precinct of the political economy 
of any economic system either conventional or Islamic economic system. Qur'an and 
Sunnah along with the necessity of social justice, also emphasises the central 
importance of protection of property rights (Haq-al-Mal) and market value highly 
valued by ethics and morality under the political economy of Islam. The concept of a 
highly powerful social regulatory body called Al-Hasiba to work under the strict Shari'a 
law is emphasised also to protect the general public from any unjust decisions. The 
reason for such powerful law enforcement body is for the protection of the weak, needy, 
old or young and the unprivileged. 
By this introduction, one can easily define the basic principles of Islamic political 
economy in the light of Unity precept of God (i. e. Oness of God as elaborated by 
Qur'an and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (mpbuh)), the social justice, the property rights 
(of which work and property are parts). To serve the humanity according to the basic 
and fundamental principles set in the political economy of Islam, the moral and 
economic concept as given by the Sharia laws for the prohibition of interest in any type 
and form or quantity is unanimously agreed upon by all of the Islamic economists. The 
implementation and practice of profit-loss sharing laws at all levels of political 
economy of Islam can be through the basic instruments of investment e. g. Musharka 
and Mudaraba. As the prayers has been made obligatory for all adult Muslim men or 
women, the paying of Zakat has also been made obligatory and considered as the 
second pillar of Islamic jurisprudence. In Qur'an Allah has asked all the wealthy 
Muslims to pay Zakat from their wealth as a religious tax to purify their wealth to help 
the needy and poor being pushed to live under or on the poverty line. The distribution of 
Zakat under the political economy of Islam is managed by an institution called Bait-al- 
Mal (the public treasury) and the other taxes are reduced if this institution is managed 
well under political economy of Islam. 
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As in the political economy the enhanced spending is considered as the major economic 
activity of a state, the elimination of interest and its replacement by Musharka and 
Mudaraba modes of investment alongwith the induction of Zakat will attribute a great 
deal of solidarity and goodwill for human being. 
In the political economy of Islam, Qur'an has emphatically prohibited wasteful 
consumption and production (Israf) establishing the minimal number of instruments 
needed for the Islamic political economy and also other instruments like mark-up in 
foreign trade financing (Murabaha), rental (Ijara), leasing (Ba'y Muajjal), interest-free 
loans (Qard- e-Hassanah), endowments (Wagf), a range of Shari'ah prescribed 
secondary market instruments, etc., can be added to the minimal list of instruments of 
the political economy of Islam. 
These instruments are linked to each other along with the principles of political 
economy of Islam to provide justice and welfare to humanity for the achievement of 
social objective. 
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